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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines three aspects of the law of 
succession which, it is contended, are ripe for reform. 
Modern testamentary practice is governed by s.9 of 
the Wills Act 1837. That section stipulates the 
formalities which must be complied with in order to 
execute a valid will. These apparently simple requirements 
have produced complex case law due, in large part, to the 
courts' rigorous insistence on any defect in the 
formalities automatically voiding a will. An examination 
of the case law coupled with a study of the underlying 
rationale for the existence of the formalities is 
undertaken. Using that background it is suggested that a 
relaxation of the formalities in cases where the 
rationale for their existence still obtains will better 
serve the interests of "a nicer justice" than the present 
position does. A comparison of six jurisdictions which 
have instigated innovations in this area of law concludes 
the first chapter. 
The second aspect of the law of succession which is 
discussed concerns mistakes: how mistakes can occur and 
how they may be remedied. A categorisation of the common 
law is attempted: a task beset by difficulties because of 
sporadic judicial eagerness to overcome legislative inaction. 
The result comprises many fine distinctions in the interests 
of trying to "do justice" allied with dissatisfaction on the 
part of the judiciary on the complicated nature of the law 
and their limited powers under it. 
A case for the extension of those powers is made in 
third chapter where, after examining the jurisdiction of 
the courts, it is argued first, that rectification ought to 
be available as a remedy in the law of wills, and, secondly, 
that the rules regarding the admission of extrinsic 
evidence ought to be relaxed. 
CHAPTER I 
FORMALITIES FOR THE EXECUTION OF WILLS 
1. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
The will as it is known today is generally agreed 
by commentators to be an institution borrowed from Roman 
1 Law. The three major forms of Roman will in use at the 
time of Justinian couple a high degree of development with 
a distinct connection with modern testate practice. 2 
Those similarities, however, belie the true complications 
involved in tracing, albeit briefly, the history of the 
law of succession, for, despite the sophistications of 
Roman Law, in the view of Pollock and Maitland3 no 
"instrument bearing a truly testamentary 
character had obtained a well-recognised 
place in the Anglo-Saxon folk-law." 
1. Parry, The Law of Succession (6th edn) p.3. 
2. The three major forms of will being: first, the 
testamentum tripertitum (normal will) so called 
because it incorporated elements of civil law, 
praetorian law, and the will of the Emperor. This will 
required the testator's signature:to be sealed by 7 
witnesses. Secondly, the nuncupative will, .an oral will 
made in front of 7 witnesses. Thirdly, the 
testamentum apud acta conditum/principi oblatum which 
involved having a will recorded in the local archives 
or sent to the Emperor for safekeeping. See generally 
Schulz Classical Roman Law and Jolowicz Historical 
Introduction to the Study of Roman Law. 
3. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law 
(2nd edn), Vol.II, pp.347 et seq. 
2 . 
This situation still obtained after the Norman 
Conquest,although, in time, the law began to develop. 
When it did so the law pertaining to real and personal 
property respectively evolved in different fashions. 
Feudalism compelled the monarch's interest in 
disputes regarding the succession to freehold land on a 
tenant's death. Such disputes were, therefore, kept within 
the jurisdiction of the King's courts of Common Law. In 
contrast, the ecclesiastical courts supervised the 
succession to chattels after death. 
The principle of primogeniture governed the 
succession on death to freehold land in feudal times. The 
nature of the feudal system instilled in feudal lords a 
deep opposition to freedom of testation for several 
reasons, chief amongst them being the benefit which might 
fall to them in the possibility of an escheat for failure 
of heirs. Other reasons included: a reluctance to allow 
freeholders to defeat the system of inheritance on 
intestacy; an unwillingness to deprive overlords of 
their feudal dues or to disappoint heirs of their 
. 4 
expectanc1es. The culmination of this resistance 
resulted, from the end of the thirteenth century, in the 
rule being established in the Royal Courts of Common Law 
that a freeholder could not defeat the interest of the 
4. Parry, op. cit. p.4. 
eldest son (the common law heir) by making a will 
disposing of the freehold to any other person. 5 
Whilst in some areas circumvention of this rule 
was possible by resort to exceptional privilege, 6 the 
usual evasion of the rule was executed by the employment 
of the "use 11 • This was possible due to the peculiar 
dichotomy of the Courts of Common Law and the Court of 
Chancery. The Courts of Common Law vested the legal 
interest in the grantees at law. This was followed by 
the realisation of the grantor's initial intention as 
expressed in his will by the Court of Chancery after his 
death. 
Such a neat device which operated to overcome the 
rigid lack of testamentary freedom and defeat the Nobles' 
efforts to control the succession to real property 
resulted in the abolition of uses, at least temporarily, 7 
by the Statute of Uses 1535. Thus the position was 
regained: real estate could not be disposed of either 
directly or indirectly by will. 
5. Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol.III p.75 
and see Pollock and Maitland op. cit. p.328. 
6. For example in Kent where wills were recognised as 
part of the custom of gavelkind, or in the City of 
London where the privilege was granted by charter. 
See Holdsworth op. cit. and generally Simpson An 
Introduction to the History of Land Law, Chap.~ 
7. R.E. Megarry [1941] Camb.L.J. pp.354-360. 
3. 
4 . 
The intensity of opposition to that statute was 
such, however, that the Statute of Wills was passed in 
1540. That statute provided that socage tenants had full 
power to devise their lands by written will whilst tenants 
in knightservice had power to devise two-thirds of their 
land. 8 Before examining that statute, it is necessary to 
trace the development of the law in respect of personalty 
over the same period. 
As stated, the devolution of personal property 
throughout the Middle Ages was the preserve of the 
ecclesiastical courts. These courts allowed chattels to 
be disposed of by will although no formal legislation 
governing the structure and interpretation of wills 
existed. What can be established, however, is that this 
testamentary facility was not unfettered: during the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries at least the law 
recognised a division of a deceased's estates into three 
parts: the widow's part, the bairns' part and the deid's 
part. One third went to the widow, one third was divided 
amongst the children and the other third could be disposed 
of by will, usually for pious or charitable purposes. The 
popularity of wills disposing of personalty increased until 
they became the rule rather than the exception, not least 
because intestacy was regarded as disgraceful, since it 
8. It is to be noted that the legal right of devising 
estates in fee simple by will was not completed until 
1660 when tenure by knightservice was converted into 
socage tenure by The Statute of Military Tenures of 
that year. 
5 • 
implied that the deceased was unshriven: that is, without 
final confession. 9 
The custom of dividing a deceased's estate in this 
tripartite manner disappeared in England during the four-
teenth century but, as Holdsworth indicates, 10 it 
remained in York, Wales and London for another 300 years. 
Apart from these areas where the custom lingered, 
from the fourteenth century onwards it was possible for an 
owner of chattels to dispose of all of them by will. Such 
a will could be wholly or partly ora1. 11 For proof of an 
oral will the testimony of at least two witnesses was 
required. 
Thus, before 1540 the succession to real estate and 
to personalty were governed by very different rules. 
Realty could not be disposed of by will, decreed the Royal 
courts of Common Law. In contrast all personalty could not 
only be disposed of by will (in most parts of England) but 
such a will did not even need to adhere to any very 
rigorous formalities. The time was ripe for reform. 
Reform came in the shape of the Statute of Wills 
1540,. significant since it introduced mandatory require-
ments into the law for the first time. That Act required 
9. Holdsworth op.cit. p.555. 
10. Ibid .. 
11. Ibid. p.537. 
6 . 
that a will of real property be in writing. The testator 
was not under any obligation to write the will, or even to 
. . t 12 d t t. . t s1gn 1 , an no a tes 1ng Wl nesses were necessary. 
Such lax practices were ended in 1677 with the 
passing of the Statute of Frauds. That Act introduced 
further formal requirements before a valid will of realty 
could be effected: 13 
" ... all devises ... , shall be in writing, 
and signed by the party so devising the same 
or by some other person in his presence and 
by his express directions, and shall be 
attested and subscribed in the presence of 
the said devisor by three or four credible 
witnesses, or else they shall be utterly 
void and of none effect." 
As regards personalty, the Statute of Frauds altered 
the existing law by requiring writing except in two specific 
14 
cases. The first of these allowed a testator in his 
last sickness to make an oral will in the presence of 
three witnesses with the added requirement that such a will 
be reduced to writing speedily (within 6 days) otherwise it 
had to be proved within 6 months of the speaking of the 
testamentary words. 
The second exception allowed oral wills of person-
alty as long as the value of the chattels disposed of did 
not exceed £30. 
12. See, for example, Stephens v Gerrard 84 E.R. 81: a 
will written on paper which the testator said he 
would sign later was admitted to probate despite the 
fact that he never did sign it. 
13. The Statute of Frauds 1677 s.5. 
14. The Statute of Frauds 1677 s.l9. 
7 • 
It is of note that in the case of personal property 
where writing was required it was not necessary that the 
testator should sign or that there be any attesting 
witnesses. 
Although the Statute of Frauds remedied, to some 
extent, the manifest lack of procedural requirements 
necessary to execute a valid will, it did not, however, 
rid the law of succession of all its problems. 
A factor which played a leading role in the com-
plication of the law in this area was the continued 
separate jurisdictions of the Common Law courts and the 
ecclesiastical courts. The Common Law courts dealt with 
questions of the validity of devises of realty whereas the 
ecclesiastical courts retained their power to make grants 
of probate in respect of personal property. Since 
testators often left a single will dealing with all of 
their propertyf if that property consisted of both realty 
and personalty it could be a costly, litigious exercise to 
establish questions of validity in two different courts. 
Further confusions existed: as De Villiers notes15 
there were nominally six separate types of wills, whose 
classification depended on the nature of the asset disposed 
of, and which each had their own peculiar set of sub-rules. 
The resultant mass of litigation was inevitable. The 
development of detailed and difficult rules of construction 
exacerbated the situation. Resolution of such problems was 
15. De Villiers, J., Real and Personal Property in 
England, Cambridge University Press 106 @ pp.4-5. 
8. 
called for. 
It was not, however, until 1833 that any wholesale 
resolution was attempted. In that year the Real Property 
Commissioners in England examined the question of the 
execution of wills and in their Fourth Report made sweeping 
16 proposals for reform. 
The basis of their proposals lay in the view that a 
uniform method of testamentary execution was desirable. 
The Commissioners proposed that all wills should be required 
to be executed in one simple form which could be easily and 
generally understood. To this end, they concluded that the 
Statute of Frauds formalities should be retained for 
all wills. 17 Thus a uniform set of formalities was 
achieved. It is possible, indeed probable, that most 
testators understand the formalities, as the Commissioners 
desired, although their attempts to comply accurately with 
them would tend to prove otherwise. 
18 
author recently commented: 
One Australian 
"Faced with the difficult task of writing 
out the provisions of their will, signing 
their name just below the final word of 
these provisions in the presence of two 
persons, and then remaining in the room 
while these same two persons add their own 
16. In all, 58 "Propositions" were recommended. 
17. Exceptions obtained in respect of soldiers, sailors 
and mariners as, indeed, in most jurisdictions, they 
do today. 
18. Palk, Simon N.L. Informal Wills: From Soldiers to 
Citizens (1975) Adel.Law Rev. 382. 
signatures, would-be testators have contrived 
a myriad of variations. Testators have 
restlessly wandered their houses while witnesses 
have signed. Witnesses have come and gone like 
the ebb and flow of the tide. Attestation 
clauses have travelled north, south, east and 
west across the page. Weird and mysterious 
scratchings have appeared in the place of 
signatures. Codes have been employed, no 
doubt for fear the will may fall into enemy 
hands. Egg-shells have proved almost more 
popular than paper." 
Notwithstanding such problems, the Wills Act 1837 
9. 
h . d . th 1 . d . f . . 19 . t as surv1ve Wl on y m1nor mo 1 1cat1ons 1n mos common 
law jurisdictions to the present day. 
2. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS 
As already indicated20 the Statute of Frauds was the 
precursor of the modern Wills Act formalities. Four 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds formed the basis of 
h d . . f l'd't 21 t e extant con 1t1ons or testamentary va 1 1 y: 
(1) The reduction of the dispositive provisions 
to writing. 
(2) The affixing of a signature by or on behalf 
of the testator, in the presence of the 
witnesses. 
19. For example, the Wills Act Amendment Act 1852 (U.K.) 
provided a certain latitude as regards the position 
of the testator's signature. 
20. Supra p.8. 
21. The Statute of Frauds 1677 s.S; and see p.6 supra. 
(3) The attestation by the witnesses 
in the testator's presence. 
(4) The subscription by the witnesses 
in the testator's presence. 
The Wills Act provision incorporating these 
10 
requirements, and others, which must be at the foundation 
of any discussion of formalities is section 9 Wills Act 
1837. 
Section 9 provides that: 
"No will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing 
and executed in manner herein-before mentioned; 
(that is to say,) it shall be signed at the foot or 
end thereof by the testator, or by some other person 
in his presence and by his direction; and such 
signature shall be made or acknowledged by the 
testator in the presence of two or more witnesses 
present at the same time, and such witnesses shall 
attest and shall subscribe the will in the presence 
of the testator, but no form of attestation shall 
be necessary." 
Before embarking upon an individual analysis of the 
formalities embodied in section 9, it is intended to 
examine the rationale behindthe existence of such formal-
ities. That done, a better appraisal can be made of the 
existing formal conditions of validity coupled with, it is 
hoped, better informed possibilities for improvement in 
the law. 
(i) The Rationale of the Wills Act Formalities 
Whilst formalities for the execution of wills may 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, systems with the 
Wills Act 1837 as the basis of their succession laws share 
common ground as regards the rationale for the introduction 
of that Act and its subsequent retention. 
The rationale justifying formalities was put 
forward by De Villiers in 1901 as follows: 22 
II It is obvious that wills are always more than other 
legal documents open to the dangers of fraud, 
perjury and forgery, duress and undue 
influence, and to doubts as to the mental 
capacity of the testator, for the reason that 
the testator is necessarily unable personally 
to guard against these dangers at the time 
when the will takes effect. On this account 
most or all systems of law have required some 
formality or other to be observed in the 
execution of wills." 
More recently an Australian author framed the 
rationale for formalities as existing to provide 23 
"sufficient protection against witnesses who 
would misrepresent the wishes of those who 
are dead and unable to give direct evidence 
of their testamentary wishes and acts." 
11 
Professor Langbein of the University of Chicago has 
classified the purposes of the Wills Act formalities as 
24 four-fold. These he itemises as the "evidentiary", 
"channelling", "cautionary" and "protective" functions of 
the formalities. 
The evidentiary function is served by the require-
ment that wills be in writing. The paramount purpose of the 
Wills Act is to provide the court with sufficient reliable 
evidence of testamentary intent and of the terms of the 
22. De Villiers, J. op. cit. @ p.l05. 
23. William F. Ormiston, Q.C. "Formalities and Wills: 
A Plea for Caution" (1980) 54 A.L.J. 451. 
24. See (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev 489 @ pp.491-498" 
12 
testator's wishes. Legal conditions stipulating the 
position of the testator's signature, its attestation and 
subsequent subscription by witnesses are all substantial 
indications in favour of the document's authenticity. 
Holographic wills and, to a greater extent, nuncupative 
wills share deficiencies in this regard. 
The channelling function involves a recognition of 
the undoubted fact that use of uniform criteria to 
execute wills makes for a more efficient administration 
system as well as reduced litigation and uncertainty. As 
' 't 40 t 't 25 an Amerlcan wrl er some ,'years ago pu l : 
"One who wishes to communicate his thoughts 
to others must force the raw material of 
meaning into defined and recognizable 
channels ... " 
Such channelling enables the document to move through the 
judicial system with a minimum of friction. Again, 
holograph and nuncupative wills serve the channelling 
function less well as their less stringent formalities 
make it more difficult to discern whether the communicat-
ion in question was intended to be of a testamentary 
nature. 
The cautionary function of the formalities is to be 
found in the procedure and ceremony surrounding the formal 
execution of a will. The seriousness of his undertaking 
is thereby thought to be emphasised to the testator. As 
Professor Langbein states: 26 
25. Fuller, Consideration and Form (1941) 41 Colum.L.Rev. 
799, @ p.BOl-803. 
26. J.H. Langbein op. cit. p.495. 
"Writing is somewhat less casual than plain 
chatter. As we say in a common figure of 
speech, "talk is cheap"." 
13 
Further, since a will is ambulatory and therefore does not 
deprive the disponor of any enjoyment of the property 
during his life, without some formal rigidity a testator 
might be tempted to make rash or, at least, ill considered 
dispositions: after all, they will not affect his own 
material well-being. The requirements of the Wills Act 
1837 go some way towards curbing this possibility. 
Although holographic wills might be executed after 
careful, deliberate thought they might just as easily be 
the result of a casual, off-hand testator. The cautionary 
function of the formalities may then be missing. Nuncup-
ative wills can be criticised on the same basis but their 
limited use, usually in dangerous situations, is likely to 
have the same sobering and steadying effect on the mind as 
complying with formalities is intended to have. 
The protective function of the Wills Act formalities 
can be easily appreciated. The location of the testator's 
signature is an attempt to make unauthorized additions to 
the will more difficult. The requirement of independent 
witnesses seeks to ensure that no fraud or undue influence 
is practised and that unbiased evidence of ttle testator's 
mental capacity can be adduced. Holograph wills make no 
pretence of serving this function. Nuncupative wills, on 
the other hand, requiring attestation clearly do so albeit 
in a limited fashion. 
Whether the foregoing reasons for the existence of 
14 
the Wills Act formalities can be achieved in any other way 
in addition to or instead of meeting the legislative 
standards themselves is an interesting and controversial 
question. 
In 1971 the English organization "Justice" expressed 
the view that27 
" ... the relative lack of formality required for 
the making of an English will is in fact a 
serious disadvantage because it conceals from 
the ordinary testator the difficulties inherent 
in disposing of his estate." 
The Organization contrast buying a house ("the only 
property transaction of comparable importance") 28 with 
executing a will and conclude that the multitudinous 
formalities and virtually inevitable solicitor involvement 
in the former are often missing in the latter. They 
conclude that the resulting problems stemming from home-
made wills could be circumvented by the adoption of a 
notarial system for the attestation of wills whereby an 
authorized person, such as a Commissioner for Oaths, 
would be an official witness before whom a will could be 
29 formally executed: 
27. 'Home-Made Wills, A Report by Justice p.4. 
28. Ibid. p.S. 
29. Ibid. pp 4-5. 
"The principal advantage of the notarial system, 
in our view, is that the need to have a will 
formally executed in the presence of a Commiss-
ioner for Oaths or probate official would in-
directly lead more testators to take proper 
legal advice before executing their wills. In 
addition, the problems of formal invalidity 
would be completely eliminated, and while a 
notary could not be expected to make any serious 
investigation of the state of mind or circum-
stances of the testator we think his presence 
would still form a more effective barrier 
against the more blatant forms of undue in-
fluence than the present system provides." 
h t . 30 T ey con lnue: 
"These arguments of course, only apply if notar-
ial execution is made compulsory. On the other 
hand, the full benefits to be expected from a 
notarial system will not be achieved if it is 
introduced only as an alternative to the present 
system." 
To date, no such compulsory notarial system has 
been introduced in England. 
Whilst the proposals of the Organization may go 
15 
some way towards ridding the justice system of wills which 
do not comply with the strict formalities of section 9, it 
is submitted that such a move would only be of extremely 
limited use. It accepts the formalities of section 9 in 
most respects31 and is merely an attempt at streamlining 
the system so that wills are not invalidated on those 
formal grounds alone. By taking such a stance the 
3 0. Ibid. p. 6. 
31. Despite expressing limited misgivings@ p.7. 
16 
Organization has ignored, or side stepped, the wider issue 
32 
already alluded to, namely: Are the particular 
formalities of section 9 the only or the best methods of 
achieving the reputed reasons for their existence? 
The question whether the formalities of section 9 
themselves could, or should, be pared down to a minimum 
thre5hold level is discussed at the end of this chapter. 
What does merit attention here, however, is whether other 
types of will might be recognised b~ our legal system. 
Such wills, it is submitted, would have to satisfy the 
generally accepted rationale behind the formalities of the 
Wills Act. But, that, it is suggested, need not necess-
arily prove to be too arduous an obstacle to overcome. 
Holograph wills do not of necessity fail to embody 
any of Langbien's four reasons for the existence of form-
alities, save the protective aspect. That alone, it is 
submitted, need not operate to preclude their general entry 
33 into our legal system. Support for this view can be 
found in the persuasive critique of the protective policy 
b 11 . d '1 34 h . . . 1 y Gu 1ver an Tl son. T e1r pr1nc1pa arguments are: 
(1) That the attestation formalities are 
inadequate to protect the testator 
from determined rogues, and 
32. Supra p.l4. 
33. Such wills can be validly executed as privileged 
wills. See Wills Amendment Act 1955 ss.4-6 (N.Z.) 
34. Classification of Gratuitous Transfers (1941) 5l 
Yale L.J.l @ pp.9-13. 
(2) That protective formalities do more harm 
than good, voiding home-made wills for 
harmless violations. 
It is with their second argument that the authbrs of that 
article find themselves in direct confrontation with the 
17 
authors of the Justice document concerning home-made wills. 
Whilst the former aim for a greater degree of latitude in 
respect of home-made wills, the latter aim to remove such a 
recognisable category of wills from the law of succession 
altogether. 
Holograph wills, handwritten and signed by the 
testator, are valid dispositive testamentary documents in 
some jurisdictions. For example, in Scotland, Manitoba and 
America they are permitted. 35 The evidentiary, channell-
ing and cautionary functions can be as easily satisfied in 
a holographic document as in one strictly complying with 
the Wills Act formalities. The evidentiary function is 
served by the handwriting; the cautionary through writing 
and signature and the channelling from the cumulative 
evidence both in and surrounding the document. It is read-
ily admitted that the channelling function is the least 
easily satisfied. But simply because a testator is not 
constrained by the rigours of the Wills Act formalities 
does not mean that he will necessarily take a casual, 
careless view of his attempted testamentary dispositions. 
35. Law Reform Committee, England, The Making and Revocat-
ion of Wills (Consultative Document) 1977 p.4: s.7 
The Wills Act (Manitoba) 1871, and Unifo;rm Proba,te Code 2-503 
whichrequires that "the signature and the material provis-
ions [be] in the handwriting of the testator". 
18 
Such a view is hyperbolic and lacking in evidence. Not 
every will executed in terms of section 9 is done in a 
cool, serious, hard-headed fashion - although the formal-
ities,as indicated, go some way to ensuring that that is 
the case. By the same token, not every holograph will is 
executed in an offhand, unthinking manner. There is, it 
is submitted, a mean between these two extremes. And it 
is the contention of this writer that such a mean should 
find recognition in the law. 
Whilst not necessarily advocating a general freedom 
to execute legal holograph wills to be of the same effect 
as wills complying with the requirements of section 9, it 
is possible that some concession in this sphere would be 
advantageous rather than detrimental to the law. 
The arguments already reviewed36 as the rationale 
of the formalities are, it is submitted, persuasive in 
'1' . f h . f t 1 f l't' 37 m1 1tat1ng or t e retent1on o a east some orma 1 1es 
to be complied with in the normal course. Formalities do 
serve to sharpen the mind and awareness, provide strong 
evidence and go some way to excluding the unwelcome 
attentions of fraud and undue influence. 
As indicated, however, a place can be found for 
holograph wills. Under our present system a will written 
and signed on a paper bag by a lone adventurer in the New 
36. Supra pp. 10-13. 
37. See infra pp.69-73. 
19 
Zealand high country before his death would have to be 
pronounced invalid. Likewise a piece of paper containing 
the last wishes and signature of a marooned seaman on an 
isolated South Seas Island. But such documents are 
plainly evidentiary; a more cautionary situation requir-
ing the channelling of one's thoughts on matters of 
importance could hardly be imagined than when the threat 
of death looms large and real, and such situations clearly 
do not require the protective arm of the law: forgeries, 
undue influence and fraud are not serious propositions. 
Ought the law, then, in such cases where compliance 
with the formalities is an impossibility, to recognise 
holograph wills as "the next best thing"? 
It is submitted that there are strong arguments in 
favour of such a course. And indeed not just in cases 
where meeting the formal requirements is an "impossibility". 
Whenever a document, appearing to be of a testament-
ary nature and written and signed in the hand of the 
would-be testator, is discovered it is submitted that a 
court ought to have the power to issue a grant of probate 
in respect of that same document. Such a novel step for 
the law would be accompanied by conditions tending to prove 
the authenticity of the document and its equation with the 
testator's intention. Such conditions could be satisfied 
by placing the burden of proving the authenticity on the 
propounder of the document and, in addition, requiring the 
court to be satisfied as to all the surrounding circum-
stances of the execution of the document. For example, 
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why it was made without formalities, the presence of other 
persons at its execution, the lack of legal advice and any 
misapprehensions the testator was under (for example, that 
the law of another jurisdiction entitled him to make a 
valid holograph will). For consistency, it is submitted 
that the civil standard of proof on a balance of probab-
ilities be retained in such cases. 
Should the law opt to encompass such documents the 
rationale lying behind the Wills Act will be more compre-
hensively realised: instead of automatically rejecting as 
invalid documents which fail to comply with the formalities 
effect will still be given to documents which, even without 
the formalities, evince clear evidence of their own 
authenticity and the testator's intention. The acceptance 
of holograph wills is one way this could be accomplished. 
Arguments against this view tend to take the line 
that a relaxation of the formalities in any form is merely 
the "thin end of the wedge'': the floodgates will soon 
admit any tenuously testamentary document as a valid will. 
A two-fold rebuttal may suffice: first, the courts will 
only be able to admit any such document after clear proof 
that it was intended to be of a testatmentary nature; that 
it was written by the testator and reflects his intention 
(so far as that can be ascertained) and that it was not 
made under any form of pressure or duress. Thus the 
likelihood of any but the most worthy documents being 
ascribed testamentary status is remote. Secondly, the 
rigid implementation of the formalities can wreak injustice 
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in the sense that the rationale of the formalities in such 
circumstances augursfor the acceptance of such documents on 
a valid dispositive footing. To deny the rationale of 
the requirements for want of a minor formality ought not to 
be tolerated. To reiterate, the acceptance of holograph 
wills providesa means by which this could be done. 
It is, by no means, however, the only method by 
which the underlying rationale of the Wills Act formalities 
could be better given effect to. Other possibilities which 
have been canvassed over the last decade include: the 
doctrine of substantial compliance, 38 a general discretion 
39 in the hands of the court, a relaxation of the formalit-
ies themselves and a relaxation of the rules of evidence to 
facilitate the admission of all i terns of relevance .40 The 
illuminating possibilities shed by these suggestions will 
be discussed in the section following that dealing with the 
formalities of section 9. 
The other main type of will which might claim a 
stronger foothold in our system is the nuncupative will. 
Whilst recognised as a form of privileged wi11 41 it has 
failed to be recognised as a major dispositive alternative 
38. See esp Langbein op. cit.; Manitoba Law Reform Comm-
ission 'The Wills Act" And the Doctrine of Substantial 
Compliance. 
39. 28th Report of the Law Reform Committee of South 
Australia (1974) and its result in s.l2 Wills Act 
1936-197:5. 
40. Law Reform Committee (England) 19th Report 
(Interpretation of Wills) Cmnd. 5301. 
41. See e.g. The Wills Amendment Act 1955 s.6 (N.Z.). 
22 
despite the fact that given certain circumstances such a 
wi~l may satisfy most of Langbein's four functions for the 
existence of the formalities. Such functions as it fails 
to meet need not detract from its authenticity. For 
example, suppose a fisherman swept overboard called out his 
last desperate wishes to the rest of the ship's company 
before being lost in heavy seas. Such an attempted oral 
disposition, whilst not meeting the evidentiary function of 
writing, would certainly be the result of a mind cautioned 
and channelled by the peril of the disponor to an extent 
which claims the audience of a court and renders discussion 
of the protective function of the law in such circumstances 
to be of minimal importance, if not, indeed, irrelevance. 
The possibility of according nuncupative wills full 
legal effect was suggested in America in 1946. By s.49(b) 
of the draft provision of the Model Probate Code of that 
year the following circumstances for their inclusion were 
outlined: 42 
"(1) A nuncupative will may be made only by a 
person in imminent peril of death, whether 
from illness or otherwise, shall be valid 
only if the testator died as a result of 
the impending peril, and must be 
(a) Declared to be his will by the test-
ator before two disinterested witnesses; 
(b) Reduced to writing by or under the 
direction of one of the witnesses within 
thirty days after such declaration; and 
(c) Submitted for probate within six months 
after the death of the testator. 
42. See Working Paper No.28 The Making-Revocation of 
Wills, Law Reform Commission of British 
Columbia p.lBO. 
( 2) The nuncupative will rna% dispose of 
personal property onlff~o an aggregate 
value not exceeding one thousand ~1,oom 
dollars, except that in the case of 
persons in active military, air or naval 
service in time of war the aggregate 
amount may be ten thousand ~10,000) 
dollars." 
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Such a suggestion, whilst go~ng some way to recog-
nise the deficiencies in the law wrought by a rigid 
adherence to formalities, is, it is submitted, still 
inadequate. 
A nuncupative will, to be admitted to probate, 
requires to be clearly shown to be a true record of the 
deceased's wishes (the evidentiary function). It must also 
be proved to have been made as a will with due regard to its 
import (the channelling and cautionary functions). Finally, 
it must be made free from any external pressures (the 
protective function). 
The evidentiary requirements could be established by 
an insistence on disinterested witnesses, a subsequent 
reduction to writing under their auspices, and a limited 
time for submission to probate. Thus far the former 
American proposal is satisfactory. 
The channelling and cautionary functions can, it is 
contended, be satisfied by closely defining the circum-
stances in which such wills may be effected. The Americans 
suggested their admission to probate if made by a person 
"in imminent peril of death" and "only if the testator died 
as a result of the impending peril". In such a situation 
it would be hard to envisage a testator who was not aware 
of the gravity of his predicament. (The rationale behind 
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the erstwhile admission of dying declarations into the law 
of evidence in New Zealand would be applicable here.) The 
difficulties encountered would lie in setting the parameters 
of meaning of the phrases "in imminent peril of death" (or 
"close to death" or "about to die"). Expressions such as 
these indicate the types of situation which could be 
legally identified by the law. Problems in discovering a 
suitable formula to cover oral deathbed wills coupled with 
the perennial legal difficulty of interpretation should 
not, it is suggested, result in the sacrifice of such wills 
in the name of legal simplicity and formalism. 
Satisfaction of the protective functions of the 
formalities would require evidence tending to negate any 
possibility of duress, coercion, undue influence. Given 
that the formalities required by the Wills Act are not an 
effective bar to a determined rogue, it is suggested that 
as long as such evidence satisfies a court on the balance 
of probabilities then that, coupled with the evidence of 
witnesses to the audible remarks of the testator, should 
operate to ensure the recognition of such wills. 
It is notable that, in the opinion of the Law 
Reform Commission of British Columbia, oral wills would be 
of small value in attempting to provide the same safeguards 
h '11 f l't' 43 as t e W1 s Act orma 1 1es: 
"Any form of oral will which came close to 
providing the same safeguards would be so 
technical as to be practically useless." 
l3. Ibid. @ p.22. 
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With respect, it is submitted that it has been 
demonstrated that this need not be so. A determination to 
give effect to a testator's wishes coupled with precise 
drafting watched over by a careful judicial eye could ensure 
that the number of intestacies decrease. In any event, 
even if the relevant legislation was excessively technical 
to ~h~ point of being ''practically useless" if just one more 
testator's property devolved according to his desires then, 
it is submitted, the true rationale of the Wills Act would 
have been achieved, at least in respect of that testator. 
A willingness to shape the law around not only the general 
but also the particular ought not to be abandonned because 
the suggested improvement is difficult, technical or little-
used. On this basis the addition of a well-regulated 
category of nuncupative wills into the law of New Zealand 
would fill a void which has long been evident. 
On the subject of whether nuncupative wills should 
be limited to certain types or amounts of property, as in 
the former American draft, 44 it is contended that the 
reasons for doing so are outweighed by those militating 
against the practice. 
If the rationale behind the Wills Act formalities can 
be achieved by the establishment of a set of closely monit-
ored conditions allowing nuncupative wills in "imminent 
death" situations, then there seems a compelling argument 
44. Supra p.22. 
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in favour of permitting such wills to be able to perform 
exactly the same functions as wills executed in accordance 
with the formalities of s.9 Wills Act 1837. The same 
rationale has been satisfied: should not the same legal 
effect be accorded to each? 
The view supporting a difference in effect between 
the types and amounts of dispositions which could be dealt 
with by these two sorts of will, stems, it is thought, from 
an innate reluctance in some quarters to allow what is seen 
as a snag to develop in the law and cause a tear in the 
sheer fabric sewn by the formalities of section 9. Again, 
as with holograph wills, the "thin edge of the wedge" 
argument is employed to emphasise the manifold possibilities 
of every jocular oral expression of intent being eventually 
construed as a nuncupative will and that therefore the dis-
positive powers of such wills, if they must be, must be 
severely limited. This argument suffers from an excess of 
hysteria. It must be stressed, first, that the only type of 
nuncupative will foreseen is that arising from "imminent 
peril" 45 or "deathbed" situations. Secondly, the point 
must be reiterated that if the rationale for the Wills Act 
formalities is satisfied then any type of will legally re-
cognised thereafter ought to be able to perform all testa-
mentary functions. Any other conclusion involves the 
acceptance of a hybrid dispositive power lacking any 
sensible reason for the distinction. 
45. Supra p.22. 
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Having thus considered holograph and nuncupative 
wills as possible contenders to give better practical effect 
to the rationale of the Wills Act formalities in particular 
and to enhance the law of succession in general, it is now 
time to discuss the formalities themselves to assess whether 
they do in fact enact their purported rationale satisfact-
orily and to attempt to gauge whether any possible reforms 
might usefully be suggested. 
(ii) A Detailed Examination of the Formalities 
It has been ascertained that section 9 of the Wills 
Act 1837 embodies most of the formalities necessary to 
execute a valid will. 46 A close scrutiny of the formalit-
ies will now be undertaken, bearing in mind the current 
dissatisfaction in many jurisidctions with the excess of 
formalism surrounding them. For example, the Manitoba Law 
Reform Commission states: 47 
"In Manitoba, as in other areas, literal compliance 
with the formalities is mandatory. That is, the 
slightest defect as to form invalidates the will. 
This formalistic approach has created a body of 
harsh and often inconsistent case law." 
Ad . 'th f L b ' 48 n , aga1n w1 Pro essor ang e1n: 
"The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and 
relentless formalism. The Wills Act prescribes 
a particular set of formalities for executing 
one's testament. The most minute defect in 
46. The section is set out at p.lO supra. 
47. Op. cit. pp.S-6. 
48. Op. cit. p.489. 
formal compliance is held to void the will, 
no matter how abundant the evidence that the 
defect was inconsequential. Probate courts 
do not speak of harmless error in the execu-
tion of wills. To be sure,there is considerable 
diversity and contradiction in the cases 
interpreting what acts constitute compliance 
with what formalities. But once a formal 
defect is found, Anglo-American courts have 
been unanimous in concluding that the 
attempted will fails." 
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It is accepted that b:Ur courts het\7e no discretionary 
power to admit to probate an authentic will which is invalid 
under section 9. 49 At this juncture the law of succession 
is commonly criticised for parting company with other legal 
subjects which require formalities. Formalities are 
present in various parts of the law, but the courts of 
probate are especially noteworthy for holding that, 
although the testator's genuine intention to make post-
mortem dispositions has been manifested, nevertheless, non-
compliance with s.9 Wills Act 1837 necessitates a decision 
being handed down which precludes that intention from being 
carried into effect. 
Whether it is desirable to rectify this rigidity 
and, if so, by what means involves a study of the formalit-
ies themselves. 
It is proposed to examine the formalities under 
four headings: 
(a) Writing 
(b) Signed by the testator 
(c) Signature of testator and presence 
of witnesses 
(d) Attestation and subscription by 
witnesses. 
49. Parry and Clark The Law of Succession p.l6. 
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(a) Writing. The Wills Act provides that a will 
must be in writing, but it places no restrictions on the 
type of materials which may be used or on the type of 
materials on which the will may be written. 50 No special 
form of words is necessary and it is immaterial what lang-
uage is used: 51 the terse instruction "all for mother" 
has been held to constitute valid will. 52 a 
A will may be made in pencil or in ink or in a 
combination of the two. If a will is partly in pencil and 
partly in ink, it is likely that the pencil writing will be 
treated as deliberative and not fina1. 53 
case of pencil alterations. 54 
Likewise in the 
(b) Signed by the testator. Section 9 requires 
that a will "shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by 
the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by 
his direction". The courts have traditionally given a 
broad interpretation to the words "signed by the testator" 
and no particular form of signature is necessary. A mark 
placed on the will which was· in some way intended as the 
50. e.g. Hodson v Barnes (1926) 43 T.L.R. 71 (writing on 
empty egg shell) . 
51. An extreme example of this is illustrated by the case 
of Kell v Charmer (1856) 23 Beav. 195 where sums 
bequethed were represented in letters using a 
jeweller's private code. 
52. Thorn v Dickens [1906] W.N. 54. 
53. In bonis Hall (187l)L.R. 2 p & D. 256. 
54. In bonis Adams (1872) L.R. 2 P & D 367. 
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testator's signature will suffice. A good illustration is 
provided by In the Estate ofF inn 55 where a smudged thumb-
mark, duly attested, enabled a will to be admitted to 
probate. Langton J. gave a commendably succinct judgment:56 
"Illiterates were much more common a hundred 
years ago than nowadays, but if a mark was the 
only way a testator had of making his signature 
it came within the meaning of the statute. The 
thumb-mark in the present case is no worse than 
a cross and I shall admit the will to probate, 
but the method adopted does not commend itself 
to me at all." 
The latitude of the law exemplified by that case has 
bl d bb t 57 . . . 1 58 d ena e a ru er s amp, 1n1t1a s an . a mark of any 
59 
shape, as long as the testator intended it as his signat-
ure, to satisfy this requirement. The words "your loving 
60 
mother" have also been found acceptable, the judge in that 
case being content that those words were intended to repres-
ent the testatrix's name. An absence of the intention that 
any mark, form of words or name was meant to constitute a 
signature to give effect to the will will result in the 
purported testamentary document being excluded from probate. 
55. [ 19 3 5] All E. R. Rep. 419 . 
56. Ibid. 
57. In bonis Jenkins (1863) 3 Sw & Tr 93; 164 E.R. 1208. 
58. In bonis Savory (1851) .15 Jur. 1042. 
59. In the Estate of Holitam (1913) 108 L.T. 732 ("a sort 
of broken line"). 
60. In the Estate of Cook [1960] 1 W.L.R. 353. 
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61 Therefore, in In the Estate of Bean where a testator had 
accidentally omitted to sign his will but wrote his name 
and address on an envelope containing it, the court refused 
to grant probate of the will and envelope because the 
testator wrote his name on the envelope in order to ident-
ify its contents, not as a signature to the will. Put 
another way, the signature on the envelope was not written 
animo testandi. Therefore, although a specimen signature 
of the testator was available on a document with a close 
connection with the will, because it was not intended to 
authenticate the entire document all the purported dispos-
itions therein were nullified. It is lamentable that the 
courts have not seen fit to adopt an approach to this type 
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of situation more in keeping with their already noted 
willingness to give a broad interpretation to the word 
"signature" in order to validate a will whenever possible. 
In the view of an English author, the_most disturbing 
factor of decisions such as In the Estate of Bean has been 
that on authority, but not on principle, they have been 
correctly decided. 63 He states: 64 
61. [1944] P. 83. 
62. Supra p. 2 9. 
63. G.M. Bates A Case for Intention (1974) 124 N.L.J. 380 
@ p.381. 
64. Ibid. 
"The conflict has been recognised in many cases, 
and, if not categorically stated thus, the 
conviction that the expressed intentions of the 
deceased should prevail if possible, has led at 
least to a greater willingness on the part of 
the judiciary to work out a credible diversion 
around the statutory provisions and ultimately 
to a conclusion in favour of validity." 
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An example of such credible diversionary tactics can 
b f d . th f h . 6 5 h e oun 1n e case o In on~s Mann. T ere, probate 
was granted of an unsigned will contained in a signed 
envelope, Langton J. being satisfied that the deceased had 
written her name on the envelope with the intention that it 
should operate as her signature to the will. 
judge took the view that: 66 
The learned 
"There cannot be any doubt whatever as to the 
intentions of the testatrix ... " 
d t . d 67 an con 1nue : 
"Where the circumstances are so plain and so 
well-ascertained as to preclude all 
possibility of fraud, the reasons supporting 
the strict application of the rule are 
greatly diminished." 
On the basis of such statements Bates contends that 
at least where there is no possibility of fraud the strict 
statutory formalities ought to be given the "go-by" in famur 
of the testator's true intentions. 68 The adoption of such an 
argument would, it is submitted, give better effect to the 
65. [1942] P.l46. 
6 6. Ibid. @ p. 
6 7 . Ibid. @ p. 
68. Op. cit. p.381. 
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rationale behind the formalities. Where the protective 
function, for example, is clearly satisfied (no external 
pressures of, say, duress or undue influence being applied) 
then it appears overly-officious and distinctly unbenefic-
ial to all concerned to insist on the will being pronounced 
invalid for lack of a formality which is, in a given case, 
superfluous to the attainment of the general rationale 
behind the formalities. 
A lack of leniency in judicial interpretation has 
also been evident in the decisions handed down on the 
position of the testator's signature. 
Section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 required the signat-
ure to be "at the foot or end" of the will. Early cases 
invalidating wills on extremely technical grounds 69 as the 
courts pursued their goal of strict compliance, led to the 
passing of the Wills Amendment Act 1852. That Act expand-
ed the definition of the term "end" to include numerous 
locations on the face of the will. After 1852, therefore, 
a will would be pronounced valid if the signature was pos-
itioned: 
II at or after, or following, or under, or 
beside, or opposite to the end of the will, 
that it shall be apparent on the face of 
the will that the testator intended to give 
effect by such his signature to the writing 
signed as his will, and no such will shall 
be affected by the circumstance that the 
69. For example, Smee v Bryer (1848) 1 Rob. Ecc.616 in 
which a will was held invalid because the signature 
of the testatrix was not placed in eight-tenths of 
an inch left blank at the bottom of a page but, 
instead,on the next page. 
signature shall not follow or be immediately 
after the foot or end of the will, or by the 
circumstance that a blank space shall inter-
vene between the concluding word of the will 
and the signature, or by the circumstance 
that the signature shall be placed among the 
words of the testimonium clause or of the 
clause of attestation, or shall follow or be 
after or under the clause of attestation, 
either with or without a blank space inter-
vening, or shall follow or be after, or under, 
or beside the names or one of the names of the 
subscribing witnesses, or by the circumstance 
that the signature shall be on a side or page 
or other portion of the paper or papers con-
taining the will whereon no clause or para-
graph or disposing part of the will shall be 
written above the signature, or by the 
circumstance that there shall appear to be 
sufficient space on or at the bottom of the 
preceding side or page or other portion of the 
same paper on which the will is written to 
contain the signature; " 
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The Act ends with two prohibitions: a signature can never 
operate to give effect to any part of the will: 
i) which is underneath or which follows the 
signature in space or 
ii) which was inserted later ih time after 
the signature was made. 
Despite this full, even verbose, explanation contain-
ed in the 1852 Act, cases on the positioning of a testator's 
signature have been many in number. 
The general inclination of the courts has been 
towards a lenient interpretation of the Act in order to save 
wills from invalidity. This, however, has not been a con-
sistent inclination with the result that not only has the 
language of the Act been severely tested but also a mass of 
difficult, conflicting decisions has been created. 
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70 In Re Roberts the testator, having reached the end 
of his hand-written will, was forced by the exigencies of 
space to extend his signature along the margin on the left 
hand side of the page. The result was that the testator's 
own signature was written physically opposite to the 
beginning of the will. It was held, nevertheless, that 
the will was valid. The court regarded the entire margin 
as opposite to the end of the will. 
71 The celebrated case of In b. Hornby took an even 
more radical line. In that case the testator ruled off an 
oblong box about half way down one side of a page. He then 
wrote his will around the box finally affixing his signat-
ure in the box itself. Wallington J. upheld the will 
stating that the signature in the box was "in the intention 
of the testator, at the end of the will". 72 In this case, 
therefore, the whereabouts of the end of the will was made 
to depend upon the intention of the testator. 
Hardingham, Neave and Ford strongly emphasise the 
inadequacy of Wallingham J's test in that it fails to give 
due weight to both the position of the signature and the 
73 intention of the testator as required by the 1852 Act. 
70. [1934] P.l02. 
71. [1946] P.l71. 
72. Ibid. @ p.l79. 
73. The Law of Wills @ p.30. 
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Such criticisms, it is submitted, have considerable force 
and highlight an unreasonable tendency on the part of some 
members of the judiciary to give effect to the testator's 
wishes notwithstanding the words of the relevant 
legislation. 
Not all judges have fallen prey to these inclinations. 
The result has been the compounding of a collection of 
inconsistent case-law. 
In Re Stalman? 4 for example, a testatrix squeezed 
her signature in at the top of the will since there was no 
room at the bottom. The Court of Appeal had no difficulty 
in holding that a will signed at the beginning was invalid, 
being contrary to the first prohibition in the 1852 Act. 75 
Similarly in Re Beadle 76 where a testatrix signed a 
will in the top right hand corner and on the envelope 
wherein it was contained, both signatures were held not to 
be in compliance with the Wills Act. The former for the 
reasons given in Re Stalman, the latter because it was 
intended merely to identify the contents of the envelope 
not to authenticate the whole will. 
The overwhelming feeling gleane6 from this maze of 
difficult,tortuously reasoned cases is one of judges in a 
cleft stick: keen to validate as many testator's wishes 
as possible but, at the same time, hidebound by the 
74. (1931) 145 L.T. 339. 
75. The two prohibitions are outlined at pp.33/34 supra. 
76. [1974] 1 All E.R. 493, 
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formalities of the Wills Act coupled with the doctrine of 
strict compliance. Bates 71uggests a possible safe passage 
out of this Catch 22 situation: he submits that: 78 
"All that should be necessary is that the 
signature should be intended to validate 
the whole of the document, no matter where 
it is placed. The strict statutory re-
quirements can easily be overcome in favour 
of the testator's wishes by construing the 
foot or end of the will simply to mark that 
place where the testator intended to finish 
the business of making his will. 
In any case it is submitted that in the 
absence of any evidence of fraud, the test-
ator's signature, wherever it is placed, 
should be taken to signify this and validate 
everything on the paper or papers." 
This suggestion comes remarkably close to Wallingham 
J's statements in In h. Hornhy 79 and accords with the gen-
eral argument of this author that if the rationale of the 
formalities can be satisfied without strict compliance with 
the actual formalities then only those formalities necess-
ary to achieve the rationale ought to be required: the 
others can safely be abandonned, as Bates suggests. 
Such a proposal is not nearly as novel as it first 
80 
appears. For example, in In the Estate of Long the 
judiciary felt able to give effect to the proposal but had 
to do so by careful, exhaustive reasoning which strained 
77. G.M. Bates A Case for Intention, supra @ n.63 contains a 
useful critical analyses of these cases and others. 
78. Ibid. p.381. 
79. [1946] P.l71 and supra p.35. 
80. [1936] P.l66. 
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the very limits of the law. Bates' suggestion obviates the 
necessity to perform mental legal gymnastics. 
81 In In the Estate of Long a testarix wrote her holo-
graph will on both sides of a piece of paper: on one side 
appeared the heading of the will, the appointment of an 
executor, and an attestation clause with the signatures of 
the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and on the other 
appeared a list of bequests. Sir Boyd Merriman P. granted 
probate in respect of both pages, reading the will as 
beginning with the bequests and ending with the signatures. 
In the course of his judgment he remarked: 82 
"Provided that the Court is satisfied that the 
whole document was written before the signat-
ures were made, and that the dispositive part 
of the document may be fairly read as preceding 
and leading up to the part containing the 
signatures, and in no sense as a mere annexe or 
schedule thereto, I think that it would be 
transgressing what Sir James Hannen in In the 
Goods of Wotton 83 called "the spirit of the Act" 
to insist, as a criterion of valid execution, 
upon proof that the several parts of the document 
were actually written in any particular order." 
Other judges have followed this line insofar as they 
have been able. 84 Inevitably, however, this has not 
81. Ibid. 
82. [1936] P.l66 @ p.l73. 
83. (1874) L.R. 3 P & D 159 @ p.l61. 
84. See, for example, In b. Smith [1931] P.225 (pages of 
will read in order 2, 3 and 1 so that the signature of 
the testarix at the bottom of page 1 was at the end) . 
In b. Gilbert(l898) 78 L.T. 762 @ p.763 (emphasising 
that this approach can only be taken if the will is a 
"circle" i.e. no pages requiring to be read either 
before or after any others), Re Young (deceased) [1969] 
N.Z.L.R. 454 (sufficient nexus found in pressing pages 
together) . 
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1 b 'bl 85 a ways een possl e. 
To leave the judiciary to stretch the meaning of an 
inelastic piece of legislation thus far to give effect to 
testators' intentions is irresponsible and not conducive to 
the establishment of fair, equitable principles. Justice, 
in any given case, has been made to depend on a judge's 
willingness and wiliness in overcoming or circumventing the 
obstacles provided by the formalities of the Wills Act. 
The time has come, it is submitted, for the legislature to 
rethink the aims of the Wills Act and only to require such 
formalities as give effect to those aims. A needless 
adherence to formalities has brought extra problems to a 
sufficiently complex area of law: simplification is to be 
welcomed. 
(c) Signature of testator and presence of witnesses. 
The Wills Act requires that a testator must make, or acknow-
ledge his signature in the presence of two or more witnesses 
h t t th Same tl'me. 86 Th 1 f w o are presen · a e e preva ance o 
II ' ' bl d ' ' 8 7 ' h ' ' 1 1 b f lnequlta e eclslons ln t lS area lS arge y ecause o 
85. See for example In b. Gee (1898) 78 L.T. 843; In e. 
Bercovitz [1962] 1 W.L.R. 321 and the Practice Direct-
ion [1953] 1 W.L.R. 689 which points out that "an in-
·oa:rrect practice appears to have grown up as regards 
wills which are signed only at the foot of the first 
page, but which, for lack of space, are continued upon 
the next page". It goes on "no such continuation 
should be admitted as part of the will unless there is 
also a reference, above the signature on the first 
page, which effects incorporation". 
86. Wills Act 1837, s.9. 
87. Manitoba Law Reform Commission @ p.6. 
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these stringently enforced requirements. The section 
demands that the making or acknowledgment of the testator's 
signature must occur before either of l.the witnesses signs 
as a witness. The result, therefore, is that if a witness 
appends his signature before the occurrence of that event 
it will be useless. The apparent simplicity of this rule 
is deceptive, as the cases reveal. 
In Re Davies 88 a testatrix signed her will in the 
presence of the first witness who then signed it as a wit-
ness. At that point no other witness was present. Sub-
sequently a second witness entered the room. The testatrix 
acknowledged her signature to him and he then signed as a 
witness. It was held that the will was invalid: there had 
not been a single act of signing (or acknowledgment) in the 
presence of both witnesses before either of them signed. 
In Re Colling 89 a will was struck down on the same 
ground. A testator began to sign his name in the presence 
of two witnesses. During the act of signing, however, one 
witness left the room. The signature was completed in her 
absence. The witness remaining in the room signed the 
will. The second witness then returned and both the test-
ator and the first witness acknowledged their signatures to 
her. She then signed as a witness. 
The acknowledgment to both witnesses was ineffective 
as they did not both subscribe thereafter. 
8 8. [ 19 51] 1 All E. R. 9 2 0. 
89. [1972] 3 All E.R. 729. 
And, since the 
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full process of signing by the testator had not been 
completed in the presence of both witnesses the requirements 
of section 9 had not been complied with. Consequently the 
will was declared invalid. 
In giving judgment Ungoed-Thomas J. commented on the 
fact that section 9 was designed for the avoidance of 
fraud, and continued: 90 
"It is perhaps, unfortunate ... that the 
section has manifestly on occasion defeated 
the intention of the testator and, in some 
cases, of which this is one, glaringly so." 
He went on: 91 
"The requirements of the section ... are 
established as strict and technical. Both 
the technicality and the effect of defeating 
a testator's intentions are brought out very 
clearly ... by the observations of Morris J. in 
Re Davies.92 In that case ... Morris J. 
observed: 
" ... I am compelled to decide the case 
in accordance with law, even though my 
decision has the effect of defeating 
the purpose and intention of the 
testatrix." 
I feel, with great regret, driven to the same 
course in this case." 
Despite perceiving the inequity of their decisions 
many judges have been forced to similar conclusions. 93 
90. Ibid. @ p. 730. 
91. Ibid. @ pp.730-731. 
9 2 . [ 19 51] 1 All E . R . 9 2 0 . 
93. For example see Re Groffman [1969] 2 All E.R. 108; 
Moore v King (1842) 163 E.R. 716; Hindmarsh v 
Charlton (1861) 11 E.R. 388; cf. Re Gibson (deceased) 
[1953] N.Z.L.R. 122. 
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The frequently harsh results of an unyielding strict 
compliance with these formalities has not gone unnoticed by 
Reform Committees in several jurisdictions. 
The Law Reform Committee in England is currently 
reassessing the necessity for two witnesses to be present 
at the same time. 94 In the United States the Uniform 
Probate Code proposes abolishing the requirement that the 
two witnesses be present when the testator signs the will. 
The official commentary to the Uniform Probate Code 
asserts: 95 
"The formalities for execution of a witnessed 
will have been reduced to a minimum." 
The will must be in writing and the testator must sign or 
acknowledge it to two witnesses. Remarkable by their 
absence are the requirements that the witnesses sign in 
the testator's presence, that the testator sign it "at the 
foot or end thereof" and that the witnesses be competent 
(disinterested)? 6 
b . t 97 Lang e1n commen s: 
"Doubtless the draftsmen balanced 'the injust-
ice brought about by technical violations of 
the publication and presence requirements 
94. Consultative Document on the Making and Revocation 
of Wills (1977) @ p.lO. 
95. 2-502, Comment. 
96. cf. s.l5 Wills Act 1837 (U.K.) (voiding gifts to an 
attesting witness, or his or her spous~ and s.3 Wills 
Amendment Act 1977 (N.Z.) (validating gifts to attest-
ing witnesses if the will is validly witnessed without 
such additional subscription). 
97. Op. cit. @ p.511. 
and decided that the incremental cautionary 
value of those two former requisites was 
not worth the price in wills invalidated 
for defective compliance." 
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It certainly appears from the cases that technical-
ities have rendered wills invalid when the rationale behind 
the Wills Act has been satisfied: clear evidence reveals 
the document to be a testamentary one; the testator is 
aware of what he is doing and its importance and there is 
no suggestion of undue influence, fraud or the like but he 
has failed to comply with the strict formalities. The 
British Columbia Law Reform Commission recognize and aim to 
repair this defect in the law: 98 
"It would be possible to modify the formalities 
of the Wills Act to relax those aspects that 
most often seem to create difficulties. 
Alternatively, it would be possible to develop 
a parallel regime in which different criteria 
would apply to determine the admissibility to 
probate of a purported testamentary document." 
A discussion of the various regimes either currently 
implemented or currently proposed by which the strict 
formalism of the Wills Act can be overcome, follows the 
next, concluding section which takes a detailed look at 
the final formality required by s.9 Wills Act 1837. 
(d) Attestation and subscription by witnesses. The 
Wills Act requires the witnesses to attest, i.e. bear wit-
ness that the signature was made or acknowledged by the 
testator in their simultaneous presence,and to sign it. 
Failure by the testator to sign or acknowledge his signat-
ure before either witness signs has probably, in the view 
98. Op. cit. @ p.33. 
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99 
of Parryand Clark, made more wills invalid than any other 
1 
cause. Thus, here again, the Wills Act formalities face an 
attack from the schools of thought which advocate the test-
ator's intention overriding the formalities and not vice-
versa. 
Whilst both witnesses must sign ''in the presence of 
the testator" they need not sign in the presence of each 
other. And, unlike the testator, who must sign at the end 
2 
of the will, a witness may sign anywhere on the document. 
Courts have held that while the testator must be both 
3 physically present and mentally aware, he need not actually 
see the witnesses sign as long as he could have done so if 
he had cared to look. 4 
An interesting aspect of this requiremen4 originally 
found in the Statute of Frauds,is that in 1833 the Real 
Property Commissioners recommended that it be abolished. 
Parliament retained it on the ground that it might prevent 
a witness from substituting a different will without the 
99. Op. cit. @ p. 22. 
1. e.g. Wyatt v Berry [1893] P.5 (separate acknowledge-
ments to each witness, the second occuring after the 
first witness had signed. Held, will invalid) and see 
Hindmarsh v Charlton @ n.93 supra. 
2. In the Estate of Denning [1958] W.L.R. 462. 
3. See In b. Chalcraft [1948] P. 222. 
4, Tribe v Tribe (1849) 1 Rob. Ecc. 775 (testatrix 
unable to turn herself in bed to see witnesses sign; 
will held invalid); Newton v Clarke (1839) 2 Curt. 
320 (curtains around the bed which could have been 
drawn back without an alteration in position; will 
held valid) . 
5 testator's knowledge. Perhaps a reversion to the 
thinking of 1833 is overdue. 
3. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
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The mounting dissatisfaction with the strict compli-
ance demanded by the Wills Act is evident from the foregolig 
discussion. What, then, can be offered as a possible 
medicament to cure this apparently fatally ill statute? 
Various suggestions exist. 
Professor Langbein favours the introduction of the 
doctrine of substantial compliance. Thus he calls for: 6 
"reduced formalism in enforcing whatever 
formalities the Wills Act requires." 
His conception of the doctrine assumes that the testator 
has made some attempt, at least, at due execution. This 
view has been termed the "narrow approach" to substantial 
1 . 7 comp lance. 8 The "broad approach", by contrast, extends 
to the court a discretion to validate a document intended 
as a will, but in respect of which the testator has made 
little or no effort to comply with the formalities. 
Langbein explains the difference thus: 9 
5. Consultative Document on the Making and Revocation of 
Wills (1977) @ p.lO. 
6. Op. cit. p.510. 
7. See Palk op. cit. p.393. 
8. Jlbi'd. p.394. 
9. Langbein op. cit. p.526 @ note 27. 
"The term [i.e. substantial compliance] 
is presently used to mean that borderline 
conduct is close enough to the prototype 
to be deemed in compliance, but not that 
concededly defective compliance is perm-
issible on purposive grounds." 
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The narrow approach, therefore, requires both testa-
mentary intent and its evidence in the form of an attempt 
at due execution. The broad approach, on the other hand, 
merely requires evidence of testamentary intent from 
whatever quarter. 
The narrow approach is less objectionable in the 
United States, where holograph wills are admitted, than in 
jurisdictions where they are not. In such jurisdictions 
the narrow approach would preclude their entry into the law 
of succession, whereas the broad approach would not (assum-
ing always the requisite standard of evidence having been 
tt . d) h b d 1' 10 th t h 1 . a a1ne . It as een argue ear 1er a t e exc us1on 
of holograph wills satisfying the rationale of the Wills 
Act ought to be remedied. As such, it is submitted that 
on this ground alone the narrow approach ought not to be 
adopted unless possibly, a separate category validating the 
use of holograph wills has been established. 
Another suggestion which aims to improve the results 
of the formalism of the Wills Act is that of the so-called 
"threshold requirements". 
Advocates of this view reject Langbein's narrow 
concept of attempted compliance. They would replace it 
10. Supra pp.l6-21. 
with reduced formalities, for example, merely writing and 
signature. 11 Or perhaps, a~ Bates proposes, the only 
formalities which should be required are: 12 
"that the will should be in writing, signed 
at some place by the testator; or by 
someone in his presence and under his 
direction, and attested by two witnesses 
on some part of the document." 
The "threshold requirements" view, however, suffers from 
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the criticism that if these minimal formalities are to be 
enforced with the same literalism as the extant ones then 
it will be questionable whether any progress has been made 
at all. To circumvent this likely attack, Bates, at 
least, chooses to support threshold requirements only as an 
alternative, for he goes on to adopt what appears to be a 
"broad approach" to the doctrine of substantial compliance 
as the other alternative. 13 
"If one or more of these formalities is 
not observed, then the court should 
nevertheless give effect to the true 
intentions of the testator as expressed 
in the document, in the absence of sus-
picious circumstances ... The 
absence of formalities merely obliges 
the court to satisfy itself that there 
are no suspicious circumstances surr-
ounding the making of the will ... 
In any event the formalities must not be 
allowed to override the deceased's 
wishes." 
11. See the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia 
Working Paper @ pp. 67-8. 
12. Op. cit. p.382. 
13. Ibid .. 
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Thus far would-be reformers are faced with four 
possibilities to adopt, namely: 
(1) the narrow approach of substantial compliance; 
(2) the broad approach of substantial compliance; 
(3) minimum threshold provisions; and 
(4) minimum threshold provisions coupled with a 
liberal discretion to give effect to the 
testator's intentions, notwithstanding a 
failure to comply with the minimum 
threshold requirements. 
Yet another possibility lies in the question whether 
the rules of evidence ought to be relaxed in respect of 
wills. Statements made by a testator to others as to what 
he intends to constitute his will will usually be hearsay, 
and, therefore inadmissible unless they fall within the 
doctrine of res gestae. That doctrine requires the state-
ment to be contemporaneous with the events in issue and 
imposes a limitation on the use of self-serving statements. 
Once, however, a document has been established as the 
deceased's, the deceased's intention with regard to it 
becomes relevant. At this point the deceased's statements 
before, at or after his making the document may be intra-
duced as original evidence of his state of mind. In Sugden 
v Lord St Leonarda Mellish L.J. said: 14 
14. (1876) 1 P.D. 154 @ p.251. 
"Wherever it is material to prove the 
state of a person's mind, or what was 
passing in it, and what were his intent-
ions, there you may prove what he said, 
because that is the only means by which 
you can find out what his intentions 
were." 
If a remedial provision were to be adopted which placed 
reliance on the intentions of the testator then, it is 
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submitted, the rules of evidence should be reconsidered in 
the light of that remedial provision. No overwhelming 
reasons would require the relaxation of the rules in such 
circumstances, however, as the rationale for the existence 
of the limits on the introduction of evidence would still 
obtain. There would, for example, still be no prospect of 
examining the testator; witnesses in such cases would 
still usually have a financial or emotional interest in the 
outcome and the problem of hearsay outside of the confines 
of the res gestae doctrine leading to fabrication and a 
multiplicity of issues would still be very real. 
In this light it is suggested that Ormiston's 
15 
advice not to relax the rules of evidence by statute 
"if the real vice being attacked is the 
rigour of the existing rules" [relating 
to execution of wills] 
ought to be heeded. 
Having thus canvassed the four main contenders for 
adoption to remedy some of the defects prevalent in the 
Wills Act legislation, it is now germane to examine how 
several jurisdictions have chosen to solve their own 
peculiar problems. 
15. Ormiston op. cit. @ p.456. 
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(i) The United States. In some states in America 
the approach of reducing the Wills Act formalities to a 
"threshold" level was adopted in the Uniform Probate Code 
of 19~9. The Code requires only bare essentials for the 
proper execution of a formal will. The will must be in 
writing, signed by the testator or by some other person in 
the testator's presence and by his direction, and signed 
by two witnesses who witness either the signing or the 
acknowledgment of the signature. 16 
For holograph wills only the material provisions 
need be in the handwriting of the testator. Furthermore, 
h t ' ' ' ' ' 1' ' t d 17 t e attes 1ng w1tnesses prov1s1on 1s e 1m1na e . 
Whilst this approach would rid the law of some 
18 19 ' problems (for example the Re Beadle, Re Stalman l1ne of 
cases would no longer cause difficulty) circumstances can 
still be envisaged where strict adherence even to those 
formalities, should they be adopted here, would still 
operate to frustrate the testator's intention. For 
example, if the will was only witnessed by one witness. 
It is possible then that in the absence of fraud, forgery 
or coercion, the testator's intention might yet be defeated 
on a technical basis. 
16. Uniform Probate Code ( 1974) (official text) sec 2.-502. 
17. L.H. Averill, Uni£orm Probate Code in a Nut Shell 
(1978) @ pp.75 and 77. 
18. [1974] 1 All E.R. 493. 
19. (1931) 145 L.T. 339. 
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Therefore, whilst "threshold requirements" might 
rid the law of some of its imperfections, it is submitted 
that it leaves too many others which remain troublesome, 
for the same type of amendment to be usefully introduced 
into the law here. 
(ii) Queensland. In 1978 in a report of the Law 
Reform Commission of Queensland On the Law Relating to 
Succession a provision was drafted for possible future 
inclusion in the Queensland succession laws. 20 The prov-
ision adopts Langbein's narrow approach to the doctrine of 
substantial compliance, and, in fact, was specifically 
seen and approved of by Langbein himself. 21 
h d ft . . d 22 T e ra prov1s1on rea s: 
"Will to be in writing and signed before 
two witnesses. No will shall be valid 
unless it shall be in writing and 
executed in manner hereinafter mentioned 
and required (that is to say) it shall 
be signed at the foot or end thereof by 
the testator or by some other person in 
his presence and by his direction and 
such signature shall be made or acknow-
ledged by the testator in the presence 
of two or more witnesses present at the 
same time and such witnesses shall attest 
and shall subscribe the will in the 
presence of the testator but no form of 
attestation shall be necessary provided 
that: 
20. Report on the Law Relating to Succession, Queensland 
Law Reform Commission No. 22 (1978), Appendix 5 
(Draft) p.S., s.9. 
21. Ibid., p.7. 
22. Ibid., Appendix 5 (Draft) p.S, s.9. 
(a) the Court may admit to probate a 
testamentary instrument executed in 
substantial compliance with the 
formalities prescribed by this 
section if the Court is satisfied 
that the instrument expresses the 
testamentary intention of the 
testator; and 
(b) the Court may admit extrinsic evidence 
including evidence of statements made 
at any time by the testator as to the 
manner of execution of a testamentary 
instrument." 
The Commission considered improving and clarifying 
the law by reducing the formalities required (as the 
23 Uniform Probate Code has done) but concluded= 
'' ... we are satisfied that some formal 
requirements are necessary; and although 
sometimes the intention of testators is 
defeated, nevertheless, the existing law 
is in a fairly clear condition, having 
attracted a multitude of decisions." 
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Two comments require attention: first, that to express any 
kind of limited satisfaction that because most testator's 
intentions are not defeated by the formalities then the 
formalities are acceptable as they stand is to shy away from 
an attempt at a complete attainment of the r~onale of the 
formalities. Such a stance, it is submitted, is neither 
laudable nor a firm base from which to work. Secondly, 
issue is taken with the view that the existing law is in "a 
fairly clear condition". Decisions discussed elsewhere in 
. h 1 th h . . 1 . 1 2 4 th1s c apter revea at t 1s 1s p a1n y not so. 
2 3 . Ibid . , p. 7 . 
24. See, for example, p.36 supra. 
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While the Commission rejected arguments in favour of 
"threshold formalities" the members were impressed by argu-
ments which attacked the rigid attitude of the courts 
respecting compliance with those formalities. 25 To this 
end the provision requiring only substantial compliance was 
drafted. The explanation of the provision was couched 
thus: 26 
"We have ... decided to recommend that some 
relaxation in the court's standard should 
be permitted, and that provided substantial 
compliance is shown, and the court is sat-
isfied that the instrument presented for 
probate represents the testamentary intent-
ion of the maker of it, the court may admit 
it to probate. It will be for the court 
to work out what it understands by substant-
ial compliance, but it is envisaged that the 
courts will be cautious in their approach to 
the latitude given, and that only in cases 
of accident and minor departures will it be 
possible to give effect to the obvious in-
tention of the testator, as in cases where 
the court has hitherto wished to admit an 
instrument to probate but has f~lt unable to 
do so because of the shackles of its policy 
of meticulous compliance." 
The major criticism of the Queensland proposal lies, 
it appears to this author, in the limitation of its approach. 
It only applies in cases where there has been a failed 
attempt to execu~a will according to the prescribed form-
ali ties. But what of cases where the intention of the 
testator can be clearly ascertained although no "attempt" 
has been made to execute the will in accordance with the 
25. Op. cit. @ p.7. 
2 6. Ibid .. 
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prescribed formalities? For example, what of the will 
written on a paper bag by a lone adventurer in the high 
country? No gainful attempt could be made by the testator 
to find witnesses. And it is doubtful whether their omiss-
ion would be classified as an "accident" or "minor depart-
II f th ' b d f 1 ' t ' 2 7 ure rom e prescr1 e orma 1 1es. Likewise, the 
omission of a testator's signature through his being too 
sick to sign would, it is submitted, be a circumstance too 
difficult for the provision, as drafted, to overcome. 
Support for this criticism can be found in the 
Manitoba Law Reform Commission which submits (on the subject 
of the Queensland provision) that: 28 
" ... this form of provision unnecessarily 
limits the potential scope of the 
remedial doctrine, weakening its 
usefulness." 
(iii) South Australia. In South Australia a 
remedial provision is already in force. In 1975 on a 
recommendation of the Law Reform Committee of South 
Australia29 section 12 of the Wills Act 1936-1975 was 
introduced. It reads: 
"s.l2(1) .A will is valid if executed in accordance 
with this Act, notwithstanding that the will is 
not otherwise published. 
27. Ibid .. 
28. Op. cit. @ p.22. 
39. 28th Report of the Law Reform Committee of South 
Australia Relating to the Reform of the Law on 
Intestacy and Wills (1974) @ pp.lO and 11. 
s.l2(2). A document purporting to embody the 
testamentary intentions of a deceased person 
shall, notwithstanding that it has not been 
executed with the formalities required by 
this Act, be deemed to be a will of the 
deceased person if the Supreme Court, upon 
application for admission of the document to 
probate as the last will of the deceased, is 
satisfied that there can be no reasonable 
doubt that the deceased intended the 
document to constitute his will." 
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A question discussed by Palk30 is whether subsection 
12(2) is to be interpreted broadly or narrowly. In other 
words, does some attempt at execution have to be made (the 
narrow approach) or not (the broad approach)? 
Palk concedes that the broad approach is most cer-
tainly possible on the wording of the subsection. 31 The 
only criterion specifically required before the Supreme 
Court can validate the will is that there should be "no 
reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to 
constitute his will". To interpret those words to mean: 
"to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased 
intended the document to constitute his will he must have 
made an attempt at due execution" appears wholly unwarr-
anted. 
The comment is made, however, by the same author, 
that the narrow approach would seem to be the one envisaged 
by the Law Reform Committee of South Australia. 32 The 
30. Op. cit.,pp.393-396. 
31. I bid. p.394. 
32. Ibid .. 
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Committee talks of "technical failure to comply with the 
Wills Act" 33 and "technical arguments as to the formal 
validity of wills". 34 Such statements would seem to imply, 
Palk argues, 35 something other than a total failure to comply 
with the Wills Act. And, he continues, there is no suggest-
ion in the Report that they were seeking to promote any new 
d f '11 k. 36 roo es o w1 -rna 1ng. 
"The idea was to stop technical arguments 
in these cases reaching the court, and the 
only cases to reach the court are those 
where there has been a substantial perf-
ormance of the formalities, so that a 
grant of probate is possible." 
Having thus stated a case for both interpretations 
Palk takes the view that a narrow approach to s.l2(2) would 
be a little hard to justify. He contends: 37 
"Why should an attempt to comply with the 
formalities of the Wills Act be the trigger 
that activates s.l2(2) if the document can 
be defined as an attempted will without 
these formalities? Why read s.l2(2) as 
saying that there can never be "no reasonable 
doubt" that the document was intended to be 
a will if there has not been a determined and 
substantial attempt to comply with ~he formal 
requirements]of the Act, if s.l2(2) simply 
does not say that?" 
It is submitted that these rhetorical questions are 
extremely persuasive. The broad approach is manifestly 
33. Law Reform Committee of South Australia Report @ p.lO. 
34. Ibid. @ p.ll. 
35. Op. cit. @ p.394. 
36. Ibid .. 
37. Ibid. @ p.395. 
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possible on the words of the section and none of the argu-
rnents advocating the narrow approach are of sufficient 
. ht d . 1 th th . . d . t . 3 8 . t . t we1g to 1sp ace ern. 0 er JUrls lC 1ons, 1 lS o 
be noted, seem to have assumed that the South Australians 
intended the statute to take the broad approach. 
In the Working Paper of the Law Reform Commission of 
British Columbia, for example, the sole case to date in 
which a will was admitted to probate under the new law in 
South Australia is used to demonstrate that the view of the 
judiciary favours the broad approach to the doctrine of 
b . 1 1' 39 su stant1a cornp 1ance. 
The relevant case is Re Graham. 40 The facts were 
these: the testatrix signed her will and then gave it to 
her nephew with the request that he "get it witnessed". 
The nephew took the will to two neighbours who signed as 
witnesses in his presence but not in the testatrix's 
presence. The will was later returned to the testatrix by 
the nephew. Soon afterwards the testatrix died leaving 
approximately $10,000 to her nephew in the impugned will. 
Clearly, the statutory requirements for the execution of a 
valid testamentary document had not been fulfilled: the 
testatrix had not signed the will in the presence of either 
witness, nor had either witness signed in the testatrix's 
presence. could s.l2(2) operate to save the will? 
38. For example, British Columbia and Manitoba. 
39. Report of the LaW Reform Commission of British 
Columbia (1978) @ pp.Sl-52. 
40. (1978) 20 S.A.S.R. 200. 
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The Court held that it could: s.l2(2) of the Wills 
Act 1936-1975 was to be given a broad and remedial inter-
pretation. As Jacobs J. said: 41 
"Upon these fa~ts, I have not the slightest 
doubt that the deceased intended the document 
which is before me to constitute her will. 
Accordingly, if the words of s.l2(2) of the 
Wills Act are to be given their plain and 
natural meaning, there is no reason at all 
why the document should not be deemed to be 
the will of the deceased, and admitted to 
probate as such, notwithstanding that it has 
not been executed with the formalities 
required by the Act." 
This excerpt from the judgment of Jacobs J. finally settles 
the dispute as to the manner in which the judiciary in 
South Australia intend to interpret the provision. The 
words are to be given their "plain and natural meaning". 
Thus, in order to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that 
the deceased intended the document to constitute his will 
he need not have made an attempt at due execution. Else-
where in the judgment of Jacobs J. further support for his 
view can be found: 42 
II if there is one proposition that may be 
stated with reasonable confidence, it is 
that s.l2(2) is remedial in intent, that is 
to say, that its purpose is to avoid the 
hardship and injustice which has so often 
arisen from a strict application of the 
formal requirements of a valid. will .... " 
A second jurisdiction which has assumed that the 
South Australian approach embodies the broad view of the 
41. Ibid. @ p. 201. 
42. Ibid. @ p. 202. 
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doctrine of substantial compliance is Manitoba. 43 
The Law Reform Co'mmissioh of Manitoba describe the 
South Australian approach as "the widest in scope of all the 
remedial provisions in this area". The Commission submits 
that: 44 
" this wide approach adopted in South 
Australia is the one which best achieves 
the goal of the remedial provision. By 
placing no limitation on the doctrine's 
application, it empowers a court to over-
come any technical defect or absence of 
formality in giving effect to the testat-
or's intention." 
The South Australia provision is, it is submitted, the 
boldest step yet taken in any effort to make a testator's 
intentions effective, given that the rationale for the Wills 
Act formalities have been satisfied, despite the formalities 
themselves not being met. The introduction of the provision 
has clearly not resulted in the much-feared multiplicity of 
litigation. Nor have the formalities themselves lost their 
usefulness: the section is purely remedial - it does not 
effect a new mode of execution. The fact that a document 
which falls to be considered under s.l2(2) must embody the 
"testamentary intentions" of the deceased person indicates 
that the purposes of the formalities must be complied with. 
That is, there must be sufficient evidence to establish 
authenticity, finality of intention and freedom from fraud 
or coercion. One method of proving this is by complying 
with the formalities. The importance of the South Austral-
43. See Manitoba Law Reform Commission: The Wills Act and 
the DoCtrine of substantial Compliance pp.25-26. 
44. Ibid. @ p.25. 
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ian provision, however, is that now this is not the only way. 
It is submitted that South Australia has made a considerable 
improvement in its law of succession: no longer will a 
judge be constrained, unwillingly, to conclude that a will 
cannot be upheld on a technical ground, despite the 
rationale for the existence of that technicality being 
clearly satisfied by the purported testamentary document. 
A criticism of the South Australian provision lies in 
the requirement that the Court be 
"satisfied that there can be no reasonable 
doubt that the deceased intended the 
document to constitute his will." 
Proof to such a standard is that usually demanded in 
the criminal law. It is submitted that the civil standard 
of proof, that is, proof on a balance of probabilities 
would have been more appropriate. Two main reasons substant-
iate this ·view: first, it would retain a consistency not 
only with other areas of probate law but also with other 
areas of civil law. Secondly, the imposition of the higher 
standard in criminal cases is reflective of the serious 
consequences of a conviction - in many cases a loss of 
liberty. Such gravity seems incongnous in probate law. 
Both reasons, it is suggested, lean in favour of the civil 
standard being adopted by any jurisdiction following South 
Australia's model And, indeed, in South Australia giving 
thought to the possibility of an amendment to its own 
legislation. 
(iv) Israel. By section 25 of the Israeli 
Succession Law 5725-1965 the courts in that country have 
been able, since 1965, to admit to probate a technically 
defective will. Section 25 provides that: 
"Where the court has no doubt as to the 
genuineness of a will, it may grant 
probate thereof notwithstanding any 
defect with regard to the signature of 
the testator or of the witnesses, the 
date of the will, the procedure set out 
in sections 20 to 23 or the capacity of 
the witnesses." 
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The leading Israeli case on the application of this 
45 provision is Briel v The Attorney-General decided in 1977. 
In that case the District Court had refused to grant 
probate even though it had no doubt as to the "genuineness" 
of the will. The will was in breach of the succession law 
in that it did not contain the date on which it was made. 
The Supreme Court allowed an appeal from the District 
Court's decision. The Supreme Court's judgment included 
46 these comments: 
"The question of all questions regarding the 
scope and operation of section 25 is 
always the "genuineness of the will". The 
court has to be first convinced, beyond all 
doubt, that it is indeed faced with a 
genuine will. Were it so convinced, the 
[formal] defects should not prevent it from 
granting probate of the will. Were it not 
convinced, even one defect requires it to 
abstain from granting probate." 
47 And, further: 
45. Israel C.A. 869/75 32 P.D. 98. 
46. Ibid .. 
4 7. Ibid .. 
"The discretion granted to the Court by 
section 25 is a very wide one, and if 
there is no doubt as to the veracity of 
the will, there are three things only 
that cannot be remedied by section 25: 
the testator, two witnesses, and a 
document in writing." 
These comments reveal certain sources of criticism 
in the Israeli legislation. 
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First, the standard of proof required is exceedingly 
onerous. In requiring that the court have "no doubt" as to 
the genuineness of the will the standard appears to be even 
higher than the usual standard applicable in criminal 
proceedings. Proof "beyond reasonable doubt", the usual 
standard in criminal cases, may result in "no doubt" being 
left in the mind of the court in any particular case - but 
it will not necessarily do so. To impose a standard which, 
prima facie at least, appears in excess of the usual 
criminal requirement will, if it has not already done so, 
severely limit the potential application of the section. 
Secondly, although difficulties of language and law 
coupled with a scarcity of cases on the provision increase 
the complexities of determining its scope, it does not yet 
appear to have been established48 whether section 25 
is to be construed in accordance with the narrow or 
broad view of substantial compliance. In other words, 
must there be at least some attempt at execution complying 
with the formalities before the section can be invoked or 
not? It would appear from the emphasis in the section and 
48. See British Columbia Law Commission Working 
Paper 1978 p.55. 
63 
in Briel's Case 49 on the "genuineness of the will" that the 
paramountcy of that requirement would tend to favour the 
adoption of the broad view. And, certainly, as with the 
South Australia provision, the words of the section them-
selves can clearly accommodate the broad view. As a 
matter of interpretation it would, it is thought, be hard 
a 
to justify;requirement that to bring a court to the state 
where it has "no doubt as to the genuineness of a will" an 
attempt at due execution would have to be made. 
A third criticism of the section lies in the 
threshold requirements outlined in Briel's Case 50 which 
must exist before the section can be invoked in aid of a 
defective will. These threshold requirements comprise: a 
testator, two witnesses and a document in writing. Whilst 
most jurisdictions require a testator and a document, the 
requirement of two witnesses, if rigidly enforced, could 
be the vehicle which imports, under a remedial section, the 
potential for undue formalism. Given that any remedial 
section endeavours to reduce the number of wills struck 
down on technical grounds, once freedom from fraud, 
forgery and undue coercion have been proved, then it would 
appear almost paradoxical to provide in the section a 
requirement which could invoke the courts in such cases 
again. 
49. Supra pp.61-62. 
50. Israel C.A. 869/75 32 P.D. 98 and see supra @ 
p. 61. 
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Reducing the formalities in this way to a minimum 
threshold level does not, it is submitted, rid the law of 
the problem of wills brought down on mere technicalities. 
Even making so few demands limits the operation of the 
section for they are required to be satisfied in order to 
trigger the section into action. 
These criticisms, it is submitted, are of sufficient 
substance to preclude any potential wholesale adoption of 
the Israeli experience into our legal system. 
(v) British Columbia. In British Columbia the 
Law Reform Commission of that province recommended in its 
1978 paper that: 51 
"The Wills Act be amended to permit the 
Supreme Court to admit to probate a 
document capable of having testamentary 
effect notwithstanding that it has not 
been executed in compliance with the 
required formalities if: 
(a) the instrument is in writing and 
signed by or on behalf of the 
deceased, and 
(b) the court is satisfied that the 
deceased intended the document to 
have testamentary effect." 
This proposal clearly rejects the concept of 
attempted compliance. Instead, threshold requirements of 
writing and signature are preferred. 
The British Columbia approach is wider than that 
taken in Queensland, and the threshold requirements are 
lower than those required by both the Uniform Probate Code 
51. Op. cit. pp. 67-68. 
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and the Israeli Succession Law. It is not, however, as 
broad as the South Australian provision, 
The criticisms levelled at the 0,ueensland, Uniform 
Probate Code and Israeli provisions requiring witnesses can 
be gladly omitted in a discussion of the British Columbia 
proposal. The possibilities of execution with, for 
example, a single witness, which could cause wills to be 
refused probate in those three jurisdictions, do not 
present insurmountable obstacles under the suqgested 
provision for British Columbia. 
Despite, apparently, paring the threshold require-
ments to an absolute minimum, even demanding writing and a 
signature is unnecessary in the view of the Mahitoba Law 
Reform Commission, At page 23 of its report the Mahitoba 
Commission comments: 
" ... circumstances can still be envisioned 
where strict adherence to even these minimal 
formalities could defeat the testator's 
intention. As Professor Langbein points out 
what of the testator who is about to sign his 
will in front of witnesses, when an "inter-
loper's bullet or a coronary seizure fells 
him". 52 The likelihood of such an occurrence 
is small but the fact remains there is no 
necessity for such limitations to the proposed 
section. In effect such requirements do not 
conform with the functional analvsis on which 
the remedial provision is based.~ 
This, it is submitted, is a valid criticism. Although 
the proposal for British Columbia covers most of the 
difficulties currently encountered and hitherto discussed53 
(for example, position of signature, presence 
52. J. Langbein' Substantial Compliahce with the Wills Act 
(1975) 88 Harv. L.Rev. l89 @ 518. 
53. Supra pp. 29-45. 
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of witnesses, number of witnesses) it still allows the 
possibility of a testator's intention failing to be real-
ised for want of a formality. 
For example, suppose a testator wrote out his will 
but then suffered a heart attack and died just as he began 
to append his signature. Or even before he attempted 
signing at all. In both sets of circumstances, on the 
British Columbia provision, the will would not be admitted 
to probate. But, equally, in both cases the testator's 
intention might be very clear: he meant to sign the 
document as his will but was prevented by a supervenin~ 
disability. If the rationale of a reduction in the form-
alities is to effect,as far as possible, the legal 
embodiment of the testator's intention (in the absence of 
fraud, forgery and coercion) then,it is submitted, the 
principle demands freedom from the shackles of all form-
alities if there is a chance of those formalities operating 
to defeat the testator's intention in any given case. 
An extension of this argument would favour the 
introduction of oral wills in other than privileged 
instances. But, to prevent abuse of such nuncupative wills, 
only, it is submitted, should they be allowed in in extre~ 
. . . 1 d. d 54 s1tuat1ons, as prev1ous y 1scusse . 
Thus, although the proposal for British Columbia 
widens the remedial scope of the law by permitting, for 
54. Supra pp. 21~26. 
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example, signed holograph wills to be valid without wit-
nesses, it is thought that the provision does not go far 
enough. A clear manifestation of intention by a testator, 
unaffected by extraneous factors, ought to be given effect 
to by the law - irrespective of whether all formalities 
have been complied with. And some consideration could 
have been given to the application of this principle in 
the field of oral wills ~ although, it is appreciated, 
several policy factors would serve to limit such a class 
of wills fairly rigidly. 
(vi) Manitoba. At page 30 of the Manitoba Law 
Reform Commission Report, the Commission recommends!that: 55 
"A remedial provision should be introduced 
in "The Wills Act" allowing the probate 
courts in Manitoba to admit a document to 
probate despite a defect in form if it is 
proved on the balance of probabilities, 
that the document embodies the testamentary 
intent of the deceased person." 
This proposal is the most radical of the six dis-
cussed. It contains no threshold requirements, it does 
not demand any attempt at due execution and the Manitoba 
Commission envisagesthe relevant standard of proof being 
the normal civil standard, that is, proof on a balance of 
probabilities or on a preponderance of evidence. 56 This 
is in marked contrast to the South Australian provision 
55. "The Wills Act" and the Doctrine of Substantial 
:Compliance." 
56. Op. cit. p.27. 
which required proof to show that there 57 was: 
"no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended 
the document to 90nstitute his will." 
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In other respects, however, the Manitoba Commission 
regards the South Australian provision as a blue print for 
its own. At pages 26 and 27 of the Report it is 
submitted that: 
" ... the wide approach to the remedial 
provision taken in South Australia is 
the optimal approach for such a section. 
The introduction of limitations defeats 
the purpose of the provision without 
serving any necessary function. There-
fore, the majority of the Commission 
recommends that the remedial provision 
introduced in Manitoba should take this 
wide approach so as best to encompass all 
present and potential difficulties." 
The wording of the proposed Manitoba provision is 
intended to be similar to that adopted in South Australia 
but amended to incorporate the altered standard of 
proof. 
It is submitted that the Manitoba proposal is the 
most exciting and far~reaching of the six. Exciting in 
its possibilities: far~reaching in its unique scope. 
It takes the principle of giving effect to the testator's 
intentions the furthestof.all the jurisdictions discussed. 
It is to be hoped that the provision is accepted and 
adopted into the law of Manitoba unaltered. 
57. s .12 (_2) Wills Act 1936 ~19 7 5 {_South Australia)_ . 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The current formalities required to make a valid 
will and their inherent inadequacies have been discussed 
in this chapter. It has been seen that the rationale 
which spawned the formalities is often defeated by them. 
To reverse this trend various proposals have been put 
forward in several jurisdictions advocating the introduct-
ion of remedial provisions. These provisions have varied 
from those requiring most of the present formalities 
coupled with attempted due execution (as in Queensland) to 
those demanding solely the necessary "testamentary in-
tentions" in a document (as in Manitoba). Which is the 
most preferable course for New Zealand law to follow? 
It is submitted that the testator's testamentary 
intentions, insofar as they can be ascertained, ought to 
be given effect to by the law. Therefore, as long as a 
testator intimates his intentions free from fraud, 
forgery and undue influence, it should matter not at 
all whether he has complied with any threshold require-
ments of, for example, writing, signature and/or witness-
es or not. Thus the South Australian statute and the 
Manitoba proposal are preferred to those of the Uniform 
Probate Code, Queensland, Israel and British Columbia. 
Manitoba's insistence on the civil standard of proof is 
more acceptable than South Australia's requirement 
"beyond reasonable doubt". Of the six, therefore, it is 
submitted that Manitoba's proposal makes the clearest and 
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least complicated attempt at giving effect to a testator's 
testamentary intentions. 
The major drawback of the Manitoba approach 
~deed of all the approches discussed) is their insistence 
on the requirement of a document. But if true effect is 
to be given to testamentary intentions evinced by a 
testator should not oral wills be mentioned in discussion 
also? Granted, a wide definition of document could serve 
to validate some such wills. For example, the definition 
of document in the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 
' 1 d 58 1nc u es 
"(a) Any writing on any material: 
(b) Any information recorded or stored by 
means of any tape-recorder, computer, 
or other device; and any material 
subsequently derived from information 
so recorded or stored: 
(c) Any label, marking, or other writing 
that identifies or describes any 
thing of which it forms part, or to 
which it is attached by any means: 
(d) Any book, map, plan, graph, or drawing: 
(e) Any photograph, film, negative, tape, 
or other device in which one or more 
visual images are embodied so as to be 
capable (with or without the aid of 
some other equipment) of being 
reproduced." 
Were a proposal similar to Manitoba's to be adopted into 
New Zealand law, and the aforementioned definition of 
document utilised, then testamentary intentions spoken 
into a tape recorder or evinced, for example,in deaf and 
dumb language could be valid. (Freedom from fraud, 
forgery and coercion would always have to be proved 
58. Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 s.2(1). 
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with evidence on the balance of probabilities going to the 
authenticity of the document and the testator's intention 
that it actually be testamentary.) Such a step would be 
far removed from our present vigorous insistence on the 
s.9 formalities. Not only would it validate some types of 
oral wills but also holograph wills currently not 
recognised by New Zealand probate law. 
One problem not wholly solved by the adoption of such 
a solution would be that of oral wills. Oral wills, in 
certain circumstances, can be proved to contain an authent-
ic expression of a testator's testamentary wishes. The 
possibility of widespread abuse of oral wills coupled with 
difficulties of proof have precluded such wills from being 
adopted as a general mode of will-making in most jurisdict-
. 59 
lOllS. It is thought that these considerations would still 
not allow the general introduction of oral wills into probate 
law. However, it is submitted, that the acceptance of oral 
wills made in extremis in a situation of imminent death as a 
result of which the testator actually died would be a 
1 . t th . t t . 6 0 we come 1mprovemen on e present Sl ua 1on. It would 
not fully embody the principle of giving effect to a 
testator's intentions but it would, it is thought, go as 
far as policy factors might allow. 
Thus New Zealand succession law can be seen to be 
deficient in its formalism, and its failure to recognise 
59. Although oral wills are generally recognised as 
privileged wills - see, e.g. Wills Amendment Act 1955 
ss. 4-6 (N.Z.). 
60. Supra p.22 for discussion of this type of will. 
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holograph wills and nuncupative wills. The introduction 
of a proposal similar to Manitoba's would remedy the 
rigid interpretation of s.9 and would allow holograph 
wills to be proved. The introduction of an in extremis 
provision might operate to save some genuine expressions of 
testamentary intent made free from fraud, forgery and undue 
influence and for that reason is advocated. These changes 
would better reflect the rationale behind the present Wills 
Act formalities. 
In the two jurisdictions which actually have a 
remedial provision currently in force (namely, Israel and 
South Australia) it has not been the experience of either 
that litigation has increased. 61 Nor has it been the 
experience of either that a multiplicity of forms of wills 
has resulted. The provisions are remedial only. They do 
not provide a new method of. execution: only a remedy for 
certain types of failures in complying with the formalit-
. 62 
leS. Neither the Courts nor the general system of 
administration of estates, therefore, appear to have been 
unduly upset by the introduction of these provisions in 
Israel and South Australia. 
For those reasons, and because a remedial provision 
allows the Court to give effect to a testator's wishes 
61. British Columbia Working Paper pp.57-60. 
62. Ibid .. 
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when it is certain that the document is meant to be the 
last will of the deceased, it is submitted that New 
Zealand law ought to adopt a remedial provision. The 
advantages of adopting a proposal similar to that 
advanced by the Manitoba Law Reform Commission outweigh, 
it is thought, those of the other proposals. Its 
deficiency in not providing for oral wills made in 
extremis ought to be remedied in any proposal advanced or 
adopted for New Zealand. By opting for this course New 
law 
Zealand probatejwill have made some long overdue and much-
welcomed reforms to the well-nigh invincible Wills Act 
of 1837. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INTENTION REQUIRED TO EXECUTE A VALID WILL 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An instrument duly executed with all the formalities 
required by law may prima facie appear to be a valid will. 
That conclusion, however,could prove erroneous. For behind 
the instrument the requisite mental element must exist. To 
be valid as a will a document must not only comply with the 
necessary formalities: it must also be executed by the 
testator while in a mental state recognized by the law as 
being equal to the task. What amounts to such a 
sufficient.state of mind can be ascertained from the 
1 judgment of Cockburn C.J. in Banks v Goodfellow. 
!I It is essential to the exercise of [the 
power of testation] that a testator shall 
understand the nature of the act and its 
effects; shall understand the extent of 
the property of which he is disposing; 
shall be able to comprehend and appreciate 
the claims to which he ought to give 
effect; and, with a view to the latter 
object, that no disorder of the mind shall 
poison his affections, pervert his sense 
of right, or prevent the exercise of his 
natural faculties - that no insane 
delusion shall influence his will in dis-
posing of his property and bring about a 
disosal of it which, if the mind had been 
sound, would not have been made. 11 
1. (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 549 @ p.565. 
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This definition has several facets. First, a 
testator must understand "the nature of the act and its 
effects". This does not mean that a testator need 
appreciate the precise legal effect of his wishes - simply 
their broad effect on his death. 2 Secondly, the deceased 
must have a recollection of the extent of the property of 
which he is disposing. He need not hold a detailed 
inventory in his head but must have a general idea of that 
which comprises his estate. Thirdly, as regards "the 
claims to which he ought to give effect", Sir James 
Hannen's statement in Boughton v Knight is apposite. 
A testator must have: 3 
"a memory to recall the several persons who 
may be fitting objects of the testator's 
bounty, and an understanding to comprehend 
their relationship to himself and their 
claims upon him." 
A clarification of this third facet may be found later 
in the same case, where the learned judge reiterated that 
a will is not invalid merely because in making it the 
testator is moved by capricious, frivolous, mean or even 
bad motives. 
4 test he: 
As long as he satisfies the aforementioned 
"may disinherit ... his children, and 
leave his property to strangers to gratify 
his spite, or to charities to gratify his 
pride." 
2. Ibid. @ p.567. 
3. (1873) L.R. 3 P & D 64, @ pp.65-66. 
4. Ibid. @ p.66. 
Thus the general requirements of testamentary 
capacity, or animus testandi, seem clear. In Cockburn 
C.J's classic summation in Banks v Goodfellow~ a testator 
must: 5 
II in the language of the law, have a 
sound and disposing mind and memory. In 
other words, he ought to be capable of 
making his will with an understanding of 
the nature of the business in which he 
is engaged, a recollection of the property 
he means to dispose of, of the persons 
who are the objects of his bounty, and the 
manner in which it is to be distributed 
between them. It is not necessary that he 
should view his will with the eye of a 
lawyer, and comprehend its provisions in 
their legal form. It is sufficient if he 
has such a mind and memory as will enable 
him to understand the elements of which it 
is composed and the disposition of his 
property in its simple forms." 
Various factors might vitiate a testator's 
understanding of his will in any given instance. For 
example, he might suffer from insanity in which case he 
will usually not have the requisite animus testandi. 
However, he may have sufficient capacity if he is gener-
ally insane but experiences lucid intervals. In 
Cartwright v Cartwright 6 there was clear proof of 
habitual insanity, but there was also evidence that the 
will was made by the testatrix during a lucid interval. 
Consequently Sir William Wynne admitted the will to 
probate. Or, again, a testator might not be habitually 
76 
5. (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 549@ p.567 (quoting from the 
American case of Harrison v Rowan 3 Washington @ p.595). 
6. [1793] 1 Phill. 90. 
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insane but, instead, suffer from delusions, or monomania, 
on a particular topic which affects the dispositions in 
his will. 7 In Dew v Clark, for example, a testator, in 
other respects sane when the will was made, had an 
insane aversion to his daughter, his only child. As a 
result the daughter was virtually completely excluded 
from her father's will. The court held that the delusions 
operated to vitiate the testator's mental capacity and, 
therefore, pronounced the will invalid. In other 
circumstances, weakness of faculties due to illness or 
old age have also denied a testator sufficient animus 
testandi to execute a valid will. 8 
Thus far, the situations precluding the existence 
of the requisite mental capacity have been connected 
with physical infirmity: insanity habitual or partial, 
or the effects of age on the faculties. These are, 
however, not the only circumstances in which the necessary 
testamentary capacity may be vitiated. Three other 
instances demand discussion here. First, where there 
is undue influence or fraud; secondly, where there is 
duress, and, finally, where there is a want of knowledge 
and approval. 
7 . ( 18 2 6 ) 1 Add. 2 7 9 . 
8. See, for example, Battan Singh v Amirchand (testator 
dying from tuberculosis. Held: so enfeebled by 
disease that he could not execute a valid 
will) . 
As regards undue influence: A will will be 
declared invalid if, although the testator knew what 
the contents were, he has been forced to make it because 
of influence exerted over him by someone else. Thus in 
a court of probate undue influence means coercion: 9 
nothing short of mental coercion, destroying the 
testator's freedom of action is sufficient. The mere 
fact that the testator was persuaded by someone to make 
a will in a certain way, or has been continually 
bothered or harassed, is insufficient in itself. Nor 
is it sufficient that the other party was in such a 
relationship to the testator as would make it easy 
for him to be influenced. A will made in such circum-
stances will be valid as long as it can be shown that 
any behaviour of the other party stopped short of 
coercion. As Sir J.P. Wilde said in Hall v Hall: 10 
I 
"Persuasion "is not unlawful, but pressure 
of whatever character if so exerted as 
to overpower the volition without con-
vincing the judgment of the testator will 
constitute undue influence, though no 
force is either used or threatened." 
As regards fraud: it differs from undue 
influence in that fraud misleads a testator whereas 
undue influence coerces him. For example, if a person 
9. Per Hannen P. in Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) ll 
P . D . 81 @ p . 8 2 . 
10. (1868) L.R. l P & D 481 @ 482. Comparative cases 
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on this point comprise: Bullock v Lloyds Bank [1955] 
Ch.3l7; Re Craig [1971] Ch.95; Boyse v Rossborough 
(1857) 6 H.L.C. 2; Tanner v Public Trustee [1973] 
N.Z.L.R. 68; Re Brocklehurst [1978] l All E.R. 767. 
falsely represents his own or another's character or 
conduct as being exemplary in order to inveigle his way 
into being an object of the testator's bounty then 
fraud will clearly be established. Many other types of 
fraud have been perpetrated: for example, by deceit 
preventing a testator from revoking a provision; 
deliberately misrepresenting personal circumstances so 
as to obtain a gift; deliberately impersonating another 
in order to benefit under a will. 11 A detailed 
examination of such cases are, however, not within the 
scope of this paper. 
The second vitiating factor to be discussed in 
this section is duress. Testamentary intention is 
deemed to be overborne where a testator is compelled to 
make a will by force or threats of physical violence. 
The situation is similar where a testator wishes to 
alter a valid will but is prevented from doing so by 
force or threats by a person who stands to benefit from 
an unchanged will. 
In such circumstances the court will declare that 
the beneficiary taking under the will holds his 
interest as trustee for the person who would have taken 
if the testator had done what he wished. 12 In other 
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11. See, for example, Allen v McPherson (1847) 1 H.L.C.l91 
and In the Estate of Posner [1953J P.277. 
12. See Betts v Doughty (1879) 5 P.D. 26. 
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words, the court will, as far as possible, give effect 
to the real intentions of the testator. 
Finally, it is essential to the valid execution 
of any will that a testator knows and approves of its 
contents. A testator must know and intend to execute 
that which he does in fact execute. A want of either 
knowledge or intention will result in the document 
being refused admission to probate. Although the 
formalities of execution might have been complied with, 
it cannot be said that the requisite mental capacity 
was present if the testator either had no knowledge or 
intention to execute the document propounded as his 
will. The situation is similar where there is a want of 
knowledge and approval as regards some part of the 
document. Then the part in question will be excluded 
from probate. The rest of the document will be 
admitted to probate as long as it satisfies all the 
other relevant requirements. 
Thus knowledge and approval in this sense involves 
two central aspects: the testator's intention which is 
not realised because of mistake. 13 These two concepts 
in turn raise further questions for discussion, namely: 
how do mistakes arise in this context? and what powers do 
the courts have in trying to correct them so that the 
13. While a want of knowledge and approval can arise 
for other reasons e.g. fraud and those canvassed 
at pp.76-79 supra, it is proposed to confine the 
central discussion to want of knowledge and 
approval in the field of mistake. 
will reflects the testator's original intention to 
some extent at least? 
An attempt will now be made to answer these 
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testing questions, as it is submitted that this particular 
area of mental capacity is fraught with difficulty for 
both testator and courts alike and is long overdue for 
reconsideration and reform. 
2. KNOWLEDGE AND APPROVAL 
It has been demonstrated that, before a document 
can be admitted to probate, both the physical and 
mental elements of legal testamentary execution must be 
complied with. That is, the formalities required by 
s.9 Wills Act 1837 coupled with a knowledge and approval 
of the contents of the document in question. Having 
already discussed the various failings of the formal 
requirements, 14 what constitutes a want of knowledge 
and approval falls to be discussed here. 
In general terms, a want of knowledge and approval 
means that the testator did not fully appreciate what he 
was executing. In other words, he executed something 
different to that which he intended to execute. In 
these circumstances the testator will not possess the 
14. See previous chapter. 
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necessary testamentary intention and the document cannot 
be admitted to probate: he cannot be said to have 
"known and approved of" the document at the time he 
executed it. Proving a want of knowledge and approval on 
grounds of mistake may, however, be difficult. This is 
because where a will appears properly executed in point 
of form then it will be presumed that the testator did 
know and approve of its contents. The following section 
deals in detail with the many problems on this point. It 
will suffice to mention here the two main exceptions to 
this general presumption. 
First, in the case of blind, dumb or illiterate 
testators positive evidence is required to show that the 
will was read over to the testator before execution or 
that in some other way the testator had knowledge of its 
15 
contents before it can be admitted to probate. A 
statement to this effect should be included in the will. 16 
Secondly, suspicious circumstances prevent the 
operation of the presumption unless and until the 
grounds for suspicion are removed. For example, where 
a person has prepared a will and that same person takes 
15. See, for example, In the Goods of GeaZe (1864) 3 
Sw & Tr. 431, (testator deaf, dumb and illiterate). 
In the Estate of HoZtam (1913) 108 L.T. 732, 
(testator deaf, dumb and illiterate) and Fincham v 
Edwards (1842) 4 Moo.P.C. 198 (proof by other 
evidence than reading over may suffice) . 
16. See, for example, in England, the Non Contentious 
Probate Rules 1954 r.ll. 
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a benefit under it, then, if the validity of the will is 
attacke~ the presumption of knowledge and approval ceases 
to apply. Instead, the facts are taken to raise a 
suspicion that the beneficiary surreptitiously slipped the 
provisions in without the knowledge of the testator. That 
suspicion can only be removed by positive evidence of 
knowledge and approval. What amounts to "positive 
evidence" will vary with the circumstances of the case. 
In Wintle Nye 17 the whole of testatrix's v a 
residuary estate (a substantial amount) was given, by the 
will, to the solicitor who had drawn it up. The 
plaintiff, Colonel Wintle, interested in the event of an 
intestacy, challenged the will on the ground of want of 
knowledge and approval. He eventually succeeded in the 
f d h . . d . d 18 House o Lor s, w ere V1scount S1mon s sal : 
"It is not the law that in no circumstances 
can a solicitor or other person who has 
prepared a will for a testator take a 
benefit under it. But that fact creates 
a suspicion that must be removed by the 
person propounding the will. In all cases 
the court must be vigilant and zealous. 
The degree of suspicion will vary with the 
circumstances of the case. It may be 
slight and easily dispelled. It may, on 
the other hand, be so grave that it can 
hardly be removed. In the present case 
the circumstances were such as to impose 
on the respondent as heavy a burden as can 
be imagined." 
17. [1959] 1 W.L.R. 284. 
18. Ibid. @ p.291. And see Barry v ButZin (1838) 2 Moo. 
P.C. 480 @ pp.481-2 (Parke B.) and, more recently, 
Re Stott (deceased) [1980] 1 All E.R. 259 (where 
Wintle v Nye was applied) . 
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A third situation,not strictly an exception to the 
presumption, but an exception to the principle that a 
testator must have full mental capacity when he makes his 
will, and, therefore, occupying a peculiar position in the 
19 law, is the rule known as the Rule in Parker v FeZgate. 
The rule may be expressed thus: Where a testator 
gives instructions for a will at a time when he fully 
understands his actions and subsequently he executes a 
will prepared in accordance with those instructions, then, 
that will will be valid despite the fact that at the 
date of execution the testator is no longer capable of 
completely understanding the instructions or the provisions 
of the will giving effect to them but he does remember 
that he gave instructions and understands that he is 
executing a will carrying out those instructions. 20 
As Hannen P. put it in Parker v Felgate itself: 21 
"If a person has given instructions to a 
solicitor to make a will, and the solicitor 
prepared it in accordance with those 
instructions, all that is necessary to make 
it a good will, if executed by the testator, 
is that he should be able to think thus far, 
"I gave my solicitor instructions to 
prepare a will making a certain disposition 
of my property. I have no doubt that he has 
given effect to my intention, and I accept 
the document which is put before me as 
carrying it out."." 
19. (1883) 8 P.D. 171. 
20. Ibid .. 
21. Ibid, @ p.l73. 
This principle was subsequently accepted in the 
Privy Council case of Perera v Perera 22 but, it is 
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submitted that it is illogical and dangerous and that the 
law would be the better for its absenc~. The principle allows 
a testator to make a valid execution of a document when 
he is not fully aware of what he is doing: if he had 
been he might decide that the previous instructions 
ought to be altered. Such a manifestly unsatisfactory 
situation ought not to find a place in any reforms of 
this aspect of the law of succession. 
t h 1 d b t . d 23 th t t f I as a rea y een men lone a a wan o 
knowledge and approval can arise for various reasons: 
for example, fraud, duress, mistake. The following dis-
cussion, however, will only deal with the subject of 
want of knowledge and approval in connection with 
mistake. Two major reasons have prompted this course. 
First, the breadth of the topic. Cases of mistake have 
plagued the courts relentlessly over the last 150 years. 
The result, predictably perhaps, has been a mass of 
difficult case law. Secondly, proposed remedies for 
mistake tend to be peculiar to that subject. It demands, 
therefore, a certain amount of singular treatment. 
22. [1901] A.C. 354. 
23. Supra p.BO and n.l3. 
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3. MISTAKE 
It has already been seen that the usual onus upon 
the propounder of a testamentary document to show that it 
was the subject of the testator's knowledge and approval 
is shifted once due execution has been proved. 24 In most 
cases of mistake, therefore, the challenger has a form-
idable task. To succeed he must establish, for example, 
that the document signed as the testator's will in fact 
contains unintended material. That is, that the testat-
or's actual intention was not given effect to by the 
document propounded as his will: there was, therefore, a 
want of knowledge and approval as regards the will or 
some part of it. 
If the challenge on the ground of mistake succeeds 
then the will or the parts which the testator did not 
know and approve of will be omitted from probate. 
Difficulties in this area of the law revolve around 
two major points. First, the meaning of knowledge and 
approval. What amounts to knowledge and approval? Must a 
testator have actually read, absorbed and understood the 
legal phraseology employed by his draftsman in the 
drawing of the will? Or is it sufficient that he merely 
"glanced over" the document executed as his will? 
Principles in this area are difficult to discern. An 
attempt to reconcile the relevant cases has been said by 
24. Supra pp.81-83. 
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Latey J. to produce "intellectual gymnastics, if not 
acrobatics". 25 He continues by advising that not all the 
decisions and dicta are reconcilable. 26 With these 
warnings in mind an attempt at the interpretation of the 
relevant cases has, nevertheless, been undertaken. It is 
hoped, thereby, not only to achieve a clarification of 
the meaning given to "knowledge and approval" in this 
field but also to gain a better informed general view of 
an area which has caused, and continues to cause, consid-
erable problems. 
The second major point of difficulty involves the 
powers of the court of probate. Given that the will is 
shown not to reflect the testator's intentions how far 
can that court go in an attempt to remedy the situation? 
Again, as will be seen, inconsistencies in the cases are 
prevalent. 
The confusing state of the law in this area has 
resulted in the Law Reform Committee in England recomm-
ending that the equitable remedy of rectification should 
27 be available to the court of probate. The Committee 
further suggested that the court of construction should 
have wider powers to admit external or extrinsic 
• t ' d d I • t • 28 ev1dence to ascer a1n a ecease person s 1n ent1ons. 
25. In re Morris (deceased) [1971] P.62 @ p.75. 
2 6. Ibid .. 
27. Law Reform Committee 19th Report Cmnd.5301. 
28. Ibid .. 
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The powers of the court of construction are outlined in 
the next chapter. 
The following classification of cases and the 
principles laid down therein are tentatively stated only. 
They highlight the obstacles encountered when it is 
contended that a testator's intentions are at variance 
with that which he has signed as his testamentary 
document. Of necessity, therefore, the court of 
probate's remedial powers, their limitations and 
inadequacies are discussed. Mention is also made of 
current proposals for reform, their relative merits 
and their prospects of success. 
(i) Execution of the wrong document. 
This situation usually arises where a testator, 
instead of executing the document prepared as his will, 
executes a document prepared as someone else's will, 
the documents being similar, if not identical, in form 
and substance. Can the document which the testator 
has signed be admitted to probate? 
of 
In 
In England, on the authority of In the Estate 
29 Meyer, the answer appears to be in the negative. 
New Zealand30 and Canada 31 the opposite view has 
been taken. 
29. [1908] P.353. 
30. See Guardian Trust & Executors Company of New 
Zealand Ltd v Inwood [1946] N.Z.L.R. 614 (C.A.). 
31. See Re Brander [1952] 4 D.L.R. 688. 
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In the Estate of Meyer concerned two sisters who 
had each made wills and now wanted to make codicils in 
identical terms. Two codicils were therefore drawn up 
and placed before the sisters for execution. Unfortunately, 
however, by mistake, the sisters executed each other's 
codicil. It was held that neither document would be 
d . d b . 32 a m1tte to pro ate, Barnes P. stat1ng: 
"But it is quite clear that this lady, though 
her signature is on the document, never 
meant to sign this particular codicil at 
all. She meant to sign a totally different 
document." 
On principle, it is submitted that the decision in 
In the Estate of Meyer is correct. For a will to be valid 
it must be shown that the deceased intended to execute a 
will in the terms of the document put forward as his will. 
Thus, the testator must have intended to execut~ the very 
document which he signed. If, therefore, he signs a 
document similar, even identical, to that which he intend-
ed to sign that is insufficient: there is no animus 
testandi as regards a similar or identical document as the 
testator did not intend to sign that document. 
In New Zealand, however, a contrary view has been 
taken. In Guardian Trust & Executors Company of New 
7 d d a33 . . d Zea&an Lt v Inwoo two s1sters, Jane Rem1ngton an 
Maude Lucy Remington, executed each other's wills by 
mistake. In substance the wills were identical. The 
32. [1908] P.353 @ p. 354. 
33. Supra n.30. 
Court of Appeal admitted the will of the first to die 
(Jane) to probate with the omission of her sister's 
names (Maude Lucy) in the dispositive parts of the 
document. Fair J. @ page 623 said: 
"True, the physical document was not the 
paper that the testatrix intended to sign, 
but it was a paper that contained every-
thing that she wished included in the 
paper she intended to sign except the 
Christian names of her sister. She adopted 
it believing that it expressed her intent-
ions in every respect. It does in most, 
and can be read as carrying out her 
intentions." 
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In this conclusion Fair J. dismissed the forceful argument 
of counsel opposing probate: an argument which embodied 
in 
in 
lucid language the stance taken by the English courts 
34 In the Estate of Meyer: 
"Jane Remington did not sign the paper with 
the intention of making the document her 
will .... There is no significance in the 
fact that the document signed by Jane 
contained similar provisions to the one she 
intended to sign. It was not her will, 
although it had some similar features. She 
intended to sign the will she had seen and 
read as her own will, but the document she 
intended to sign was not signed, and her 
mind did not go with her signature to the 
other document. Consequently, the mistake 
of the testatrix destroyed her animus 
testandi .... There must be an animus 
testandi involving knowledge of the contents 
of the document and intention to make it the 
will. Intention is not sufficient. Mistake 
like fraud, or duress, invalidates a will.by 
removing the animus testandi. The plaintiff 
has confused this with a mistake in some 
disposition, which may be rectified, but the 
mistake here goes to validity of the whole 
34. [1908] P.353. 
document... This [the document signed] 
cannot be rectified, as it is not a will 
at all." 35 
Neither Jane nor Maude Lucy Remington intended to sign 
the document prepared for the other. Had the documents 
not been drafted in similar terms, it is submitted that 
the Court of Appeal would have found no difficulty in 
refusing probate. This case did not involve a general 
intention to execute the very documents in question 
coupled with a mistake as to inclusion or exclusion of 
some part (the more usual type of mistake 36 ). Instead, 
no intention existed to execute the documents in fact 
signed. But, because of the substantial uniformity of 
the terms of the documents it is suggested that the Court 
made an unwarranted and unjustifiable extension to the 
law of mistake in New Zealand in concluding that: 37 
"the document does express, as it was 
intended to, the real intention of the 
testatrix except for the omission of 
the two words "Maude Lucy" and the 
substitution for them of the word 
"Jane." 
The court accordingly granted probate of the will signed 
by Jane with the omission of the word "Jane" from the 
body of the will. 
35. Guardian Trust etc v Inwood~ supra @ pp.620-621 
Hutchison arguendo. 
36. See infra pp. 95-133 for a 
discussion of such situations. 
37. Guardian Trust etc v Inwood~ supra 
@ p.624 (Fair J.). 
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Although the result of the case gave effect to the 
testarix's intentions as regarded the disposition of her 
property it is submitted that the route chosen to arrive 
at the decision is suspect. Had the court asked itself: 
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Did the testatrix intend to execute the document which she 
in fact did execute irrespective of its contents? then the 
confusion would not have arisen. The answer to that 
question ought to have been in the negative and no 
further question ought then to have been asked about the 
similarity of the terms of the two documents. 
Inwood> however, has been followed elsewhere in 
the Commonwealth. In the Canadian case of Re Brander 38 
Wilson~ relied heavily on that New Zealand case in his 
judgment. 
The brief facts of Re Brander were these: John 
and Margaret Brander had had their solicitor prepare 
for each of them a will leaving all of their respective 
property to the other and appointing the other executor. 
Through an error, however, John signed the will drawn 
for Margaret and Margaret signed the will drawn for John. 
John died first, and this case involved an application by 
his wife requesting that part of the words of the document 
be struck out (those referring to the husband John in 
the clause appointing the executor and naming the sole 
beneficiary) and a substitution made in each 
38. [1952] 4 D.L.R. 688. 
instance with words appropriately describing his wife 
Margaret. Wilson J. granted the application, including 
the alterations requested. He said: 39 
"Any difficulty I might have in grappling 
with this matter is solved by the judgment 
in Guardian Trust & Executors Co v Inwood 
... where the Court of Appeal for New 
Zealand was confronted with an almost 
identical problem and solved it by granting 
the relief here asked for." 
But in the New Zealand case no request was made 
for the insertion of words, only deletion was asked for. 
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Thus it is submitted that Wilson J. came to a questionable 
decision in two respects. First, neither John nor 
Margaret intended to execute the very document which they 
in fact signed. 40 Therefore the principle to be found 
in In the Estate of Meyer could (and arguably should) have 
disposed of the case by refusing admission to probate. 
Secondly, given, however, that Inwood was to be followed 
to the extent that the document was to be admitted to 
probate with words omitted, no basis is to be found in 
that case allowing a court of probate to insert words. 41 
3 9. Ibid .. 
40. See In the Estate of Meyer supra, and In the Goods 
of Hunt (1875) L.R. 3 P & D 250 (probate refused when 
two sisters mistakenly signed each other's will) . 
41. The Court of Probate has long exercised jurisdiction to 
exclude from a will upon admission to probate words 
inserted by way of mistake within the limits laid down 
in Re Horrocks [1939] P.l98. And see Morrell v Morrell 
(1882) 7 P.D. 68: Re Boehm [1891] P.247; Rhodes v 
Rhodes (1882) 7 App. Cas. 192. 
The decision in Re Brander has been described by 
' 4 
one Canadian commentator as: 2 
" ... eminently wise and sensible. There 
is no doubt as to the testamentary 
intentions of the testator. They were 
reduced to writing in proper form and he 
thought he was executing them as his will. 
He did execute a document in the form of a 
will and he had it properly witnessed as 
his will." 
94 
Whilst this writer agrees that in both Brander and Inwood 
the testamentary intentions of the testator and testatrix 
were clear, it is objected that that alone cannot circum-
vent the current legal requirement of animus testandi 
directed towards the actual document signed as the 
testator's will. Until a change in the law allows the 
testator's ascertained intentions to override his 
physical act in the case of signing the wrong will then 
it is suggested that the Meyer approach ought to be 
adhered to. 43 
42. Case and Comment 31 Can. B.R. 185 @ p.l87 
(Gilbert D. Kennedy). 
43. Theobald on Wills states that despite 
the wrong paper being executed by mistake if 
the essential elements of execution as a will 
have been fulfilled and the testamentary 
intentions established beyond doubt, and all 
the testamentary gifts can be given effect to 
by the striking out of inapt words, the paper 
so amended may be admitted to probate; as the 
Court will not allow a matter of form to stand 
in the way if the essential elements of execut-
ion have been fulfilled. This, it is submitted, 
is correctly viewed as a concession to the common 
law rules, not as a statement of them. Reform of 
the rules themselves would obviate the necessity 
for such compromises. 
(ii) Clerical slip made by testator while 
drafting his own will. 
95 
If words are inserted in a will by a mere clerical 
error by a testator drawing his own will then they will 
be omitted from probate. This is because the testator 
did not intend the words to form part of his will: the 
mind of the testator did not advert to the presence of 
the words and then consciously authorise their inclusion 
in the document signed as his will. On the contrary, in 
most cases the testator in question will not even know 
that the words are there. Therefore, the courts have 
been reluctant to ascribe knowledge and approval to the 
words inserted by the draftsman's own clerical error in 
his home-made will. 
44 In the case of Re Swords~ for example, a 
testatrix herself drew up a codicil amending her will. 
In the codicil she referred to the wrong clauses of her 
will: she had intended to refer to "clauses 2, 3 and 
4" of her will but in her codicil referred to 'clauses 
3, 4 and 5". The mistake had occurred through the 
testatrix's reference to an old draft of her current will 
rather than the will itself. It was held that this was 
similar to a clerical error, and the inadvertant refer-
ences were omitted from the probate. 
44. [1952] P.368. 
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The more recent case of In re PheZan 45 demonstrates 
the application of the relevant principles even more 
clearly. 
In that case the testator executed a home-made will 
on the lOth of June 1968. That will contained a legacy 
and a gift of residue. On July 29th 1968 he executed 
three further wills which dealt only with different 
blocks of specific assets. The documents were not incon-
sistent. The problem, however, was that each of the July 
wills was made on a printed will form containing a 
clause which purported to revoke all previous wills made 
by the testator. On an application by the sole 
surviving executor for a grant of probate of all the 
wills, it was held that all four wills could be admitted 
to probate. Although the testator had signed printed 
will forms containing revocation clauses, he had not 
adverted to those clauses: it was as if they had slipped 
in by clerical error. 
law: 46 
Stirling J. stated the relevant 
II although a testator who has executed 
a will, which prima facie he has read, if 
he is of competent mind must be taken to 
know and approve what he executes, and that 
would include, of course, a revocation 
clause, there is no presumption of law; it 
is merely a grave and weighty circumstance 
to consider, and if the obvious facts 
militate against such an intention as ex-
pressed in the document the court can act 
upon the real intention as found by the 
45. [1972] Faro. 33. 
46. Ibid. @ p.35. 
court. It can do so in this case 
(and there is authority for it) by 
omitting certain words. The court 
cannot,of course, remake a will for a 
testator but it can omit words which 
have come in by inadvertance or by 
misunderstanding if their omission 
gives effect to the true intentions 
of the testator as found by the 
court." 
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In re Morris (deceasedJ~ 47 a judgment of Latey J., 
was relied on heavily in In re Phelan (deceased). The 
more flexible and realistic approach to giving effect to 
ascertained testamentary intentions, which characterised 
In re Morris (deceased)~ is to be found in In re Phelan 
(deceased). Despite the testator in In re Phelan 
(deceased) having signed three wills with revocation 
clauses (because of inadvertance or misunderstanding) the 
court was prepared to depart from the prima facie infer-
ence of knowledge and approval. It is submitted that it 
is a point of some note that the revocation clauses in 
question were not written by the testator himself. If 
they had been it would have been extremely difficult to 
establish that he had not adverted to their presence 
irrespective of whether he realised their significance. 48 
In such circumstances their inclusion could not be 
termed a "clerical slip~': the mere result of absent-
mindedness on the part of the testator. Any attempt, 
therefore, to have them excluded from the probate would 
have to be considered under another head of mistake. 
47. [1971] P.62. 
48. Compare Collins v Elstone [1893) P.l. 
(iii) Clerical slip made by draftsman to 
whom testator has delegated the 
task of drafting his will. 
The cases on this topic are legion not only in 
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number but also in result. As such, principles are diffi-
cult to ascertain. Despite this, an attempt at a basic 
principle follows: If a draftsman has been instructed by 
a testator to draw up his will, and that draftsman 
introduces words contrary to his instructions by clerical 
error,then the testator is not bound by the mistake 
unless the very words are brought to his notice and he 
adopts them as his own before the execution of the will. 
A testator, usually bound by his draftsman'swork, 
is not so bound where the draftsman acts outside the 
scope of his authority. By introducing words contrary 
to the testator's instructions the draftsman has exceeded 
his authority. And no general rule imputes knowledge and 
approval to the testator in all circumstances where a 
testator has instructed a draftsman to draw up his will. 
In most cases, therefore, the question for the court to 
determine is whether the testator has acknowledged and 
approved of the draftsman's work, including his clerical 
error(s), thereby in effect, making the error(s) his own. 
What amounts to knowledge and approval in this 
area is a vexed question. However, several statements 
can be made with a degree of certainty. 
If a draftsman makes a clerical error in the will, 
and that will is not read by or read over to the 
testator before execution then the testator cannot be said 
to adopt the draftsman's mistake. 49 In Morrell v Morrell 
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a draftsman inadvertantly inserted the number "40'' instead of 
the number "400" before a gift of shares from a testator to 
his nephew. The will as drafted was engrossed and executed 
by the testator. It was not read over to the testator, nor 
did he read it himself. It was clear, therefore, that the 
testator did not know that "40" had been written instead of 
"400". The court held that the 40 ought to be omitted from 
the probate so that effect could be given to the testator's 
intention: he intended to leave all his shares in that com-
pany to his nephew and all his shares amounted to "400". Thus 
the omission gave effect to "the true intentions of the 
testator as found by the court"~O Similarly, in In the Goods 
of Schott 51 the testator executed his will which contained, 
by mistake, the word "revenue" instead of "residue". The 
error appeared in the dictated draft will and the engross-
ment. The court heard evidence that, insofar as it was 
possible to ascertain, neither the draft will nor the 
engrossment was read over to the testator. And the discrep-
ancy between the instructions and the will as executed was 
not brought to his notice. Jeune P. therefore held that the 
word "revenue" be omitted from the probate copy of the will: 
the testator had not adverted to the existence of the word and 
could not be held to have adopted it has his own. In his 
49. (1882) 7 P.D. 68. 
50. See n.46 (In re Phelan). 
51. ~1901] P.l90. 
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judgment Jeune P. disapproved of the practice advocated by 
Sir Charles Butt in In the Goods of Bushell 52 and later in 
In the Goods of Huddleston 53 . 
In In the Goods of Bushell a draftsman's clerical 
error caused the word "British" instead of the word 
"Bristol" to appear in a will which the testator signed 
without reading it over. It was held that the word 
"British" ought to be struck out for want of knowledge and 
approval. Thus far the decision is unobjectionable. 
However, Sir Charles Butt then sanctioned the insertion of 
the word "Bristol" in its place. In so doing he exceeded 
the powers of the court of probate which are limited to 
striking out. As Jeune P. commented at p.l92 in In the 
Goods of Schott: 
"I am afraid that it must be admitted that 
upon this point of probate practice the 
late Sir Charles Butt was heretical." 
A similar point of probate practice was raised a 
few years later in the case of In the Goods of Sir J.E. 
54 Boehm. In that case a draftsman, by a clerical error, 
inserted the name of one intended beneficiary (Georgiana) 
twice whilst omitting the name of another intended 
beneficiary (Florence) altogether. The will was not read 
over to the testator at any time, and the error was not 
brought to his notice. It was held that probate might be 
52. (1887) 13 P.D.7. 
53. (1890) 63 L.T. 255. 
54. [1891] P.247. 
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granted to the executor with the omission of the name 
"Georgiana" where it appeard for the second time. 
Jeune J's difficulty in arriving at this conclus-
ion involved a realisation that in all the cases cited to 
55 him in argument: 
" ... to strike out the word or words , 
inserted in error left the will what 
the testator intended it to be. Here, 
to strike out the word Georgiana and to 
leave a blank in its place does not 
leave the will what the testator in-
tended it should be, and I am not aware 
that there is any exact authority for 
striking a word out of a will under the 
circumstances." 
t h t . 56 Bu e went on o op1ne: 
" ... that the application of the principle 
of striking out a word clearly inserted in 
mistake may be safely extended, if it be 
an extension, to a case where the effect 
of its rejection may be to render ambiguous, 
or even insensible, a clause of which it 
formed part. If a person by fraud obtained 
the substitution of his name for that of 
another in a will it would be strange if his 
name could not be struck out, although the 
rest of the clause in which it occurred 
became thereby meaningless. It may be that 
in the present case the effect of striking 
out the name in question will be, on the 
construction of the will, as it will then 
read, to carry out the testator's intentions 
completely. It is not for me to decide 
that. But even if to strike out a name 
inserted in error and leave a blank have not 
the effect of giving full effect to the 
testator's wishes, I do not see why we 
should not, so far as we can, though we may 
not completely, carry out his intentions." 
55. Ibid. @ p.250. 
56. Ibid. @ p.251. 
lOla 
The court of probate's power to strike out raises 
problems common to all the categories of mistake. It 
will therefore be discussed after this classification of 
cases has been completed. 
At this juncture it is pertinant to note that New 
Zealand courts have also had cause to consider this area 
of law. In In Re Smith (deceasedJ 57 for example, a 
draftsman's clerical error included in the will a phrase 
which the testator had intended to be omitted. ' Before 
execution the testator did not read over the will and it 
was not read over to him. Henry J. held, consistently 
with the line of authority just discussed, that the 
testator could not be held to have knowledge and approval 
of the phrase and that it ought, therefore, to be 
omitted. 
An issue of a like nature was raised by the case 
of Re Whyte ( deceasedJ.58 In that case a testatrix left 
two wills, one made in 1945 and the other in 1968 
shortly before her death. Her instructions were that the 
later will was to contain the same provisions as the 
earlier will except for the substitution of a new 
alternative trustee. Inadvertently a provision of the 
earlier will devising and bequeathing the whole estate 
to her husband was omitted from the later will. The 
testatrix duly executed the 1968 will but it was not 
57. [1956] N.Z.L.R. 593. 
58. [1969] N.Z.L.R. 519. 
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read over to her prior to her signing it. McGregor A.C.J. 
held that, on the evidence, the testatrix did not read her 
will over or have it read over to her, that she therefore 
had no knowledge and approval of its contents and that it 
would therefore be declared invalid. At page 520 
McGregor A.C.J. summarised the relevant law thus: 
"It is essential to the validity of a will 
that the testator should know and approve 
of its contents: Guardhouse v BZackburn.59 
Ordinarily, unless suspicion attaches to 
the document, the testator's execution is 
sufficient evidence of his knowledge and 
approval, but if the manner in which the 
will was read over is called in question, 
or if the will was not read over, the bare 
presumption may be rebutted: Garnett-
BotfieZd v Garnett-BotfieZd;60 but the 
clearest evidence is required: Gregson v 
TayZor~l The party propounding must prove 
affirmatively that the testator knew and 
approved of the contents. The Court cannot 
supply words omitted from the will by 
mistake or correct an obvious mistake. 
In the present case I am satisfied, and it 
is accepted, that at the time of the execut-
ion of the later will the testatrix did not 
know and approve of the contents thereof .... " 
This case seems to take the established principles 
to their outer limits. Here the clerical error concerned 
an omission, as opposed to an inadvertant insertion: the 
courts having no power to insert words 62 prima facie there 
is little a court would seem able to do. However, the 
59. (1866) L.R.l P & D 109; [1861-73] All E.R. Rep.680. 
60. [1901] P.335. 
61. [1917] P.256. 
62. See following chapter. 
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judge found that the testatrix had no knowledge and 
approval at all of her will which she had signed. The 
result by holding the second will invalid was much more 
nearly to give effect to the testatrix's original 
intentions. 
The principle established by these cases from both 
England and New Zealand thus seems clear: A draftsman's 
clerical error in a will which is not read over to or 
read over by the testator prior to execution will not be 
deemed to be adopted by that testator, and will, accord-
ingly, be omitted from the probate copy of the will. 
(Although, as mentioned previously, the latter point is 
not without its own difficulties which are discussed 
later.) 
It can readily be seen from the cases, and from the 
principle itsel0 that evidence establishing the exact 
sequence of events prior to execution may be of the 
utmost importance. Whether the will was read over or 
not may result in the application of very different 
legal doctrines. 
Where a will containinga draftsman's clerical error 
has been read over to a testator prior to execution the 
law is more complicated. In the case of Guardhouse v 
63 Blackburn Sir J.P. Wilde reiterated the following 
64 
rules in relation to the subject of knowledge and approval: 
63. (1866) L.R. 1 P & D 109 
64. Ibid. @ p.ll6. 
"First, that before a paper so [i.e. duly] 
executed is entitled to probate, the Court 
must be satisfied that the testator knew 
and approved of the contents at the time 
he signed it. Secondly, that except in 
certain cases, where suspicion attaches to 
the document, the fact of the testator's 
execution is sufficient proof that he knew 
and approved of the contents. Thirdly, 
that although the testator knew and approved 
the contents, the paper may still be reject-
ed, on proof 1 establishing, beyond all poss-
ibility of mistake, that he did not intend 
the paper to operate as a will. Fourthly, 
that although the testator did know and 
approve the contents, the paper may be 
refused probate, if it be proved that any 
fraud has been purposely practised on the 
testator in obtaining his execution thereof. 
Fifthly, that subject to this last preceding 
proposition, the fact that the will has been 
duly read over to a capable testator on the 
occasion of its execution, or that its 
contents have been brought to his notice in 
any other way, should, when coupled with 
his execution thereof, be held conclusive 
evidence that he approved as well as knew the 
contents thereof. Sixthly, that the above 
rules apply equally to a portion of the will 
as to the whole." 
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The fifth rule is of particular import to this dis-
cussion. From it, it appears that Sir J.P. Wilde under-
stood that the reading over to or by a testator of his 
will provided, in the absence of fraud, conclusive proof 
of knowledge and approval of the contents of the will by 
the testator. Thus no evidence, however forceful, could 
be received once it had been proved that a testator had 
either read over his will or had it read over to him. But 
testators do not all read their wills closely and care-
fully: some do so by what amounts to no more than a 
glance. Thus it seems iniquitous that the same amount of 
knowledge and approval was to be imputed to each. 
It was to be 11 years before the rule came before 
the House of Lords. In the interim it was followed in 
Atter v Atkinson 65 and in Harter v Harter. 66 
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The rule came before the House in 1875 in Fulton v 
Andrew 67 (an appeal from a decision of Lord Penzance, 
formerly Sir J.P. Wilde). Lord Cairns L.C. considered the 
rule, which Sir J.P. Wilde had purported to lay down in 
Guardhouse v Blackburn~ 68 thus: 69 
65. 
66. 
6 7. 
6 8. 
69. 
"It is said that it has been established by 
certain cases ... , that in judging of the 
validity of a will or of a part of a will, 
if you find that the testator was of sound 
mind, memory, and understanding, and if you 
find, further, that the will was read over 
to him, or read over by him, there is an end 
of the case; that you must at once assume 
that he was aware of the contents of the will, 
and that there is a positive and unyielding 
rule of law that no evidence against that pre-
sumption can be received. My Lords, I should 
in this case, as indeed in all other cases, 
greatly deprecate the introduction or creation 
of fixed and unyielding rules of law which are 
not imposed by Act of Parliament. I think it 
would be greatly to be deprecated that any 
positive rule as to dealing with a question of 
fact should be laid down, and laid down now for 
the first time, unless the Legislature has, in 
the shape of an Act of Parliament, distinctly 
imposed that rule." 
(1869) L.R. 1 p & D 665. 
(1873) L.R. 3 p & D. 11. 
(1875) L. R. 7 H.L. 448. 
Supra p. 103. 
Fulton v Andrew (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 448 @ pp.460-461. 
Lord Hatherley agreed, commenting on the supposed 
' f ' 'd 1 70 exlstence o a rlgl ru e 
" ... by which, when you are once satisfied 
that a testator of a competent mind has had 
his will read over to him and has thereupon 
executed it, all fart.her inquiry is shut out. 
No doubt those.circumstances afford a very 
grave and strong presumption that the will 
has been duly and properly executed by the 
testator; still circumstances may exist 
which may require that something further 
shall be done in the matter than the mere 
establishment of the fact of the testator 
having been a person of sound mind and 
memory, and also having had read over to him 
that which had been prepared for him, and 
which he executed as his will,... . One is 
strongly impressed with the consideration 
that, according to the natural habits.and 
conduct of men in general, if a man signs 
any instrument, he being competent to under-
stand that instrument, and having had it 
read to him, there is a very strong presumpt-
ion that it has been duly executed, and that 
very strong evidence is required in opposition 
to it in order to set aside any instrument so 
executed." 
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Both learned judges therefore acknowledged the very 
real dangers of the imposition of such a rule where a 
testator has read his will over, or had it read over to 
him. Since "reading over" was not (and has not been) 
defined to mean "thoroughly appraising the testator of any 
alterations, insertions, omissions etc" it could wreak 
injustice, in some cases, to adhere to such a rule. 
Different testators deal with their wills in different 
ways: some like to study them in detail, reading them 
over meticulously; others prefer to have as little to do 
with them as possible, often relying heavily on a draftsman 
70. Ibid. @ p.469. 
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although "reading the document over", in the sense of 
scanning through it briefly, themselves. The importance 
of Fulton v Andrew is that it allowed each case to be 
dealt with on its own peculiar facts whilst still recog-
nising ~n the form of a presumption) the important act 
accomplished by a testator in reading over (or having 
read over to him) and appending his signature to the 
document he intended-~ constitute his will. Permitting 
evidence to be adduced to disprove knowledge and approval, 
despite the document having been read over and signed by 
the testator as his will,was a major step on the road to 
recognising the testator's intentions as being of paramount 
importance in probate cases. The end of that vista, almost 
a century later, has been brought within sight by the case 
of In re Morris (deceased). 71 
In the hundred years separating Fulton v Andrew and 
In re Morris (deceased) the law on this subject suffered 
various vicissitudes. 
Many problems, it is submitted, arose from confusion 
over the courts' powers, 72 but others stemmed from a 
failure to isolate different types of mistake, and the 
relevant principles pertaining to them. Brief reports did 
not ameliorate the situation. A case in point is In the 
73 Goods of Walkeley. 
71. [1971] p. 62. 
72. For example see In the Goods of Bushell (supra). 
73. (1893) 69 L.T. 419. 
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In that case a will was engrossed from a draft 
approved by the testatrix. The engrossment clerk copied 
the number of one hOuse twice over, and omitted the number 
of another house. The will was in fact read over to the 
testatrix, but the clerical error was not discovered until 
after her death. The Court struck out the duplicated 
number and granted probate of the will with a blank 
space in its stead. It refused to insert the correct 
number into the space. 
Jeune P. dealt with only two cases in his very short 
judgment: namely 74 In the Goods of Boehm and In the Goods 
of Bushell. 75 Both these cases concerned situations 
where the will was not read by, or read over to, the 
testator immediately prior to execution. It has been seen 
that the general principle in such cases operates to 
prevent the testator adopting the draftsman's mistake. 76 
However, the law is otherwise where a will has been read 
by (or read over to) a testator before he signs. 77 
While it is not contended that Jeune J's decision was in 
any way wrong, this failure to deal with why the testatrix 
did not have knowledge and approval of her will although 
74. [1891] P.247. 
75. (1887) 13 P.D.7. 
76. Supra p.99. 
77. Supra pp.l02-105. 
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it was read over to her and she had signed it does not aid 
in any attempted simplification of an already complex area 
of law. In that case he merely stated that: 78 
" ... the engrossment was read over to the 
testatrix but the mistake in the numbers 
of the houses was not noticed, and the 
testatrix executed the engrossed copy." 
Presumably each case "turns on its facts", as Lord 
Hatherley suggested in Fulton v Andrew 79 whilst refraining 
from establishing any guidelines, basic or otherwise. 
That certainly appeared to be the view taken by Jeune P. 
' ' B '..,.., ' ''~t 80 @ 237 1n Br~sco v a~&&~e Ham~& on p. : 
"No doubt, if it can be proved that a will 
has been really brought to the mind of a 
testator or testatrix, and has been duly 
executed, it is difficult - perhaps 
impossible - in law to hold that anything 
contained in the will is a mistake. But, 
as was pointed out by the House of Lords 
in Fulton v Andrew, 8l the question is still 
left open whether the will was or was not 
really brought to the notice of the 
testator or testatrix. That question is a 
question of fact depending upon the circum-
stances of the particular case." 
82 In Vaughan v Clerk, another case before the same 
President of the Probate Division in the same year, the 
word "real" was, by a "mere mechanical clerical error", 
inserted instead of the word "said" in a will. 
It is unclear from the report of the case whether 
the will was read over to,or by, the testator prior to 
execution. It is also difficult to ascertain what type of 
78. In the Goods of Walkeley supra @ p.419. 
79. See n.70 supra. 
80. [1902] P.234. 
81. See n.67 supra. 82. (1902) 88 L.T.l44. 
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evidence allowed the court to find an absence of knowledge 
and approval and therefore enabled it to strike out the 
word "real" from the will. The report in its entirety 
reads: 83 
"The President said that he had not the 
slightest doubt, after the evidence had 
been given by Mr Matthews [the testator's 
solicitor] and the clerk who made the 
engrossment, that the word "real" had 
crept into the will by mistake, and that 
the word "said" had become "real" in the 
process of copying from the draft. The 
mistake was an obvious one. The word 
"real" would therefore be struck out, and 
that would give effect to the wishes of 
the testator, but the word "said" could 
not be substituted. The original grant of 
probate would be revoked, and a fresh 
grant with the word "real" omitted, would 
be issued. The costs of all the parties to 
the suit as between solicitor and client 
would come out of the estate." 
Vaughan v Clerk was followed in 1912 in New Zealand 
in In re Cogan (deceasedJ 84 with the result that a clerical 
error was rectified by the omission of a word from the 
probate copy of the will. 
Another New Zealand case worthy of note is In re 
Warrington (deceased). 85 There, the word "not" was inad-
vertently inserted by the draftsman, at the engrossing of 
the draft will, after its approval by the testator. 
Its presence was not noticed at the reading over and 
execution of the will. Denniston J. held that the word 
"not" would be omitted from the probate copy of the will. 
83. Ibid. @ p.l45. 
84. (1912) 31 N.Z.L.R. 1204. 
85. [1917] N.Z.L.R. 124. 
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The three cases followed in that case (namely, 
Vaughan v Clerk~ In the Goods of Bushell and In the Goods 
of Schott) 86 concerned situations where the will was not 
read over prior to execution (although, as noted above, in 
Vaughan v Clerk the relevant sequence of events is unclear) . 
However, as in In the Goods of Walkeley 87 it is not easily 
explicable just why, despite a reading over to the testator 
before he appended his signature, he was not deemed to 
have knowledge and approval of the will as he signed it. 
88 The subject is treated cursorily in the report: 
"The solicitor does not remember reading the 
will over to the testator, but is satisfied 
he followed his usual practice in doing so. 
It is, however, clear that the error was not 
noticed either on comparing the engrossment 
or when read." 
Thus, while it is evident from Fulton v Andrew 89 
that reading over prior to signing does not automatically 
imbue the testator with knowledge and approval of all the 
subject-matter of the will yet it does, in Lord 
Hatherley's words "afford a very grave and strong presumpt-
.ion"9<l:.hat the will was properly executed. The major 
criticism of cases such as In the Goods of Walkeley and 
In re Warrington (deceased) lies, it is submitted, in 
their failure to record their reasons for displacing the 
86. Supra n.82, 75 and 51 respectively. 
87. Supra n. 73 and see p.l06 supra. 
88. Per Denniston J. @ p.l26. 
8 9. (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 448. 
90. Ibid. @ p.469. 
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presumption and allowing words to be omitted for want of 
knowledge and approval. Possibly the principal reason is 
to be found in a fear of establishing too rigid a line of 
precedent which might detract from the courts' ability to 
come to each case unhindered by previous decisions and to 
deal with each in an individualistic vein. Whatever the 
merits and likely utilisation of this argument, giving 
very little (if any) indication of the evidence required 
to shift the presumption of knowledge and approval after 
proof of due execution is not helpful to potential 
litigants or their advisers. The latter, in face of few 
statements on tile subject from the judiciary, usually must 
advise litigation in order to discover the courts' stance: 
the theory of stare decisis holding firm but its practical 
application distinctly lacking. Fortunately not all 
cases have maintained such a silence. From those that 
explain why the presumption of due execution has failed to 
attribute knowledge and approval to any given testator it 
is possible to piece together a very much more distinct 
picture of the workings of the law in this field. 
In Tartakover v Pipe 91 the testator's will was 
prepared by his draftsman in a hurry, and, owing to a 
mistake on his part, or on the part of the typist, the 
will did not express correctly the testator's intentions 
as to the disposal of his estate. (The word "real" was 
included in the document by a clerical mistake.) After 
91. [1922] N.Z.L.R. 853. 
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the will had been typed the draftsman did not read it 
himself, and it was not read by anyone to the testator. 
Instead, the draftsman handed it to the testator who 
"looked at it" and signed it. The question for the court 
was: Could "looking at" the will amount to reading it 
for the purposes of establishing knowledge and approval on 
the part of the testator? S im J . @ p . 8 55 : 
"In the present case the will was not read 
to the testator, and Mr Dougall [the 
draftsman] does not say that the testator 
himself read it over. He looked at it, 
he said, and then signed it. I am satis-
fied that the testator's mind could not 
have been directed to that portion of the 
will in which the gift to his wife was 
limited to his real estate. If he had 
known that the gift was limited in this 
way he certainly would have objected to 
it, and would have refused to sign the 
will. The instructions to the solicitor 
must have been to prepare a will giving the 
whole estate to the wife. The restrictive 
word by which the testator's intention was 
defeated was introduced per incuriam by a 
mere clerical error on the part of the 
draftsman or his typist, and the testator 
is not bound by the mistake unless the 
restrictive word was directly brought to 
his notice ... This was not done in the 
present case, and the testator, therefore, 
was not bound by the mistake." 
The word "real" was, therefore, struck out of the will 
with the comment that: 92 
"This does not leave the will in the exact 
form in which it would have been if Mr 
Dougall had expressed correctly the 
testator's intentions, but that, I think, 
does not matter so long as the omission 
enables the will to give effect to those 
intentions." 
92. Ibid. @ p. 856. 
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Thus, merely "looking over" a will prior to signing 
it did not amount to a sufficient "reading over" such 
that knowledge and approval was established on the part 
of the testator. Or, if it did amount to a reading over 
it was of an insufficiently attentive nature to attract 
knowledge and approval. 
Tartakover v Pipe~ therefore, went a step further 
than the cases in which wills were not read, or looked at, 
at all by testators prior to signing. Here the testator 
did glance at it and read it in the loose sense of 
"skimming through it". Nevertheless, the court was sat-
isfied that the terms of the will as executed were never 
really brought home to the testator and that, therefore, 
it was justified in striking out the word "real" which had 
crept in unnoticed and unauthorised. 
Reading in the sense of "casting an eye" over the 
will before execution failed to cause the presumption of 
knowledge and approval to operate in ~n re Morris 
(deceased). 93 
The facts of that case were these: By clause 7 of 
her will a testatrix gave several pecuniary legacies 
including one to a resident employee, Winifred Hurdwell, 
which was contained in subclause (iv) of clause 7. 
Hurdwell also benefitted under clause 3 of the will. 
93. [1971] P.62. 
Miss 
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Later, the testatrix wrote to her solicitor inform-
ing him that she wished to revoke the provisions relating 
to Miss Hurdwell (and substitute others) but that she 
wanted no other change in the will. The solicitor, 
therefore, drew up a codicil which included the words 
"I revoke clauses 3 and 7 of my said will". That prov-
ision plainly contained a clerical error which the 
solicitor's clerk noticed and corrected to read: "I 
revoke clause 3 and sub-clause (iv) of clause 7 of my 
said will". Unfortunately, the solicitor changed the 
codical back to contain his original formula, that is "I 
revoke clauses 3 and 7 of my said will". 
The testatrix executed the codicil after, as 
Latey J. found, having "read it in the sense of casting 
her eye over it" 94 but without really taking in its 
effect: 95 
"That the engrossment effected what in fact 
it effects she never knew - it never reg-
istered on her consciousness - it was 
never within her cognisance - to mention 
some of the phrases which have been used in 
this context. If she had known she would 
never have approved': and never have 
executed." 
Thus, Latey J held, following dicta in Fulton v Andrew~ 
that there was no rigid rule that a testator who has 
read his will before execution must be conclusively taken, 
in the absence of fraud, to have knowledge and approval 
of its contents. Even although a will has been read or 
94. Ibid. @ p.74. 
95. Ibid. 
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read over inadvertance might still exist to deny knowledge 
and approval. In each case it will be a question of fact 
to be established by the available evidence. 
Latey J. also held that no general principle existed 
whereby a testator had knowledge and approval imputed to 
him by being automatically bound by all words used by his 
draftsman. This aspect of the decision is discussed 
later. 96 
Having reached these conclusions, the judge reiter-
ated that where there was an absence of knowledge and 
approval (for example, because of mistake, as in this case) 
then the law was clear: the court had no power to rectify 
by adding words to the instrument. 97 However, it had 
the power to do what it could by omission. 98 In this 
case a simple omission would not give immediate effect to 
the testatrix's erstwhile intentions, as in most of the 
cases reviewed hitherto. Nevertheless, the judge decided 
that the course which came the closest to giving effect 
to the testatrix's dispositive intention involved the 
omission of the numeral 7 d'from the codicil. At page 81: 
"I cannot add the numeral (iv) after 7 but 
if 7 is excluded, clause 1 of the codicil 
would read as follows: "1. I revoke 
clauses 3 and of my said will"." 
It was thus left to the chancery court as the court of 
construction to deduce from the will and the codici~ as 
altered,read together that the testatrix's intention was 
96. Infra @ pp.l35-139. 
97. In re Morris (deceased) @ p.75. 
98. Ibid. @ p.81. 
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that after the words "clauses 3 and " should be the 
numerals 7 (iv). 
In this alteration to the probate copy of the will 
it can be ascertained that the jurisdiction to exclude 
words from probate is carried to a point well beyond its 
previous limits. In the earlier cases, the words struck 
out were words which had got into the will by accident 
and which the testator never intended to be there. 99 In 
In re Morris, by contrast, the words ordered to be struck 
out were in the will with the full knowledge and approval 
of the testatrix; what happened was that their meaning 
was modified by the accidental omission of other words. 
A similar type of mistake carne before Templeman J. 
1 in In re Reynette-James (deceased). In that case a 
solicitor's secretary, in typing out an engrossment of a 
draft will, approved by the testatrix, inadvertently ornitt-
ed words in Clause 10 which contained an absolute gift of 
the capital of the residue in favour of the testatrix's 
son, Michael. The clause as read gave life interests to 
the testatrix's sister, Mrs Wightman, and a friend, Miss 
Pedley; then ought to have followed the part in fact 
omitted; and,finally,there were reversionary gifts in 
favour of Michael's wife and children in the event of 
Michael not surviving either Mrs Wightman or Miss Pedley. 
99. See, for example, Re Boehm [1891] P.247 and 
Re Schott [1901] P.l90. 
1. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 161. 
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The omission went unnoticed by everyone concerned, 
including the testatrix, to whom the engrossment was 
read, until the executor asked the court to pronounce in 
favour of the will with the whole of Clause 10, apart 
from the prior life interests in favour of Mrs Wightman 
and Miss Pedley,omitted, on the ground that, because of 
the omissions, the testatrix could not have known and 
approved of the rest of Clause 10. 
Templeman J. held, first, that no gift of capital 
to Michael could be implied, as a matter of construction, 
in the will as executed. The governing principle was 
that words could only be implied in a will: 2 
"Where it is clear on the face of a will 
that the testator has not accurately or 
completely expressed his meaning by the 
words he has used, and it is also clear 
what are the words which he has 
omitted." 
In the instant case, however, although there was clearly 
some omission from the residuary gift as it appeared on 
the face of the will, it was not clear from the context 
that what was omitted was a gift of capital to the 
testatrix's son, Michael. Therefore,on its true con-
struction, the will as executed contained a gift of 
capital, following the life interests, to Michael's wife 
and children, whereas the testatrix thought that it 
contained a gift of capital to Michael if he survived the 
two life tenants. Templeman J., despite reaching this 
conclusion, commented @ page 164: 
2. In re Follett (deceased)~ Barclays Bank Ltd v 
Dovell [1955] 1 W.L.R. 429 @ pp.431 and 437. 
"I am tempted to construe the will in the 
light of the known intentions of the 
testatrix, thus giving effect to her wishes 
and avoiding any question of omitting part 
of the will from probate. The will must, 
however, be construed according to its 
terms." 
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According to the terms of the will, the judge held, 
secondly, that the testatrix did not know and approve of 
the ultimate gift of capital to Michael's wife and child-
ren. At pages 163-164 he said: 
"The contemporary documents and the affidavit 
evidence now available show beyond any doubt 
that the testatrix thought and intended that 
the will she signed contained a gift in 
reversion of the capital of residue to 
Michael." 
On the authority of Re Horrocks, 3 the jurisdiction of the 
court, in such a case, was confined to ordering the exclus-
ion of words: it had no power to order the insertion in 
the will of the omitted words which appeared in the draft. 
In the present case, therefore, if the power of omission 
were exercised, the intended ultimate gift over to 
Michael's wife and children would not stand with the 
result that a partial intestacy would ensue. The practic-
al effect of distribution on partial intestacy would not be 
in accordance with the testatrix's real intention as 
established by extrinsic evidence: the capital would not 
go to Michael entirely but be divided among the testatrix's 
next-of-kin. Michael would then undoubtedly benefit but 
not to the extent envisaged and intended by his mother. 
3. Re Horrocks., Taylor v Kershaw [1939] P.l98, per Sir 
Wilfred Greene M.R. @ p.216. 
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Templeman J. considered these problems but concluded that, 
in his judgment, 4 
" ... whatever the result, the gifts in 
Clause 10 of the will, other than the life 
interests of Mrs Wightman and Miss Pedley, 
must be omitted." 
He ended: 5 
"The result is not satisfactory but will 
perhaps encourage a further study of the 
recommendations which have been made from 
time to time that rectification of a will 
should be allowed on the same terms as 
rectification of other instruments, with 
perhaps the added safeguard of written 
contemporaneous evidence supporting the 
claim to rectification. There is ample 
such evidence in the present case, but it 
does not enable the will to be rectified." 
This criticism by the judge in In re Reynette-James 
has beeh added to by several legal commentators. 
Professor E.C. Ryder echoes the criticism already 
made of Re Morris 6 that to strike out words approved and 
acknowledged by the testator but whose meaning is changed 
by the omission of other words is to exceed the court's 
powers. 
" 
He comments: 7 
it is one thing to say: "These words 
have crept into the will by accident; the 
testator never intended them to be there; 
they must therefore be struck out"; it is 
quite a different thing to say: "These 
words were inserted intentionally; the 
testator knew they were there and intended 
them to be there; but (as the result of 
an omission elsewhere) they do not produce 
the result which the testator wanted to 
produce; they must therefore be struck out." 
4. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 161 @ p.l68. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Supra p.ll6. 
7. 40 Conveyancer 312 @ p.314. 
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He contends that in the latter type of case the court is, 
in effect, remodelling the testator's own language to 
produce a result more in keeping with the testator's 
intentions as ascertained from extrinsic evidence. Such a 
course, he argues, runs counter to established principles 
of construction and weighty decisions, such as Collins v 
8 Elstone. He would not, therefore, be surprised if a 
higher court took a different view. 
On principle, a higher court might well reset the 
limits of this area of mistake as they stood before the 
decisions of Re Morris and In re Reynette-James. For, 
in strict terms, these cases have combined to give 
some, hifrerto unknown, measure of significance to test-
ator's intentions not generally thought to be sanctioned 
by the common law. On the other hand, it is possible 
that the view will be taken that awkward manoeuvres to 
circumvent a much criticised aspect of the law of succ-
ession ought to be heeded. Where the law is deficient 
substantial repairs should be effected: not simply case 
to case First Aid. 
Journal: 9 
As Bates argues in the New Law 
II the testator's intentions, where they 
can reasonably be deduced from evidence 
available, should be paramount; otherwise, 
the spirit of the Wills Act is itself 
subordinated to the formal requirements 
designed to put that purpose into effect. 
8 . [ 18 9 3] P. 1 and infra p. 12 5 . 
9. G.M. Bates Another Case for Intention (1976) 126 
N.L.J. 1083 @ p. 1085. 
So let us hope that the equitable 
doctrine of rectification will soon be 
applied to wills and that the Wills Act 
itself will be subjected to much closer 
scrutiny in the very near future." 
Thus, where a draftsman, to whom a testator has 
delegated the task of drafting his will, has made a 
clerical slip in the drafting the testator is not deemed 
to have adopted that slip unless he had "knowledge and 
approval" of it. If the will was not read by or read 
over to the testator then no knowledge and approval will 
be imputed to him. If, on the other hand, the testator 
has read his will (or had it read to him) then no know-
ledge and approval will be conclusively accorded him. 
Evidence is admissible to show that certain words were 
not in fact approved of by the testator in spite of the 
fact that the testator read the will or had it read to 
him. In either case there might still be inadvertance 
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on the part of the testator. What amounts to sufficient 
evidence to prove a lack of knowledge and approval on 
the part of the testator despite a reading will depend on 
the facts in each case. As has been seen, several cases 
now exist where such an absence prevailed although the 
will was technically "read" in a loose sense. It is 
submitted, however, that it would be dangerous and unwise 
to rely heavily on these fact situations. Each case 
involves some different facts although they may share 
broad similarities: principles can, therefore, be gen-
erally stated but their particular application to any 
given case can only be resolved on consideration of the 
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peculiar evidence of that case: probably, therefore, 
only in litigation. 
Difficult as it has proved to distil~ the meaning 
of knowledge and approval from the compound and complex 
mass of case law it is yet more difficult to comprehend 
the courts' powers once a mistake has been discovered. 
This subject is considered in detail in the following 
chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that the courts 
are hamstrung by artificial distinctions and rules which 
preclude them, often, from giving effect to testator's 
known intentions. It is argued from many quarters that 
this is a state of affairs which has prevailed far too 
long. 
(iv) Word(s) inserted by testator drafting 
his own will which he intends to use 
but he is mistaken about the word's 
legal effect. 
Where a testator has deliberately chosen to use 
particular words but, in fact, the words chosen do not 
carry out his real intention, as it appears from the 
surrounding circumstances, that fact is irrelevant. A 
testator in such circumstances is deemed to have know-
ledge and approval of the words and they must, therefore, 
remain in the will. 
This point was considered in In the Estate of 
Beech 10 where Salter J. said @ pp.53-54: 
10. [1923] P.46. 
"A testator cannot give a conditional 
approval of the words which have been 
put into his intended will by himself, 
or by others for him. He cannot say: 
"I approve these words, if they shall 
be held to bear the meaning and have 
the effect which I desire, but if not I 
do not approve them". He must find, or 
employ others to find, apt words to express 
his meaning; and if, knowing the words 
intended to be used, he approves them and 
executes the will, then he knows and 
approves the contents of the will, and all 
the contents, even though such approval 
may be due to a mistaken belief of his own, 
or to honestly mistaken advice from others, 
as to their true meaning and legal effect." 
Uncertainty and confusion resulting in increased 
litigation would abound if the law were otherwise. 11 
And, to allow oral evidence of intention to override 
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actual dispositions in a will would amount, in substance, 
to allowing wills to be made by word of mouth. Such a 
circumvention of the formalities of s.9 Wills Act 1837 
could not be countenanced - as the English Law Reform 
12 Committee has agreed. But here, as elsewhere indic-
ated in the law of mistake, some remedy is required to 
abate the tide of cases of hardship thrown up by the 
present sea of rigid principles. For many would-be 
testators, it is difficult to comprehend why a mistake 
in their understandinJ of a word must stand while, perhaps, 
written evidence of their actual intentions exist. To 
11. Albery Coincidence and Construction of Wills 
(1963) 26 M.L.R. 353 @ p.364. 
12. 19th Report Law Reform Committee (Interpretation of 
Wills) Cmnd. 5301 @ para.36. 
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introduce evidence of their intentions would not be allow-
ing a will to be made orally; and if those written 
intentions satisfy the rationale of s.9 Wills Act 1837 
(that is, freedom from fraud, forgery and coercion) and 
perhaps even the formalities of that section then it 
seems a needlessly harsh law which denies relief in such 
circumstances. 
(v) Word(s) inserted by draftsman to whom 
the testator has given instructions to 
draw up a will: the draftsman has made 
a deliberate choice of words giving 
effect to the instructions, but he is 
mistaken in his choice: it does not, 
in fact, give effect to the testator's 
instructions. 
In this situation it is again pertinant to enquire 
whether the testator has adopted the relevant words as 
his own, or not. In other words, has he knowledge and 
approval of the words or not? If so, then he will be 
deemed to be bound by them, despite the fact that he may 
be unaware that there is a discrepancy between his 
instructions and the effect of the will. If he is proved 
to have no knowledge and approval of the words themselves 
then he is deemed not to be bound by them. 
In this area of the law of mistake the presumption 
of due execution imputing knowledge and approval is 
often invoked and, in addition, there is a reduced like-
lihood of a testator not having knowledge and approval 
of the actual words once the will has been signed. This 
is because it is not the inclusion of the words 
themselves that he is objecting to but their legal effect. 
He is not saying "If I had known the words were there I 
would have excluded them" but rather "I knew the words 
were there, but if I had perceived their legal effect I 
would have excluded them". At this stage cases such as 
Re Morris and In re Reynette-James might seem to give 
the lie to this argument. But, as discussed, those 
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cases pertained to another area of the law and, it 
appears, that the present area has not taken the opport-
unity of extending its boundaries so far. 
In CoZZins v EZstone 13 this type of mistake fell to 
be considered. The facts of the case were these: A 
testatrix left two wills, and a codicil to the first will. 
The second will, which only disposed of a small policy of 
insurance on her life, was prepared for her on a printed 
form by one of her executors. The form commenced with a 
clause revoking all previous testamentary dispositions; 
but when this was read over to her she objected to it, 
saying that she did not wish to revoke her first will and 
codicil. The person who prepared the will assured her 
that as it only related to the insurance policy the words 
of revocation would not apply to her former testamentary 
dispositions, and that to make an erasure might invalid-
ate the will. Being satisfied by this assurance the 
testatrix duly executed the will. It was held that the 
testatrix must be taken to have known and approved of 
those words of revocation, and that they must be included 
in the probate of the last will~ 
13. [1893] P.l. 
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Following Morrell v Morrell 14 the President of the 
Probate Division approved of the view of Lord Hannen in 
that case that: 15 
"if a testator employs another to convey his 
meaning in technical language, and that 
other person makes a mistake in doing it, 
the mistake is the same as if the testator 
had employed that technical language 
himself." 
The President went on to question whether it might not be 
possible to extend the doctrine of fraud so as to 
include this mistake. He concluded, however, that there 
was no authority for it. He, therefore, regretted that 
he was16 
II compelled to come to a conclusion 
the effect of which I am conscious will 
be that the real intentions of the 
testatrix will not be carried out." 
Collins v Elstone raises several points of interest. 
First, support for the actual decision can be found 
in the judgment of Latey J. in Re Morris @ p. 79: 
" ... it is established, in my opinion, 
that there are cases where, though the 
testator did not in fact know and approve 
the effect of what he is executing, he is 
deemed to do so; he is bound by the 
draftsman's mistake. Here again it is not 
easy to reconcile all the decisions and 
dicta, but certainly the rule does not 
cover all cases where a draftsman had made 
a mistake; indeed, it applies to a limited 
class of case. Its basis is one of exped-
iency, because without it confusion and 
uncertainty would produce worse results." 
14. (1882) 7 P.D. 68. 
15. Collins v Elstone @ p.4. 
16. Ibid. @ p.3. 
And again, at the same page: 
"The scope of the draftsman's authority is 
to carry into effect the testator's 
intentions. In some cases (where, for 
example, an expert in law is needed to 
provide the appropriate wording to give 
effect in law to the testator's intent-
ions) the testator has to accept the 
phraseology selected by the draftsman 
without himself really understanding its 
esoteric meaning, and in such a case he 
adopts it and knowledge and approval is 
imputed to him. If the draftsman in the 
use of the selected phraseology which he, 
knowing the testator's intentions, has 
deliberately and not per incuriam chosen, 
and thus himself known and approved, has 
made a mistake as to the effect of that 
phraseology, the testator, having adopted 
it, is bound by the mistake." 
Secondly, two cases relied on in Collins v Ektone 
were not followed in Re Morris~ namely Guardhouse v 
Blackburn 17 and A tter v Atkinson ~ 8 
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Thirdly, the inability of the court in Collins v 
Estone to extend the first, fourth and fifth rules19 laid 
down by IDrd Penzance in Guardhouse v Blackburn20 to include 
not only fraud but also mistake has not proved an insur-
mountable obstacle in other decisions as the recent 
21 trend reveals. That trend is exemplified in the 
unreported decision of Sachs J. in Crerar v Crerar 22 
where that judge stated that it was the court's duty: 
17. (1866) L.R.J_ P & D. 109. 
18. (1869) L.R. 1 p & D 665. 
19. Discussed @ p.l03 supra. 
20. (1866) L.R. 1 p & D. 109 @ p.ll6. 
21. Re Morris @ pp. 7 6 -7 9. 
22. Ibid. @ p.78. 
" to consider all the relevant evidence 
available and then, drawing such inferences 
as it can from the totality of that mater-
ial, it has to come to a conclusion whether 
or not those propounding the will have dis-
charged the burden of establishing that the 
testatrix knew and approved the contents of 
the document which is put forward as a valid 
testamentary disposition. The fact that the 
testatrix read the document, and the fact that 
she executed it, must be given the full 
weight apposite in the circumstances,but in 
law those facts are not conclusive, nor do they 
raise a presumption of law." 
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That type of reasoning, if applied to the sort of mistake 
considered by the court in CoZZins v EZstone may well, it 
is submitted, have yielded a different result. But, it is 
accepted that it would be more difficult to adopt such an 
argument in respect of the CoZZins v EZstone type of 
mistake as opposed to the Re Morris kind. Any such adopt-
ion would require an extended meaning to be attributed to 
the words "knowledge and approval" to encompass not only 
knowledge and approval of the existence of the words but 
also knowledge and approval of their effect. Thus far no 
suggestion in this vein has been heard and, possibly, the 
potential for uncertainty and confusion it might create 
would preclude its adoption at all. 
Finally, the realisation of the court in CoZZins 
v EZstone that the decision would operate to defeat the 
testator's intention, a realisation echoed by other 
judges, 23 must presage, it is submitted, a complete review 
of the principles and policies of this area of the law of 
23. See, for example, Templeman J. in In re Reynette-
James [1976] 1 W.L.R. 161 @ p.l68. 
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succession. How far and how often a testator's expressed 
intentions are to be overriden in the name of expediency 
and established principle is a question currently under 
' ' 24 lntense scrutlny. The various proposals suggested as 
an attempt to ameliorate the situation revolve around two 
basic ideas. The first of these is to introduce the 
remedy of rectification into the law of succession. The 
second involves a relaxation of the current evidentiary 
rules insofar as they pertain to probate problems. Both 
these suggestions are discussed in the next chapter. 
In Collins v Elstone it was clear that the testa-
trix actually read her will for she queried some of its. 
terms. She, therefore, had knowledge of the actual words 
which constituted her will. In the later case of Re 
25 Horrocks such knowledge was imputed to the testatrix by 
virtue of the presumption of due execution: the testatrix 
signed the document as her will, she was thus taken to 
have knowledge of its contents. The presumption was not 
displaced by the ~vidence in the case - as it might 
perhaps have had the case involved a clerical slip. But 
while Re Horrocks serves as a comparison to show how 
knowledge may be attributed to testators, that is by no 
means the case's sole importance. As will be seen, the 
Court of Appeal's statements in the decision on the 
limitations of the courts' powers of omission have proved 
24. See, for example, G.M. Bates Another Case for Intent-
ion 126NI.fl· 1083; R.D. Mackay Discovering a Testator's 
Intention 127 NLJ 1089; 19th Report of the Law Reform 
Committee (England) Cmnd. 5301. 
25. [1939] P.l98. 
to be of some consequence. 
The facts of Re Horrocks were these: A testatrix 
employed a solicitor to draw up her will. Among the 
instructions for the will was one which required the 
draftsman to include a gift for charitable purposes to 
be selected by the trustees of the will. The draftsman, 
therefore, in the will, gave the trustees the residuary 
estate upon trust. 
"for such charitable institution or instit-
utions or other charitable or benevolent 
object or objects in Preston and district 
as my acting trustee or trustees may in 
his or their absolute discretion select." 
130 
From the evidence it was apparent that the testatrix 
knew nothing about the technicalities of the law. It was 
equally evident that the will was not read by nor read over 
to the testatrix before she signed it. When the mistake 
which placed "or" instead of "and" between the words 
"charitable" and "benevolent" was discovered,the trustees 
brought proceedings to have the probate in common form 
revoked and probate granted in solemn form with the 
omission of the word "or". 
The Court of Appeal held (reversing the court 
below) that the testatrix was bound by the words 
deliberately chosen by her draftsman; that on the facts 
there was no evidence cogent enough to justify the 
alteration in the language of the will; and that as the 
effect of omitting the word "or" would be to depart from 
the intention of the testatrix by limiting the objects 
of the residuary gift to those that were benevolent as 
charitable, there was no jurisdiction to make the 
alteration asked for. 
Sir Wilfred Greene M.R. gave the judgment of the 
Court. 
On the point of the testatrix being bound by the 
d I ' k ' h' ' h 'd 26 raftsman s m1sta e 1n t 1s 1nstance, e sa1 : 
"The fact that a testator or the draftsman 
employed by him is mistaken as to the 
legal effect of the language which he uses 
is, of course, no ground for altering the 
will for the purpose of procuring the 
legal result desired." 
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There was no evidence effective to displace the presumption 
of due execution with its attendant imputation of knowledge 
and approval. And, even if there were, the Court held 
that it had no power to accede to the trustees' wishes in 
altering the will. Sir Wilfred Greene @ p.216: 
"The jurisdiction of the Court of Probate to 
grant probate of a will textually different 
to the actual document signed by the 
testator is a strictly limited one. If the 
testator himself approved the words to which 
he put his signature (and the presumption is 
that he approved them), those words must 
stand. If the words were selected by a 
draftsman to whom the testator confided the 
task of drafting his will, similarly the 
words so selected must stand, even if the 
testator was ignorant of the actual words 
used. The mistake of the testator or of the 
draftsman employed by him as to the legal 
effect of the words used is immaterial. 
The jurisdiction, where it exists, is admitt-
edly confined to the exclusion of words and 
does not extend to the insertion of words, 
since the insertion of words would run counter 
to the provisions of the Wills Act." 
26. Ibid. @ p.209. 
To omit the word "or" between "charitable" and 
"benevolent" in the will would, in the opinion of the 
Court, have the effect of qualifying the word charitable 
to exclude that part of the field of charity which was 
not benevolent. This the testatrix had not approved 
when she adopted the word "charitable" in her will. 
The Court therefore concluded that: 27 
"It appears to us that so to alter a will as, 
under the guise of omission, to affect the 
sense of words deliberately chosen by the 
testator or his draftsman is equivalent to 
making a new will for the testator, and on 
principle we do not consider that this is 
permissible." 
These observations have provided a rich source for 
28 
criticism by legal commentators. And, indeed, it is 
difficult to see how or why any litigation would be 
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instigated if the best that could be hoped for is that the 
part of the will remaining is to have the same meaning as 
before. These criticisms, and others, are dealt with in 
more detail in the section dealing with the court of 
probate's powers in this regard in the following chapter. 
A final case demonstrating that the rule laid 
down in CoZZins v EZstone and followed in Re Horrocks has 
had recent expression is the New Zealand case of Re 
29 Walker (deceased). In that case a testatrix was held 
to be bound by her draftsman's use of the word "issue", 
although it was at variance with her intentions. 
27. Ibid. @ p.218. 
28. See, for example, Lee Correcting Testators Mistakes: 
The Probate Jurisdiction (1969) 33 Conveyancer 322. 
29. [1973] 1 N.Z.L.R. 449. 
Henry J. following Re Horrocks and Re Morris stated: 30 
"The law is, I think, clear that mistake as 
to the legal effect of the language used 
is no ground for either altering the will 
or for construing it so that a result 
desired by the testatrix is obtained." 
133 
Thus it seems apparent that where a testator gives 
instructions to a draftsman,who makes a deliberate,but 
erroneous,choice of words designed to give effect to those 
instructions,then, once the will has been executed and 
the presumption of knowledge and approval applied, the 
testator is bound by the draftsman's mistake. How far 
the court may go in its attempt to remedy such a mistake 
is severely limited by the observations in several cases, 
chief amongst which ranks Re Horrocks. 
(vi) Possible extensions to the law of mistake. 
In this category it is intended to discuss two 
types of, as yet, unlitigated mistakes which may, 
arguably, extend the limits of this field of law. 
The first type of mistake is that made by a 
draftsman (to whom the testator has assigned the task of 
drawing up his will) who thinks that he can bring about 
the effect desired by the testator on his instructions 
by a different legal means from that specified in his 
instructions. 
The second sort of mistake concerns the situation 
where a draftsman misunderstands the testator's 
30. Ibid. @ p.451. 
instructions, in consequence inserts in the will words 
contrary to his instructions, the will being executed 
without the discrepancy coming to the testator's 
knowledge. 
Taking each mistake in turn. 
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As regards the first, let it be supposed that a 
testator desires to include a provision in his will to 
benefit his nephews and nieces when each attainsl8 years. 
He writes to his solicitor, informing him of his intention, 
stating specifically that he wants the will to stipulate 
that the class of children of his brother (i.e. his 
nephews and nieces) should remain open until his brother's 
(i.e. the life-tenant's) death. The solicitor acts on 
the instructions but regards the express stipulation 
about the class remaining open an unnecessary complication 
to the drafting of the will. He believes that the 
adoption of the formula giving a proportion of the 
capital gift to each niece or nephew "when" he/she attains 
18 years" will be sufficient to effect the testator's 
intentions. The testator executes the will in this form. 
But, such a formula, according to the rule in 
Andrews v Partington 31 would operate to close the class 
when the oldest nephew or niece attained 18 years. Any 
other nephew or niece then alive would qualify for a 
share of the capital if he/she reached 18 years. Others, 
however, born after the oldest's 18th birthday would be 
excluded. 
31. (1791) 3 Bro. C.C. 401. 
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Supposing further that, in the events which 
happen, the class closes on the 18th birthday of the 
testator's niece but that 6 months thereafter twins 
are born to the testator's brother and sister-in-law. 
Would the twins be able to take any action to remedy the 
draftsman's mistake after the death of the testator? 
This type of situation is different to that 
discussed in section (v) above. In that section the 
testator is regarded as delegating to his draftsman the 
task of drawing up his will in the manner in which the 
draftsman considers will most accurately'reflect the 
testator's wishes. In the instant case the testator is 
delegating the task of drafting his will to another 
but within limits: the testator desires his wishes 
effected in a particular fashion: the draftsman 
overrides them believing the same effect can be 
achieved by a simpler method: the draftsman is mistaken. 
Is any course open which might result in a court of 
probate altering the will so that it more nearly reflects 
the testators' intentions? 
In Be Morris it was argued for the plaintiff 
executors (Lloyds Bank) that, except in the classes of 
case covered by section (v) above, a testator was 32 
" ... bound'only by what the draftsman writes 
on his instructions. If he puts in some-
thing which is contrary to the testator's 
instructions, he is acting outside the 
scope of his authority, and the testator is 
32. See Be Morris (deceased) [1971] P.62, @ pp. 79-81 
(per Latey J.). 
not bound unless, of course, the discrep-
ancy is brought to his understanding and 
he adopts it. To enlarge the category of 
cases in which, although unaware of the 
draftsman's mistake, knowledge and approval 
is imputed to the testator and he is bound 
by it, would be to subtract unnecessarily 
and wrongly from the fundamental principle 
that it is for a testator and no-one else 
to make the will." 
Latey J. expressed himself much attracted to that 
33 
argument but he held certain reservations. He 
. d 34 cont1nue : 
"But whether the line can be drawn there so 
that it follows that in all other cases 
there is not knowledge and approval, and 
the court thus has power to intervene is 
far from plain. There are decisions and 
dicta either way." 
The view is taken in both Mortimer's Probate 
t . 35 , T " t d c t I p b t p t. 36 Prac 1ce ana r1s ram an oo e s ro a e rae 1ce 
that where a draftsman, having understood a testator's 
instructions, uses inappropriate language in attempting 
to give effect to them, then the mistake must stand. 
That is not disputed. 37 However, neither work deals 
specifically with the hypothetical circumstances here 
posited. That is, where a testator has stipulated a 
particular method of giving effect to his instructions 
and his draftsman has thought fit to reject that method 
for another which he (mistakenly) believes will 
attain an identical result. 
33. Ibirl. 
34. Ibid. 
35. 2nd ed. (1927) @ p. 91. 
36. 25th ed. (1978) @ p.678. 
37. See section (v) supra. 
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The question becomes: Is due execution of the will 
with the draftsman's formula sufficient, in the absence 
of other evidence, to impute knowledge and approval to 
the testator? As has been seen, in most cases falling 
within the general principle expounded in section (v) 
execution alone would attribute knowledge and approval 
to the testator. Is it any different in this case? 
The adoption of the argument of the plaintiffs 
in Re Morris demands a positive response to that question, 
coupled with, it is to be noted, a limited meaning of 
the term "knowledge and approval". Before a testator 
could be said to know and approve of the contents of his 
will the plaintiffs argued that it must be properly read 
to or by him, that is, 38 
" ... in such a manner that the discrepancy 
between the instructions and the 
instrument is brought before the consider-
ation of the testator." 
And so that the meaning is verified or explained to the 
testator. 
In section (v) it was accepted that where a 
testator delegates the task of drawing up a will to a 
draftsman then the testator is bound by the draftsman's 
councious choice of words despite any mistake he may 
make as regards their effect. The testator, on executing 
his will, is deemed to have knowledge and approval of 
38. Re Morris (deceased) P.W.E. Taylor, arguendo, @ p.63. 
the words in issue: he intended them to be in the will: 
the mistake as to their effect made by his draftsman is 
imputed to him. 
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On the other hand, where, as postulated, a drafts-
man exceeds his instructions, it is submitted that the 
presumption of knowledge and approval arising from due 
execution ought in most cases to be more easily rebuttable. 
The testator, in such a case, can only be said to intend 
the draftsman's form of words to remain in the will if 
its yffect accords with the preferred legal method 
stipulated by the testator in his instructions. Thus 
the presence of the words (vis a vis the testator) is 
conditional only, whereas in the former case it was not. 
On this basis, it was argued for the plaintiff in Re 
Morris that the test for knowledge and approval ought to 
be reconsidered. 
It is clear that the type of mistake envisaged 
here is more fundamental than that covered by section 
(v): the draftsman has not only exceeded his instructions 
he has also made a mistake as regards the effect of the 
words he has chosen. In the section (v) cases it is 
only the latter action which has offended. 
On executing a document containing a hypothetical 
mistake of the nature postulated in this section, the 
presumption of knowledge and approval ought to be 
rebutted on proof that the knowledge and approval was 
conditional only on the effect of the draftsman's words 
and the effect of the testator's instructions coinciding. 
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Proof that this was not the case and that the discrep-
ancy was not explained to the testator ought to result in 
the Court of Probate having the power to strike the 
offending words out of the will. This type of situation 
is not similar to that discussed in In the Estate of 
Beech 39 where a testator intended to use a word but was 
mistaken about its true legal effect. Here the hypo-
thetical testator intends his instructions to be carried 
out in the manner he stipulated. Any variation from 
that course can only be deemed to be approved by him if 
it conforms, in effect, to his instructions. The 
execution of a will by a testator who is not enlightened 
on this point ought not, and, it is submitted, cannot, 
change that conditional intention into an unconditional 
intention. Stro.nger evidence, such as that proposed by 
the plaintiffs in Re Morris> ought to be required. 
The second type of mistake to be discussed in this 
section concerns the problems which arise when a draftsman 
misunderstands the testator's instructions, inserts 
words in the will contrary to the instructions, the will 
being executed without the discrepancy coming to the 
testator's knowledge. 
Mention is made of this sort of situation in 
Mortimer's Probate Practice40 and Tristram and Coote's 
. 41 Probate Pract1ce. Both works favour the opinion that, 
39. [1923] P.46. 
40. 2nd ed. (1927) @ p.91. 
41. 25th ed. ( 19 7 8) @ p. 6 7 8 • 
in such circumstances, a testator is bound by his 
draftsman's mistake. The argument for the plaintiff 
' R M . 42 1 t t h t executors ln e orr~s clear y runs coun er o t a 
view. 
It is submitted that, of the two, the former 
view is to be preferred. The testator has given his 
instructions: the draftsman has misunderstood them and, 
therefore, used words in the will which do not give 
effect to them. Again, the testator's intentions have 
been frustrated. If the testator, however, signs the 
will having had the discrepancy between his instructions 
and the draftsman's language explained to him then he 
must be deemed to have adopted the draftsman's language 
and, therefore, to be bound by it. 
If, on the other hand, the testator signs with-
out the discrepancy having been brought to his notice, 
he will, prima facie, be deemed to have knowledge and 
approval of the words contained in his will. Whether 
this presumption can, or ought, to be rebuttable on 
proof of the draftsman's misunderstanding of the test-
ator's instructions is a moot point. This is not a case 
of a draftsman overstepping the limits set by the 
instructions,as with a clerical slip and in the postul-
ated situation just discussed. In both of those cases, 
before the testator can be said to approve the wil\ his 
~nd must be intentionally brought to bear on the words 
in question and their effect. Nor is this a case of a 
42. See Re Morris (deceased)@ p.80. 
140 
testator being bound by the erroneous language of a 
draftsman chosen after comprehending the instructions. 
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In such a situation a testator is bound by the draftsman's 
mistake, essentially on expeditious policy grounds. It 
is submitted that on those same grounds, to prevent 
confusion and uncertainty, a testator must be held 
responsible for making his intentions and instructions 
comprehensible to and understood by his draftsman. 
Failure to adopt this course wou~d, in all probability, 
lead to a lack of conscientiousness on the part of test-
ators with even more disastrous results. 
It is thus contended that a distinction ought to 
be drawn between draftsmen who, in trying to give effect 
to their instructions ~s they understand them), make 
mistakes and draftsmen who, in fact acting outside their 
instructions, make mistakes. Knowledge and approval 
ought only to be imputed to a testator in the latter 
case on proof of the discrepancy between the testator's 
instructions and the draftsman's actions being specific-
ally brought to his attention and adopted by him. 
(vii) Other types of mistake. 
For completeness, it is intended to discuss, 
very briefly, two other types of mistake which fall on 
the periphery of the area of mistake covered hitherto. 
First, dependant relative revocation. This 
doctrine arises when revocation of a will or codicil by 
destruction, or by another will or codicil duly executed 
in writing, is made conditional upon the validity of a 
subsequent will or codicil. Ascertaining a testator's 
intention in such circumstances can be fraught with 
difficulties, not least because, varying with the type 
of revocation, different rules prevail. As R.D. Mackay 
states: 43 
II Where the revocation is by destruction, 
the question of the testator's intention is 
one of fact, Dixon v Treasury Solicitor 
[1905] P.42. In all other cases such as 
revocation by subsequent will or codicil it 
is a question of construction: Re Hawkesley's 
Settlements [1943] Ch. 384. But in either 
event one is obviously involved in the diffi-
cult quest of discovering the testator's 
intention at the time of revocation." 
In the former instance, but not the latte~ extrinsic 
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evidence of the testator's intention is, therefore, 
admissible. 44 The doctrine has two distinct applications. 
The first way in which it can apply to the revoc-
ation of a will by a subsequent will or codicil is as 
follows: 45 
"A subject has been disposed of in a will 
and the same subject is again disposed of 
either in a subsequent will or in a 
codicil. Then if there has been no 
express revocation of the first will and 
the only revocation is that which is 
gathered from the inconsistency of the 
subsequent disposition, should such sub-
sequent disposition fail from any reason 
to be efficacious, there will be no 
revocation of the first disposition." 
43. R.D. Mackay. Conditional~Revocation 127 N.L.J. 19 
44. Powell v Powell (1866) L.R. l P & D 209; Newton v 
Newton (1861) 12 I.Ch.R. 118 @ pp.l28 & 129. 
45. In the Estate of Southerden [1925] P.l77 @ p.l85. 
The second application of the doctrine has been 
judicially explained as follows: 46 
"The name of this doctrine seems to me to 
be somewhat overloaded with unnecessary 
polysyllables .... The whole matter can 
be quite simply expressed by the word 
"conditional" as Atkin L.J. explained in 
Adams v Southerden~ and the question which 
arises is whether or not the revocatory 
clause is inserted conditionally, the 
condition being that a new will should be 
set up by the document in which the revoc-
atory clause appears." 
These rules are wel~ settled, as witnessed by the 
d h f th b . t 47 eart o cases on e su Jec : 
"It seems that the matter has come before 
the Court of Appeal on only two occasions; 
once more than fifty years ago in In the 
Estate of Southerden [1925] P.l77, and 
recently in Re Jones~ deceased~ Evans v 
Harries and Others [1976] 1 All E.R. 493; 
[1976] 2 W.L.R. 457." 
The second type of mistake demanding inclusion 
here is the situation where a testator makes a mistake 
as to relevant facts of a kind likely to influence him 
in making his will. Of itself, a mistake of this kind 
will not operate to invalidate the will. 
In Re Posner 48 a gift in a will was made to a 
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woman described as the testator's wife. In fact, she was 
not his wife as no valid marriage ceremony had ever been 
46. Per Langton J. in In b. Hope-Brown [1942] P.l36 @ 
pp. 138-139; and see Ward v Van der Loeff [1924] 
A.C.653-656; Re Davies [1928] Ch. 24; Re Robinson 
[ 19 3 0] 2 Ch. 3 3 2. 
47. F. Graham Glover Dependent Relative Revocation 
127 N.L.J. 697. 
48. [1953] P.277. 
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performed in respect of them. The testator was unaware 
of this, believing the marriage was perfectly valid. 
It was held that the will would be upheld. The case 
involved one of mistaken impression only, there being 
no suggestion of fraud. 
Karminski J., @ p.280, required two criteria to be 
satisfied before the gift would be defeated: 
"One is a legacy given to a person in a 
character which the legatee does not fill. 
But that by itself is not enough. In 
order to defeat the legacy there must also 
be a fraudulent assumption of that charact-
er; and furthermore, the testator must have 
been deceived by that fraud." 
Finding no allegation of procuring by fraud in the 
present case Karminski J. decided the issue in favour of 
the plaintiff. 
4. CONCLUSION 
From the preceding discussion it can be seen that 
a categorisation of cases coupled with an extraction of 
principles is a complicated undertaking. Conflicting 
dicta and decisions and pressing policy factors combine 
to make any attempted classification of the law on this 
subject tentative only. Nevertheless, in endeavouring 
so to do it is submitted that the following principles 
may be elicited. 
(1) Where a testator mistakenly executes a 
document as his will and that document was 
not in fact intended to constitute his will, 
despite the almost identical nature of its 
terms, then the principles applicable vary 
with the jurisdiction. In England the 
document would not be admitted to probate 
for a lack of animus testandi. In New 
Zealand, however, a matter of form will not 
be allowed to stand in the way if the 
essential elements of execution have been 
fulfilled. Thus if words can be omitted to 
give effect to the testator's original 
intention the court has power to omit them 
but it may not insert any words. In Canada 
the courts have followed the course adopted 
in New Zealand but, additionally, permitted 
the insertion of words in order to give 
effect to the testator's intention. 
(2) Where a testator by a mere clerical 
error inserts words in his own will which he 
has drafted himself, then, the words will be 
omitted from probate for a want of knowledge 
and approval if their omission gives effect to 
the original intentions of the testator. 
(3) A clerical error committed by a draftsman 
contrary to his instructions which involves the 
inclusion of words will not bind the testator 
unless the very words are brought to his 
notice and he adopts them as his own before the 
execution of the will. A reading over of the 
will to or by the testator will not conclusively 
presume that he knew and approved of the words 
in question. 
Where such a clerical error takes the 
form of the omission of words thereby altering 
the sense of those remaining Re Morris and Re 
Reynette-James are authority for the proposition 
that the words remaining will not bind the 
testator unless they are brought to his notice 
and adopted by him. Again, merely reading the 
will raises no conclusive presumption. 
In this category of mistake the Court of 
Probate has omitted words not only in order to 
give effect to the original intentions of the 
testator but also in an attempt to approximate 
to the original intentions of the testator even 
if the omission of words results in ambiguity. 
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(4) Where a testator, drafting his own will, 
intentionally inserts words in his w~ll under 
a misapprehension as to their true legal 
effect then he is deemed to know and approve 
of the words and he is bound by them, whatever 
their legal effect. 
(5) Where words are inserted in a will by a 
draftsman to whom a testator has given 
instructions to draw up a willl and in trying 
to give effect to the testator's intentions 
the draftsman makes a mistake in his choice of 
language then the testator is bound by the 
draftsman's mistake. 
Observations in a leading case, Re 
Horrocks~ have further complicated this part of 
the law. It was there stated that the Court of 
Probate's jurisdiction to omit words (where it 
existed) only extended to exclude words if to 
do so would not affect the sense of words 
deliberately chosen by the testator or his 
draftsman. 49 
Possible extensions to these principles can be 
speculated upon but the mass of contradictions to be 
found in the dicta and decisions on both questions of 
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fact and law make this a difficult task. The distinctions 
drawn, for example, between the insertion of words by a 
clerical error and their omission by the same type of 
error seem artificial. The result, in that case, has 
seen the courts attempting to inject some form of 
rationality into the common law where the legislature has 
been lethargic. A further, major, problem is the 
inconsistent na~~re of the statements on the subject of 
the Court of Probate's remedial jurisdiction. It seems 
to be generally agreed that the court's power is limited 
to omission and does not extend to insertion. The 
49. [1939] P.l98 @ p.218. 
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problem is: What must be left after the omission has been 
effected? Is it to comprise the exact wishes of the 
testator? or can it comprise only an approximation thereto? 
As the summary of principles just discussed reveals, 
varying views on these questions have led to fine lines 
being drawn between categories of mistake which are in 
danger of being even further refined after cases such as 
R . 50 d R R tt 51 e Morr~s an e eyne e-James. Thus it seems 
apposite in the next chapter to give consideration to the 
courts' jurisdiction to remedy mistakes of the type here 
contemplated. A more complete picture of how mistakes 
can arise and what can be done about them will thereby be 
obtained. 
50. [1971] P.62. 
51. [1976] l W.L.R. 161. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE POWERS OF THE COURTS TO CORRECT TESTATORS' MISTAKES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Once it has been established that a mistake of the 
type discussed in the previous chapter has occurred in a 
testamentary instrument the need arises to consider the 
powers of the courts as regards its possible correction. 
Two occasions are available for this task. The first is 
when probate of the instrument is sought. The second is 
if the interpretation of the instrument is in question 
before a court of construction. 
Before the Court of Probate it must be shown that 
the will, because of the mistake, does not express the 
true testamentary intentions of the testator and that it 
was executed without his knowledge and approval. To this 
end the reception of extrinsic evidence is allowed. Such 
evidence establishes the will as that of the testator in 
question and, further, raises the issue of mistake. 
Before the court of construction, however, no such 
extrinsic evidence is, as a general rule, admissible. 
The Wills Act 1837 requires that testamentary intentions 
be evidenced only in the statutory form, therefore the 
court of construction is constrained, once the will is 
established, to confine itself to the terms of the 
document itself in seeking to ascertain the testator's 
testamentary intentions. 1 
Sir J.P. Wilde explained the distinction thus in 
Guardhouse v Blackburn: 2 
"For the question in such cases is not what 
intention ought to be assigned to the words 
of a given written paper but to what extent 
does a given written paper express the 
testamentary intentions of the deceased. 
And the function of the Court is not to 
construe a written paper, the validity of which 
is admitted, but to gather the necessary facts, 
and pronounce on the validity of the paper. 
Although it be right to adhere to the writing, 
and exclude all parol testimony in the former 
case, it is clearly impossible to do so in the 
latter. Indeed, the Court of Probate, setting 
about to ascertain the will of the deceased, 
could not stir a step in the inquiry without 
some proof beyond the mere writing .... The 
truth is, that the rules excluding parol 
evidence have no place in any inquiry in which 
the Court has not got before it some ascertain-
ed paper beyond question binding and of full 
effect... On this head, then, the Court may 
safely ado~t the language of Mr Williams on 
Executors: "In a court of construction, when 
the factum of the instrument has been previously 
established in the Court of Probate, the inquiry 
is almost closely restricted to the contents of 
the instrument itself, in order to ascertain the 
intentions of the testator. But in the Court of 
Probate the inquiry is not so limited for there 
the intentions of the deceased, as to what shall 
operate as, and compose his will, are to be 
collected from all the circumstances of the case 
taken together. They must, however, be 
circumstances existing at the time the will is 
made." 
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1. See, generally, C.H. Sherrin The Wind of Change in 
the Law of Wills (1976) 40 Conv. (N.S.) 66. 
2. (1866) L.R. 1 P & D 109 @ pp. 114-115. 
3. (5th edn) Vol. 1 p.313. 
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2. THE POWERS OF THE COURT OF PROBATE 
A mistake in a testamentary instrument may be 
corrected before admission to probate if it can be shown 
that there is a want of knowledge and approval in respect 
of that part of the will. The aforementioned extrinsic 
evidende of mistake is admissible at this juncture to prove 
4 that that part lacked the testator's approval. As Lee 
points out, knowledge and approval in this context is a 
limited concept, stemming from the former closely-bounded 
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court. That court 
had no jurisdiction to interpret the meaning of a testa-
mentary instrument: that jurisdiction was the sole 
preserve of the Chancery Court. Thus, in the court of 
probate, in order to ensure the deletion of unwanted 
material from the probate copy, it may not be shown that 
the testator did not intend to mean what he said: all that 
may be shown is that he did not intend to say what he said. 
5 Hardingham puts it this way: 
11 It should be noted that, while the Wills 
Act does not stand in the way of the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence to show 
that a particular document was not fully 
approved of and assented to by the testator 
during his lifetime, the statute does 
prevent the courts from using extrinsic 
evidence in order to ascertain or formulate 
testamentary intentions which may have been 
omitted from the will by mistake ... 
4. William A. Lee Correcting Testators' Mistakes: The 
Probate Jurisdiction (1969) 33 Conveyancer 322. 
5. Hardingham, Neave & Ford The Law of Wills @ p.59. 
Thus it is emphasised that the court may not make the 
testator's will for him. As Knight-Bruce V.C. said in 
Bird v Luckie :6 
" ... no man is bound to make a will in such a 
manner as to deserve approbation from the 
prudent the wise or the good. A testator 
is permitted to be capricious and improvident 
and is moreover at liberty to conceal the 
circumstances, and the motives, by which he 
has been actuated in his dispositions. Many 
a testamentary provision may seem to the 
world arbitrary, capricious and eccentric, 
for which the testator if he could be heard, 
might be able to answer most satisfactorily." 
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Once the will, with its mistake(s), has been est-
ablished before the Court of Probate the question arises: 
What are the powers of that court in remedying mistakes? 
Basically its powers are exclusionary: it may omit from 
probate words inserted in the testamentary instrument by 
mistake but it may not include words omitted by mistake, 
as that would subvert the policy of the Wills Act that a 
will must be in writing. 7 In every problem of the sort 
under consideration it is therefore pertinant to inquire 
whether the mistake actually consisted of an introduction 
of words into the will or of an omission of the same from 
the will. In Morrell v Morrell, 8 for example, a case 
already discussed, 9 the jury found that the particular 
mistake was the insertion of the number "40" 
6. (1850) 8 Hare 301 @ p. 306. 
7. This principle is mentioned several times in the 
preceding chapter. 
8. (1882) 7 P.D. 68. 
9. Supra p. 99, 
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not the failure to put in the number "400". The 
Court therefore struck out the "40". A decision by the 
jury going the other way would not have given the court 
any such power to strike out. 
A case on the other side of the line is Harter v 
Harter. 10 The short facts of the case were these: A 
testator's oral instructions to his draftsman included a 
requirement that his will contain a clause giving the 
residue of his estate equally to his sons when they 
attained 21 years of age. From these instructions a 
draft will was drawn which disposed of the residue in 
these terms: "The trustees to stand possessed of all the 
residue and remainder of my real estate in trust to 
divide the same" etc. 
Having been read over by the testator the will was 
duly executed. The executors of the testator sought 
probate of the will with the word "real" omitted, which, 
it was alleged, had been inserted by mistake. By 
expunging the word "real" the testator's intentions 
would be effected. However, evidence was given by the 
draftsman to the effect that he had intended to write 
"residue and remainder of my real and personal estate" 
but that, through inadvertence, he had omitted the words 
"and personal". 
Sir J. Hannen, in dismissing the application to 
have the word "real" omitted from the will, said: 
10. (1873) !J.R. 3 P & D.ll. 
"I think that the error consists in the 
omission of the words "and personal" 
after the word "real" in the residuary 
clause." 
He went on, that sinbe the error was one of omission it 
was not open to the court to supply the missing words. 
The will had been drawn up by a draftsman, the language 
had been adopted by the testator and the court had no 
jurisdiction by means of which it could alter the will 
. d 11 as s1gne . 
It may be seen that in every case, with three 
exceptions, 12 in the classification outlined in the 
previous chapter the will in question contained a word, 
or words, inserted through inadvertance. Potentially, 
therefore, in nearly all cases discussed the Court of 
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Probate's power to strike out could have been exercised. 
In most cases it was. In those where it was not an 
additional principle limiting the court's jurisdiction 
precluded it. The relevant principle has already been 
11 d d 1 t . . h f . 1 . 13 b a u e to severa 1mes 1n t e orego1ng ana ys1s ut 
it demands further mention here. 
11. It is to be noted that the learned judge decided 
the case alternatively in reliance upon the 
decision of Sir J.P. Wilde in Guardhouse v 
Blackburn (1866) L.R. 1 P & D 109. 
12. The three exceptions being: Re Whyte (deceased) 
[1969] N.Z.L.R. 519; Re Morris [1971] P.62; and 
Re Reynette-James [1976] 1 W.L.R. 161. 
13. See previous chapter. 
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The point-at-issue is: Is the Court of Probate's 
power to strike out limited by its (potential) effect on 
the remaining parts of the will? As several cases from 
the previous chapter show this question is far from 
settled. 14 
At the outset it is to be noted that if by 
omitting words which do not form part of the testator's 
true intentions the meaning and effect of the parts of the 
will specifically approved by him is completely altered, 
then the entire purpose of expunging is defeated. What 
remains would not reflect the testator's intentions. 
But, on the other hand, if an omission has the effect of 
giving effect to the testator's will or approximating 
thereto such omission is desirable. 
Lord Blackburn in the Privy Council case of 
Rhodes v Rhodes gave his opinion on the question: 15 
14. 
"When an instrument purporting to be the will 
of the deceased person has been executed by 
the deceased in the proper manner, but it is 
sufficiently proved that though he executed 
the instrument, yet that from fraud he 
executed that which was not his will there 
is no difficulty in pronouncing that the 
instrument is not his will. And it has 
been held that when it is sufficiently 
proved that the instrument comprised his will, 
but that from fraud, or perhaps from inad-
vertance, ·such as that In the Goods of Duane, 16 
See, particularly: Re PheZan 
Sir J.E. Boehm [1891] P.247; 
19 8 ; Re M orr i s [ 19 71 ] P . 6 2 ; 
[1976] 1 W.L.R. 161. 
[1972] Fam. 33; In b. 
Re Horrocks [1939] P. 
Re Reynette-James 
15. 7 App. Cas. 192 @ p.l98. 
16. (1862) 2 Sw & Tr. 590. 
the instrument which he actually executed 
contained also something which was not his 
will, this latter part is to rejected. 
And in such a case, if this latter part is 
so distinct and severable from the true 
part that the rejection of it does not alter 
the construction of the true part, it has 
been held that, consistently with the Statute 
of Wills, the execution of what was shown to 
be the true will, and something more, may be 
treated as the execution of the true will 
alone. A much more difficult question 
arises where the rejection of words alters 
the sense of those which remain. For even 
though the Court is convinced that the words 
were improperly introduced, so that if the 
instrument was inter vivos they would reform 
the instrument and order one in different 
words to be executed, it cannot make the 
dead man execute a new instrument; and there 
seems much difficulty in treating the will 
after its sense is thus altered as valid within 
the 9th section of the 7 Will 4 + 1 Viet. c.26, 
the signature at the end of the will required 
by that enactment having been attached to what 
bore quite a different meaning. It has never, 
as far as their Lordships are aware, been nec-
essary to decide as to this, though the judg-
ment of Sir James Hannen in Harter v Harter 17 
has some bearing on it. And their Lordships 
think it unnecessary and therefore improper now 
to express any opinion op this question for the 
evidence does not raise it." 
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In Re Horrocks 18 this extract from Lord Blackburn's 
judgment in Rhodes v Rhodes was cited. In that case, it 
will be recalled the draftsman inadvertently inserted the 
word "or" (instead of "and") between the words "charitable" 
and "benevolent" in the testatrix's will. In refusing to 
omit the word "or" the Court reasoned at pages 217-218: 
17. (1873) L.R. 3 P & D.ll. 
18. [1939] P.l98. 
" ... [T]he effect of striking out the word "or" 
and leaving the word "benevolent" is ... to 
qualify the word "charitable" and to cut out 
from its signification so much of the field of 
charity as is not benevolent. In other words, 
the omission of the word "or" alters the effect 
of the word "charitable" which was approved 
by the testatrix and which she must be taken to 
have intended should have its full significat-
ion. It is as though a proviso were to be 
inserted to the effect that the discretion of 
the trustees was not to be exercised in favour 
of a charitable object unless it was also 
benevolent. The result would be that the one 
thing as to which the intentions and instruct-
ions of the testatrix were clear would be 
defeated." 
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The Court concluded, in a passage quoted earlier, 19 
that so to alter a will (that is, by an omission) as to 
affect the sense of words deliberately chosen by the test-
ator or his draftsman would be tantamount to making a new 
will. That, it considered, it was not permitted to do 
and, questionably, on the facts of the case it refused 
to omit the word "or". At first sight these observations 
in Re Horrocks seem to have created an ugly snag in the 
law and have been criticised accordingly. 20 It is 
submitted that these remarks in Re Horrocks cannot be 
taken literally otherwise the cases of In the Goods of 
21 22 Boehm and In the Goods of Schott could not have been 
decided as they were and approved in Re Horrocks. Of the 
former Sir Wilfred Greene M.R. said, in giving the judg-
ment of the Court: 23 
19. Ibid. @ p.218 and supra at p.l32. 
20. See, for example, Lee, op. cit., @ p.330 and 
Hardingham@ p.66.--
21. [1891] P.247. 
22. [1901] P.l90. 
2 3 . Re H orr o c k s @ p . 2 2 0 . 
"But it is one thing to strike out a word 
which leaves what is left devoid of 
ascertainable content and therefore inop-
erative; it is quite another thing to 
strike out a word when by doing so the · ,, 
meaning of what is left is qualified and cut 
down. It is clear from Sir Francis Jeune's 
reference to Rhodes v Rhodes24 that he did 
not conceive himself to be doing something 
which altered the sense of what remained." 
f h 1 t h . d 25 0 t e at er case e op1ne : 
"Here again the effect of the omission was 
not to alter the sense of what remained." 
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Were a literal interpretation of the observations 
in Re Horrocks to be insisted upon then there would be 
little incentive to initiate proceedings for the omission 
of material from probate the aim of such a course being, 
usually, to bring about a state of affairs under which 
those commencing the action benefit - such a position not 
being effected by the will as it stands. 
It is suggested, therefore, that when Lord Greene 
spoke of not affecting the "sense of words deliberately 
chosen by the testator or his draftsman" what he had in 
mind was the adoption of a formula which would preclude 
the possibility of an omission being ultimately construed 
to arrive at a meaning totally at variance with the 
testator's intention. If, however, the omission was to 
have the effect of altering the will while keeping within 
the general sense of that which the testator intended 
then it ought to be permitted. Without such an inter-
2 4 • ( 18 8 2 ) 7 App . Cas . 19 2 • 
2 5 • Re Horrocks @ p . 2 2 0 • 
pretation Lord Greene's apparent agreement with Boehm 
and Schott is inexplicable. 
This explanation serves to interpret the High 
Court of Australia decision of Osborne v Smith 26 where 
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Re Horrocks was approved. In that case the Court refused 
to admit the will of the testatrix to probate for several 
reasons which indicated a lack of knowledge and approval. 
The problem arose because the testatrix left a legacy of 
£100 a year to the Horne of Peace, Petersham, for as long 
as a business forming part of her estate should be 
carried on by her trustees, and £200 to the Horne of 
Peace when the business should be sold. There was cogent 
evidence that the testatrix did not intend the Horne to 
receive any annual payment. At p.l62 Kitto J. explained 
the Court's difficulty that: 
" if the existing clause in favour of the 
Horne of Peace were to be struck out, the gift 
to the appellant [the residuary beneficiary] 
would necessarily have an effect different 
both from that which it has on the face of 
the instrument and from that which the 
deceased intended it to have." 
Any omission would, therefore, cause the will to 
bear that unacceptable class of "intermediary meaning" 
outside the general sense of the words "deliberately 
chosen by the testator or his draftsman". Following Re 
Horrocks the High Court of Australia refused to allow 
this. 
26. (1960) 105 C.L.R. 153; 34 A.L.J.R. 368. 
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Against this background of the Court of Probate's 
exclusionary jurisdiction of words inserted by mistake 
coupled with the limitations imposed by Re Horrocks, the 
cases of Re Morris and Re Reynette-James stand out. In 
neither case did the court exercise its power to omit 
words included by mistake, instead it omitted words 
intentionally included but which, because of the inadvert-
ent omission of other words, had had their effect altered. 
As indicated elsewhere in this work, 27 it is thought that 
in so doing the courts in both cases exceeded their 
jurisdiction. On that premise it seems pointless to 
attempt to determine whether by such an ultra vires 
omission the courts thereafter brought themselves within 
h k 'd 1' 28 t e Re Horroc s gu1 e 1nes. Rather, it is thought, in 
both cases the courts by their omissions were attempting 
in a general way, "to get nearer to the intentions of the 
testator" as Templeman J. expressed it in Re Reyne tte-
29 James. However laudable the end, it cannot, it is 
submitted, justify the means used to attain it. That end 
may, therefore, be called into question by a higher 
court were a case raising similar issues to come up before 
it. 
27. supra p. 120. 
28. See Hardingham's three propositions at pp.67-68. 
29. Re Reynette-James @ p.l67. 
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The complexity of the law in this area, the 
artificial distinctions of mistaken insertion or omiss-
ion, the problems associated with the terminology of Re 
Horrocks and the new departure in cases such as Re Morris 
and Re Reynette-James raise important issues. For example, 
are the decisions in those cases to be given a more secure 
foothold in succession law? Unquestionably they repres-
ent a dispensation of "justice" in a wide sense, but 
before now such an ideal has often had to be sacrificed 
to unyielding rules of law. Both cases attempt to give 
the testator's intentions a paramountcy not enjoyed 
hitherto. And can a more equitable formula not be 
advanced which would rid the law of distinctions surround-
ing the question of mistaken inclusion as opposed to 
mistaken exclusion? Finally, are the much-criticised and 
eq~ly much-misunderstood observations of Lord Greene in 
Re Horrocks to continue to be the price to be paid for a 
reluctance to interfere with the Wills Act 1837? It is 
incumbent upon the legislature to appreciate these 
problems and make some attempt to remedy them instead of 
leaving it to the judiciary to circumvent antiquated 
vestiges of past eras in trying to "do equity". Changes 
must surely be long overdue. What form they might take 
is discussed in the section dealing with possible 
reforms. 
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3. THE POWERS OF THE COURT OF CONSTRUCTION 
Once a grant of probate has been made in respect 
of a will questions may arise as to the interpretation 
of the language therein used. Any such questions are 
dealt with by a court of construction. 
The object of a court of construction, in constru-
ing a will, is to ascertain the intention of the testator. 
In the words of Viscount Simon L.C.: 30 
"The fundamental rule in construing the 
language of a will is to put on the words 
used the meaning which, having regard to 
the terms of the will, the testator 
intended. The question is not, of course, 
what the testator meant to do when he made 
his will, but what the written words he 
uses mean in the particular case - what 
are the "expressed intentions" of the 
testator." 
In carrying out its task the court of construction 
is limited in several ways. 
First, the grant of probate is conclusive as to 
what the words of the will are. Thus the court cannot 
look at the original will in order to correct any error 
alleged to exist in the wording of the probate copy of 
the will. 31 It can, however, inspect the original for 
the purpose of considering its format: for example to 
examine punctuation or the presence of blanks. 32 
30. Perrin v Morgan [1943] A.C. 399 @ p.406. 
31. Oppenheim v Henry (1853) 9 Hare 802; Gann v Gregory 
(1854) 3 De G.M. & G. 777; and Re Cliff's Trusts 
[ 1 8 9 2 ] 2 Ch . 2 2 9 . 
32. E.g. Houston v Burns [1918] A.C. 337; Re Harrison (1885) 
30 Ch.D. 390; Re Battie-Wrightson [1920] 2 Ch.330; 
Manning v Purcell (1855) 24 L.J. Ch. 522. 
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Secondly, in order to ascertain the intention of a 
testator as expressed in his will, the court has developed 
a number of general principles and several specific rules 
for its guidance. These are compendiously described as 
"rules of construction" which, in many instances, suffer 
from an excess of technicality. 
Thirdly, the court of construction is limited as 
to the evidence it may admit to discover the testator's 
intention. 
It is proposed to look at the second and third of 
these limitations in turn. 
(i) Principles/Rules of Construction 
Whether the subject-matter of this section are 
properly to be regarded as principles or as rules is a 
moot point. According to Ronald Dworkin's33 analysis, 
principles lean in favour of a decision having an element 
of weight which a judge has a discretion to utilise or 
disregard. Rules, on the other hand, apply in an "all-
or-nothing" fashion. A judge has no discretion as to 
whether to make use of any particular rule: if it covers 
the situation it must be applied. Thus, to favour the 
term "principles of construction" acknowledges their 
presumptive nature and their possible displacement. ·c2 To 
call them "rules", by way of contrast, imports an unwarr-
anted and unwelcome rigidity into an area already fraught 
with difficulties. It is submitted that the former 
33. See Is Law a System of Rules? in Essays in Legal 
Philosophy Ed.Summers@ p.27. 
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expression is to be preferred to the latter as more 
accurately reflective of their true nature. Support for 
this view may be found in several cases where the estab-
lished rules of construction have been weakened by a 
reluctance to regard them, or refer to them, as "rules" 
at all. Epithets such as "guides" 34 and "canons of 
construction" 35 have been employed instead. In Le Cras 
v Perpetual Trustee Co 36 Lord Wilberforce went even 
further and stated37 that although attempts had been 
made to subsume cases under a number of rules and even 
sub-rules, he thought that such "rules" were in reality 
38 little more than ordered lists of examples. 
What, then, are these principles (or rules) of 
construction? 
The basic principle is that, prima facie, the 
words and expressions used in a will must be given their 
ordinary meaning - "the strict, plain, common meaning of 
39 the words themselves". This principle will not be 
34. See, for example: Harman J. in Re Levy (deceased) 
[1960] 1 Ch. 346 @ p.366; Lord Denning M.R. in 
35. 
Re Jebb [1966] 1 Ch. 666 @ p.672; and Pennycuick J. 
in Re Pugh's Will Trusts [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1262, @ p. 
1266. 
See, for example, Lord Evershed M.R. in Re 
Will Trusts [1959] 1 W.L.R. 1212 @ p.l215; 
in Re Neeld [1962] 1 Ch. 643 @ p.675; and 
in ReF iggis (deceased) [1969] 1 Ch. 123 @ 
Douglas 1 
Upjohn J. 
Megarry J. 
p.l24. 
36. [1967] 3 All E.R. 9~5. 
37. Ibid. @ p.926. 
38. Later he even referred to the cases as "guiding 
illustrations". 
39. Shore v Wilson (1842) 9 Cl. & F. 355 @ p.365. 
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lightly departed from: thus, if the words of the will are 
clear, and are capable of application by reference to 
extrinsic circumstances, then the court will not admit 
evidence to demonstrate that the testator used the words 
in something other than their ordinary sense. 40 The 
apparent simplicity of the principle belies its inherent 
difficulties: often words have more than one "ordinary 
meaning"~l In such cases resort may be had to the "arm-
chair principle" 42 in an attempt to ascertain which meaning 
the testator had in mind. 
As regards technical words: they are to be given 
their technical meaning, unless the will shows an intention 
to use them in another sense. An example of the applicat-
ion of the general rule can be found in the case of Re 
Cook. 43 
In that case the testatrix by her will (made 
on a printed will form), gave "all my personal estate 
whatever" to her named nephew and nieces. Her estate 
comprised mainly realty. It was held that the realty was 
not disposed of by the will but devolved, instead, as an 
. t . d 44 1n estacy. Harman J. sa1 : 
40. See, for example, Higgins v Dawson [1902] A.C.l; 
Gilmour v MacPhillamy [1930] A.C. 713; and Re Jones 
[1971] N.Z.L.R. 796. 
41. See, for example, Perrin v Morgan [1943] A.C. 399. 
42. See p. 171 infra. 
4 3 . [ 1 9 4 8 ] Ch . 212 . 
44. Ibid. @ p.216. 
"It seems unlikely that she intended to dispose 
only of the personal estate in the lawyer's 
sense of that word ... but this is a case 
where a layman has chosen to use a term of 
art. The words "all my personal estate" are 
words so well-known to lawyers that it must 
take a very strong context to make them 
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include real estate. Testators can make black 
mean white if they make the dictionary sufficient-
ly clear, but the testatrix has not done so. It 
may well be that she thought "personal estate" 
meant "all my worldly goods". I do not know. In 
the absence of something to show that the phrase 
ought not to be so construed, I must suppose that 
she used the term "personal estate" in its 
ordinary meaning as a term of art". 
In the preceding extract Harman J. mentioned the 
third principle which falls to be discussed, namely: the 
"dictionary" principle. 
It has already been stated45 that it is the task 
of the court of construction to ascertain the testator's 
intention. This must be done by an examination of the 
whole will. Ungoed-Thomas J. in Re Maaandrews WiZZ 
46 Trusts : 
"The fundamental and overriding duty binding 
the court is to ascertain the intention of 
the testator as expressed in his will as a 
whole." 
Thus words must be read in context. If it then appears 
that the testator has used them in a sense other than the 
usual one the sense which the testator intended them to 
bear must take precedence. In other words, the testator 
has then provided his own definition of "dictionary" 47 
which the court must acknowledge. 
45. Supra p.l61. 
4 6 . [ 19 6 4] Ch . 7 0 4 @ p . 7 0 9 . 
47. See, for example, HiZZ v Crook (1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 265 
(meaning of the word "children"). 
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Another principle (or rule) of construction 
dealing with the testamentary document simplicter is 
that which permits the court to omit change or imply 
words. 
48 It has already been seen that a Court of Erobate 
may expunge words inserted in a will by fraud or mistake. 
It has no power to insert words; therefore, in such 
cases, probate is granted with a blank space in the will: 
f 1 . 49 see, or examp e, Re Morr~s. A court of construction, 
on the other hand, cannot exclude words so as to leave a 
blank space. Nor can it insert words in an attempt to 
give effect to a testator's intention. However, that 
court can achieve a similar result in interpreting the 
language of the will by ignoring words, changing them or 
reading in words by necessary implication if, otherwise, 
the words would be meaningless or very difficult to 
construe or if they clearly contradict the testator's 
intention displayed by the will as a whole. Knight 
50 Bruce L. J.: 
" ... there are many cases upon the construction 
of documents in which the spirit is strong 
enough to overcome the letter; cases in which 
it is impossible for a reasonable being, upon 
a careful perusal of an instrument, not to be 
satisfied from its contents that a literal, a 
strict, or an ordinary interpretation given to 
48. Supra p.l50. 
49. [1971] P.62. 
50. Key v Key (1853) 4 De G.M. & G. 73 @ pp.84-85; 
43 E.R. 435 @ p.439. 
particular passages, would disappoint and 
defeat the intention with which the 
instrument, read as a whole, persuades 
and convinces him that it was framed." 
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It is to be noted that a court of construction will 
only read words into a will under certain stringent 
d . t. 51 con 1 1ons. Before it will do so it must be clear from 
52 the will itself, "from the four corners of the document", 
not only that something has been omitted but also what, in 
all probability, that omission was. The principle, as it 
was approved in In re Follett (deceasedJ 53 may be stated 
thus: 
"Where it is clear on the face of a will 
that the testator has not accurately or 
completely expressed his meaning by the 
words he has used, and it is also clear 
what are the words which he has omitted, 
those words may be supplied in order to 
effectuate the intention, as collected 
from the context." 
In Re Reynette-James (deaeasedJ, 54 it may be recall-
ed that Templeman J. discussed the possible application of 
this principle in an attempt to solve the problem posed by 
the typist's omission. However, having considered In 
. 55 56 57 
re Sm'tth, In re Follett and In re Whitrick he 
concluded that: 58 
51. In re Smith [1948] 1 Ch. 49. 
52. In re Whitrick [1957] 1 W.L.R. 884 @ p.887. 
5 3 . [ 1 9 55 ] 1 W . L . R . 4 2 9 @ pp . 4 31 and 4 3 7 . 
54. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 161 @ pp.l65-166. 
55. Supra n.51. 
56. Supra n.53. 
57. Supra n.52. 
58. In Re Reynette-James @ p.l65 quoting from In re 
Follett @ p.434. 
II the necessary assurance, both as to the 
nature and wording of what has been left 
out, as well as to the fact of there having 
been an error or omission " 
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wa:s"' not to be found. Therefore, he was unable "to imply 
a gift of capital to Michael in the present case". 59 
In Re Morris 60 too, Latey J. acknowledged that a 
court of construction61 
" ... might decide from a reading of the 
documents alone that there was not enough 
intrinsic evidence to fill in the blank ... " 
left by his omission of the numeral 7 from the probate 
copy. 
Finally it is pertinant to mention here a rule 
commonly known as "the rule of despair". 62 That rule 
states that where two clauses in a will conflict, the 
later clause will prevail over the former. A striking 
example of the operation of the rule may be found in Re 
63 Hammond. In that case the will, inter alia, gave to a 
beneficiary "the sum of one hundred pounds (£500) ''. It 
was held that the beneficiary was entitled to £500. 
The five rules (or principles) discussed hitherto 
provide the basic framework for the court of construct-
ion's tasks. They do not stand alone, however, but are 
59. Ibid. @ p.l66. 
60. [1971] P.62. 
61. Ibid. @ p.82. 
62. Re Potter's Will Trusts [1944] Ch. 70@ p.77. 
63. (1938) 54 T.L.R. 903. 
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supplemented by other, more specific rules of which 
brief mention will be made. 64 A detailed examination 
of any of these rules is precluded, it is submitted, by 
the fact they are used by the court simply as tools to 
discover a testator's intention. Thus the court retains 
a certain flexibility as to whether any rule applies in 
a given case and, if so, which one. To examine them in 
detail, therefore, it is thought, would be superfluous 
to the requirements of this paper which only requires 
a general appreciation of their nature with a view to 
an analysis of present reform proposals. 
Chief amongst the more specialised rules of 
construction is a bias against intestacy sometimes known 
as the Golden Rule. Lord Esher M.R. expressed it thus 
. H • 65 1n Re arr1.-son: 
"When a testator has executed a will in 
solemn form you must assume that he did 
not intend to make it a solemn farce -
that he did not intend to die intestate 
when he has gone through the form of 
making a will. You ought, if possible, 
to read the will so as to lead to a :. 
testacy, not an intestacy. This is the 
golden rule." 
CoupLed with that rule are several others which attempt to 
militate against the possibility of intestacy: for 
64. See : · · 
Parry & Clark The Law of Succession Chap.l6; 
Hardingham The Law of Wills Chap. 11. 
Feeney The Canadian Law of Wills: Construction 
Parry The Law of Succession Chap. 7. 
65. (1885) 30 Ch.D. 390 @ p.393. 
example, falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore 
constat66 (a misdescription will not vitiate the 
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document if the thing is described with certainty). 
Another example is the rule in Lassence v Tierney 67 stated 
in Hancock v Watson thusf 8 
"If you find an absolute gift to a legatee 
in the first instance, and trusts are 
engrafted or imposed on that absolute 
interest which fail, either from lapse, or 
invalidity, or any other reason, then the 
absolute gift takes effect so far as the 
trusts have failed to the exclusion of the 
residuary legatee or next-of-kin, as the 
case may be." 
Other specific rules of construction are to be 
found in the class closing rules; 69 the Wills Act itself 
(for example, ss.24, 27 and 28); the ejusdem generis 
rule; the rule that a clear gift is not to be cut down 
by ambiguous words, 70and the rules relating to 
t . f t. 71 sa 1s ac 1on. 
Before outlining the modern judicial attitude to 
those rules of construction, it is intended to look at the 
limitations placed on the court of construction in respect 
of evidence it may admit to discover the testator's 
intention. 
66. See, for example, Re Price [1932] 2 Ch. 54; 
Re Gifford [1944] 1 Ch. 186. 
67. (1849) 1 Mac & G. 531, 41 E.R. 379. 
68. [1902] A.C. 14 @ p.22 (per Lord Davey). 
69. Parry and Clark The Law of Succession @ pp.426-433. 
70. Parry op. cit. pp.l22-123; Hardingham op. cit. pp. 
241-243. 
71. Parry & Clark op. cit. pp.437-443. 
(ii) Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence 
It has already been indicated that the grant of 
probate is conclusive as to the words of the will. 72 
That is so, but it does not prevent the admission of 
extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of the object 
or subject matter of a gift. 73 Because 
"The admission of extrinsic circumstances 
to govern the construction of a written 
instrument is in all cases an exception 
to the general rule of law which excludes 
everything dehors the instrument." 
Such evidence is closely monitored. Only so much 
extrinsic evidence as is necessary to determine the 
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identity of the persons mentioned and the things bequeath-
d b h d b h f t . 74 e can e ear y t e court o cons ructlon. 
The operation of this general rule of exclusion of 
extrinsic evidence is prevented, also, by what has 
b k h " h . . . 1 " 75 come to e nown as t e armc alr prlnclp e . That 
principle allows circumstantial evidence of the testator's 
intended meaning to be admitted as an aid in construction 
in cases of uncertainty. The court is thereby able to 
read the will from the position of the testator making it: 
that is, as if sitting in the testator's armchair. In 
76 the words of Lord Romer in Perrin v Morgan: 
72. Supra p. 161. 
73. CoZpoys v CoZpoys (1822) Jac. 451 per Sir T.Plumer M.R. 
74. See, for example, Sherratt v Mountford (1873) 8 Ch. 
App. 928 @ p.929 (per James L.J.); Doe d. Hiscocks v 
Hiscocks (1839) 5 M & W 363 @ p.367 (per Lord 
Abinger C.B.). 
75. Supra p. 164. 
76. [1943] A.C. 399 @ p.420. 
II My Lords, I take it to be a cardinal 
rule of construction that a will should 
be so construed as to give effect to the 
intention of the testator, such intention 
being gathered from the language of the 
will read in the light of the circum-
stances in which the will was made. To 
understand the language employed the 
court is entitled, to use a familiar 
expression, to sit in the testator's arm-
chair. When seated there, however, the 
court is not entitled to make a fresh will 
for the testator merely because it strongly 
suspects that the testator did not mean 
what he has plainly said ... " 
The "armchair principle" most clearly applies in 
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cases where the words of the will do not correspond with 
external circumstances at the time when the will is made. 
In such cases the usual dispute concerns the identity of 
either the object or the subject-matter of the gift. A 
good example of a misdescription of the object of a gift 
is to be found in the case of Charter v Charter. 77 By 
his will the testator, a farmer, appointed "my son 
Forster Charles" as his executor and gave him his resid-
uary estate. The facts revealed that the testator had 
had a son called Forster Charter who had died some years 
before the testator drew up his will. At the date of 
the will the testator had two sons, namely, William 
Forster Charter and Charles Charter. A grant of probate 
was made in respect of William. Charles challenged 
this, and at the subsequent trial extrinsic evidence was 
admitted of the surrounding circumstances extant when the 
testator executed his will. The evidence revealed that 
77. (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 364. 
at that time Charles lived at home with his parents and 
worked on the testator's farm, that William had lived 
away from home for some years and rarely visited the 
testator, and, that the testator never called William 
"Forster". The court held Charles to be successful in 
his challenge and revoked the grant of probate to 
William. William failed in an appeal to the House of 
Lords which was evenly divided. The House held, inter 
alia, 78 that the provision in the will under which the 
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executor was directed to pay an annuity and allow maint-
enance to the testator's widow "so long as they reside 
together in the same house" was only appropriate when 
applied to persons who were living together at the date 
of the will. As stated, the surrounding circumstances 
showed that Charles, and not William, lived with his 
parents at the time when the executor made his will. 
The principle can also be applied in cases where 
words in the will have more than one meaning. Circum-
stantial evidence is then admissible to help resolve the 
uncertainty of which meaning the testator intended the 
words to bear. 
Where, however, the words in a will have a plain 
meaning then they must be construed accordingly: 
extrinsic evidence cannot be used as a basis for an 
inference that the testator meant something which he did 
78. It is to be noted that the House also held that 
declarations by the testator of his intention to 
benefit Charles had been improperly admitted in 
evidence because there was no equivocation: infra p.l78. 
174 
not say. In Higgins v Dawson 79 a will contained a gift 
of the residue of the testator's mortgage debts after 
payment thereout of his just debts and testamentary 
expenses. The House of Lords held that evidence as to the 
state of the testator's property at the date of the will 
was not admissible to show that he meant to charge not 
only his just debts and testamentary expenses on his 
mortgage debts but also certain pecuniary legacies which 
he had given by will. Lord Shand said: 80 
79. 
"The case is not one in which either the 
property dealt with by the testator, or 
the legatees or persons to be benefit~d 
by the will, are at all doubtful. In the 
class of cases in which you cannot tell 
exactly what is given or to whom it is 
given because of obscure and doubtful 
expressions of the testator's will in 
regard to the particular conditions of his 
property, you must have recourse to ex-
trinsic evidence in order to ascertain his 
meaning. But here, in the first place, 
the will is in its expressions and language, 
as I think, unambiguous; and that being so, 
no proof in reference to the amount of the 
testator's estate at the date of the will 
can affect its construction. It appears to 
me that the purpose, or the effect at all 
events, of the proposal to lead evidence in 
this case is to supply a basis for inferring 
the intention of the testator, and to take one 
away from the true construction of the will as 
showing that the testator intended something 
different to what he has said. I agree with 
his Lordship in thinking that, even if it 
would be shown that the intention of the 
testator was something different from the 
language of the will, that intention would not 
prevail, but that the language of the will 
must settle the rights of parties." 
[1902] A.C. 1; [1900-3] All E.R. Rep. 1470. 
80. Ibid. @ p.l475. 
Thus, it can be seen that it is the primary duty 
of a court of construction to construe the words of the 
81 
will. As Farwell J. lucidly said in Be Hodgson the 
175 
court shquld not ascertain surrounding circumstances and 
in the light of that knowledge construe the will, but, 
rather, it should perform the reverse process. If the 
plain meaning of the words used is clear, surrounding 
circumstances cannot be looked at to throw a doubt on it. 82 
If, however, the ordinary meaning accorded the words of 
the will result in their not being apt to apply to the 
surrounding circumstances then the court is entitled to 
see whether the language used is capable of some meaning 
other than its ordinary meaning. In this way effect can 
be given to the intention of the testator as shown from 
the language he has used having regard to the surrounding 
circumstances. 
The reasonable clarity of these rules has not 
prevented some judges from applying them in a liberal 
fashion. Day v Collins 83 is a case in point. The facts 
of that case were these: The testator made a will on the 
13th April 1922 containing the following provision: "I 
give to my wife an annuity of one hundred and fifty 
pounds". Two women claimed the annuity: one, 
81. Be Hodgson [1936] Ch. 203 @ p.206; and see Theobald 
Wills (13th edn 1971) par. 427. 
82. See, for example Higgins v Dawson supra; National Soc-
iety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v 
Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruel~ 
to Children [1915] A.C. 207; and Be Satterthwaite's 
W.T. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 277. 
83. [1925] N.Z.L.R. 280. 
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Charlotte Jane Collins, the lawful wife of the testator, 
whome he had married in England in 1885 and deserted about 
four years later; the other, Emily Sophia Collins, whom 
he had "married" in New Zealand in 1899 and with whom he 
lived until his death in 1922. The testator had made a 
previous will ~evoked shortly afterwards by the will in 
question) by which he gave everything "to my wife Emily 
Sophia Collins absolutely". The question for the court 
was whether the lawful wife (Charlotte Jane) or the de 
facto wife (Emily Sophia) took the annuity. 
It was held by the Court of Appeal that the de 
facto wife was the person designated by the expression "my 
wife". Emily Sophia Collins was, therefore, entitled 
to the annuity. 
A strict application of the rules just discussed 
would, it is submitted, have resulted in Charlotte Jane 
Collins taking the annuity: the will gave the annuity to 
the testator's wife; the testator had a legal wife, prima 
facie, then, she ought to have taken. The ambiguity was 
established by facts proved outside the will as Sim J. 
readily acknowledged. 84 The Court of Appeal, therefore, 
permitted the admission of extrinsic evidence in order 
to create a doubt rather than to solve an ambiguity which 
the words of the will themselves had demonstrably created. 
The course pursued by the court is difficult to reconcile 
84. Ibid. @ p.301. 
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• h • • I d 't' 85 d 'th h w1t S1r James W1gram s secon propos1 1on an w1 t e 
d . . . . . 86 ec1s1on 1n H~gg~ns v Lawson. It is submitted, how-
ever, that it is indicative of the courts' reluctance to 
be bound by strict rules in this area, particularly 
when an unflinching obedience to the rules themselves 
might result in a decision manifestly at variance with 
the testator's intentions. This reluctance continues to 
prevail in present times to the extent that reforms have 
been advocated in some quarters to relieve the judiciary 
of the onerous task of trying to make malleable some 
essentially inflexible rules. These possible reforms are 
discussed in the following section .. 
Extrinsic evidence is, therefore, admissible in 
certain circumstances as an aid in construction. Not-
iceable by its exclusion, however, is direct evidence of 
the testator explaining what he intended to do by his 
will. The general inadmissibility of such statements is 
usually explained on the basis that the task of the court 
of construction is not to attempt to a~certain what the 
testator had in mind but,rather, what he had contrived to 
. . t. 87 express 1n wr1 1ng. Two exceptions to this general 
rule exist. 
85. Extrinsic Evidence in the Aid of the Interpretation 
of Wi~ls (5th edn 1914) @ pp.l6-18i and see 
Appendix (infra). 
86. Supra n.79. 
87. See Perrin v Morgan [1943] A.C. 399 @ p.406 (per 
Simon L.C.); and R.D. Mackay Discovering a 
Testator's Intention (1977) 127 N.L.J. 1089. 
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The first concerns the case of equivocal descript-
ions and may be explained thus: Where a will refers to a 
person or thing, and prima facie, that description seems 
clear but, when applied to the relevant surrounding 
circumstances, it appears that the description fits two 
(or more) people (or things) with equal accuracy, then 
evidence of what the testator said he intended is admiss-
ible to determine which of the persons (or things) he had 
in mind. A good illustration is to be found in the case 
of Doe d. Gord v Needs. 88 There, a gift in a will was 
made to "George Gord". It transpired that there were 
two persons of that name who were potential claimants. 
It was held that direct evidence of the testator's 
intention would be let in to show which of the two he had 
in mind. The grounds on which this kind of evidence is 
rendered admissible have been judicially explained thus: 89 
"In each case this kind of parol evidence is 
not admissible for the purpose of controll-
ing, varying, or altering the written will 
of the testator, but is admitted simply for 
the purpose of enabling the court to under-
stand it, and to declare the intention of 
the testator according to the words in which 
that intention is expressed. If such intent-
ion establishes that the description in the 
will may apply to each of two or more persons, 
then a latent ambiguity is exposed, and 
rather than the devise should fail altogether 
for uncertainty, the law allows the ambiguity 
which is exposed by the parol evidence to be 
cleared up and removed by similar evidence, 
provided such parol evidence is sufficient to 
enable the court to ascertain the sense in 
88. (1836) 2M & W 129. 
89. Grant v Grant (1870) L.R. 5 C.P. 385 per Bovill C.J. 
which the testator employed that particular 
expression upon which the ambiguity arises. 
If the parol evidence, after exposing the 
latent ambiguity, fails to solve it, the 
court cannot give effect to that part of 
the will." 
The second exception to the general rule admits 
direct evidence of intention if its effect is to rebut 
certain equitable presumptions. 90 It is of note that 
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if extrinsic evidence is admitted to rebut an equitable 
presumption, contrary evidence supporting the presumption 
is also admissible. 91 But, if no equitable presumption 
is applicable, the general rule applies and extrinsic 
evidence of the testator's declarations of intention is 
. d . . bl 92 1na mlSSl e. 
The general rule excluding direct evidence of a 
testator's intention exists to prevent the formal require-
ments of the Wills Act from being subverted if evidence 
could be admitted to overcome the clear words of the will. 
By executing a will a testator is expected to have 
93 
"channelled'' his thoughts with due regard to the ser-
iousness of the undertaking. If it appears the he has 
failed to express himself in clear and unambiguous terms 
while engaged in a task of such importance then, it is 
90. Usually the presumptions of satisfaction; see 
Parry & Clark op. cit. pp.437-443. 
91. Kirk v Eddowes (1844) 3 Hare 509 @ p.517. 
92. Be ShieZds [1912] 1 Ch. 591; Hurst v Beach (1821) 5 
Madd 351 @ p.360; and HaZZ v HiZZ (1841) 1 Dr & War 
94 @ pp.l24-128. 
93. See the rationale of the formalities in Chapter 1. 
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argued, 94 it is not for the court to attribute to the 
testator an intention which cannot fairly be deduced from 
such wording. The point is taken by others, 95 however, 
that nor is it for the judiciary to arrive at decisions 
which clearly defeat the testator's intentions. This 
disparity of opinion can be clearly found in the reported 
cases and it is submitted that whereas the former view 
was largely preferred last century and earlier this 
century the prevalent judicial attitude favours the latter. 
That there still is a dual approach to the question of 
construction can be clearly seen from the case of Re 
96 Rowland. In that case the majority took the strict 
literal approach: Lord Denning opted for the more liberal 
stance. 
The material facts of Re Rowland were these: Dr 
Rowland and his wife executed similar wills shortly before 
they went to the South Pacific where the doctor was to be 
employed. Both wills left the whole estate to the survivor 
with the following provision appearing in the husband's: 
"In the event of the decease of the said "wife" preceding 
or coinciding with my own decease" then the property was 
to be distributed amongst his chosen blood relatives. A 
similar provision appeared in the wife's will, the only 
difference being in the choice of her own blood relatives. 
94. R.D. Mackay op. cit. @ p.l089. 
95. See, for example, Lord Atkin in Perrin v Morgan 
[1943] A.C. 399 @ p.415. 
9 6 . [ 19 6 2 ] 2 All E . R . 8 3 7 . 
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Once in the South Pacific, the couple were 
presumed drowned when the ship in which they were trav-
elling disappeared without trace. There was no evidence 
as to the actual order of their deaths. This, however, 
97 
was determined by s.l84 of the Law of Property Act 1925 
by which the younger wife was deemed to have survived her 
older husband. The practical result, then, was that all 
of Dr Rowland's property fell into his wife's estate for 
eventual distribution amongst her blood relatives. 
In arriving at this conclusion the majority of the 
Court of Appeal considered that there was nothing in the 
body of the will to suggest that the word "coincide" bore 
other than its natural and ordinary meaning which was 
"simultaneous". Nothing in the document itself indic-
ated that the word should be given a wider meaning and, in 
the Court's opinion, it would be wrong to attribute to 
the testator an intention which could not be discovered 
from a simple reading of the will. The strict view of 
the majority is exemplified in this passage from 
11 ' . d t 98 Russe L.J s JU gmen : 
97. s.l84 states: "In all cases where, after the commence-
ment of this Act, two or more persons have died in 
circumstances rendering it uncertain which of them 
survived the other or others, such deaths shall 
(subject to any order of the court), for all 
purposes affecting the title to property, be presumed 
to have occurred in order of seniority, and accord-
ingly the younger shall be deemed to have survived 
the elder." 
9 8. Re Row "land @ p. 84 5. 
"It is an unsound approach to the construction 
of the will to ask oneself what the testator, 
if he had thought of an event not covered by 
the natural and normal meaning of his 
language, would have wished had he directed 
his mind to the event. The question is what 
event does his language cover? To ask more 
is to desert the source from which his 
intention is to be gathered, his will as 
proved." 
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Lord Denning's dissenting judgment clearly adopted 
a much more liberal course: 99 
"It is not what the testator meant, but what 
is the meaning of his words. " That may have 
been the nineteenth century view; but I 
believe it to be wrong ... the whole object 
of construing a will is to find out the 
testator's intentions, so as to see that his 
property is disposed of in the way he wished. 
True it is that you must discover his intention 
from the words he used: but you must put upon 
his words the meaning which they bore to him. 
If his words are capable of more than one 
meaning, or of a wide meaning and a narrow 
meaning as they often are, then you must put 
upon them the meaning which he intended them 
to convey and not the meaning which a philol-
ogist would put upon them .... What you 
should do is to place yourself as far as 
possible in his position, taking note of the 
facts and circumstances known to him at the 
time, and then say what he meant by his words. 
All this follows, I think, from the case in the 
House of Lords of Perrin v Morgan.l 
In Perrin v Morgan the House of Lords firmly 
rejected any fixed or "cast-iron" 2 meaning of the word 
"money". Their Lordships then took the opportunity 
afforded by that case to give their opinions on the rules 
of construction. They stated that the cardinal rule of 
99. Re Rowland @ pp. 840-841. 
1. [1943] A.C. 399. 
2. Per Viscount Simon L.C. @ p.406. 
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construction is that a will should be so construed as to 
give effect to the intention of the testator, such 
intention being gathered from the language of the will 
read in the light of the circumstances in which the will 
was made. Lord Romer stated: 3 
"In many of the cases to be found in the 
books the court is reported to have said 
that the construction it has put on a will 
has probably defeated the testator's 
intention. If this means, as it ought to 
mean, that the court entertains the strong 
suspicion to which I have just referred, 
[i.e. that the testator did not mean what he 
has plainly said] no sort of objection can 
be taken to it, but if it means that the 
court has felt itself prevented by some rule 
of construction from giving effect to what 
the language of the will, read in the light 
of the circumstances in which it was made, 
convinces it was the real intention of the 
testator, it has misconstrued the will. My 
Lords, I do not, of course, intend to suggest 
that well settled rules of construction are 
to be disregarded. On the contrary, I think 
that they should be strictly observed, but 
they ought to be applied in a reasonable way. 
It is, no doubt, of great importance to 
lawyers and others engaged in the preparation 
of wills that they should have the certainty 
of knowing that certain well-known words and 
phrases will receive from the court the mean-
ing that the court has for generations past 
attributed to them. Much confusion and 
uncertainty would be caused if this were not 
so. The rules of construction, in other 
words, should be regarded as a dictionary by 
which all parties, including the courts, are 
bound, but the court should not have recourse 
to this dictionary to construe a word or a 
phrase until it has ascertained from an exam-
ination of the language of the whole will, 
when read in the light of the circumstances, 
whether or not the testator has indicated his 
intention of using the word or the phrase in 
other than its dictionary meaning - whether 
3. Perrin v Morgan @ pp.420-421. 
or not, in other words, to use another 
familiar expression, the testator has been 
his own dictionary. I have thought it 
desirable to make these remarks, however 
elementary and obvious they may seem to be, 
as I have noticed in some of the reported 
cases on wills a tendency on the part of the 
court to pay more attention to the rules of 
construction than to the language of the 
testator." 
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Perrin v Morgan served to stem a tide of increasing 
strictness in the application of the rules of construct-
. 4 
lOll. Since that case, as indicated earlier, a more 
liberal judicial attitude has prevailed. 5 That attitude 
has gathered much support in the twenty years from the 
decision in Re Rowland to the present day. 
In the same year as Re Rowland> Buckley J. in 
Re James Will Trusts stated that: 6 
"This problem in one form or another has over 
the years begotten a large brood of judicial 
decisions, and it is tempting first to study 
those decisions in an attempt to distil a 
rule or series of rules of construction and 
then to proceed to apply such rule or rules 
to the present case. I think however that 
the better course to follow is first to 
consider the circumstances of the particular 
4. See, for example> Higgins v Dawson [1901] A.C. 1. 
5. See, for example, Re Manners (deceased) [1955] 1 W.L.R. 
1096 (per Upjohn J@ p.ll02); andRe Levy (deceased) 
[1960] 1 Ch.346 where Lord Evershed M.R. commented: 
(@ p.358) "If then, I have correctly construed the 
testator's will and discovered his intention, is there 
any good reason why effect should not be given to it? 
... I think there is not. I have said more than once 
that I do not accept the view that there is any rule of 
law which in such cases override intention .... " 
6 . [ 19 6 2 ] Ch . 2 2 6 @ p . 2 3 3 . 
case, and to try to discover the testator's 
intention without reference to authority, 
and thereafter to see whether a study of the 
reported decisions suggests any reasons for 
modifying whatever conclusion one may have 
reached." 
This statement clearly inclines towards the 
appellation of principles, rather than rules, of 
construction. It advocates a pragmatic approach to the 
construction of wills with an eagerness to give effect 
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to a testator's intention. A realisation that decisions 
failing to do the latter were becoming more prevalent, 
has, it is submitted, led the judiciary to do their 
utmost within the confines of the prevailing broad 
principles of construction to prevent the frequent 
occurrence of such events. Support for this view can be 
found in more recent cases. 
7 In Re Jehh, for example, (a unanimous decision) 
Lord Denning predictably reinforced the views he 
articulated in Re Rowland in these words: 8 
"In construing this will, we have to look at 
it as the testator did, sitting in his 
armchair, with all the circumstances known 
to him at that time. Then we have to ask 
ourselves: "What did he intend?" We 
ought not to answer this question by ref~ 
erence to any technical rules of law. 
Those technical rules too often led the 
courts astray in the construction of wills. 
Eschewing technical rules we look simply 
to see what the testator intended." 
7 . [ 19 6 6] 1 Ch. 6 6 6 . 
8. Ibid. @ p.672. 
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In Re Allsop (deceasedJ 9 that same judge stated even more 
boldly: 10 
"Eschewing technical rules and literal inter-
pretation you must look to see simply what 
the testator intended. If you find that a 
literal interpretation gives rise to a 
capricious result which you are satisfied 
the testator can never have intended then 
you should reject that interpretation and 
seek for a sensible interpretation which 
does accord with his intention." 
h W. 't' 11 h t d . T e 1gram Propos1 1ons are t us pu un er 1ntense 
12 fire, as are cases such as Higgins v Dawson which tended 
to follow the more literal interpretative process. Whether 
either the Propositions themselves or the case law of which 
they formed the basis have survived this latest judicial 
onslaught is much to be doubted. For the charge did not 
stop there. Harman L.J. remarked as follows in Re 
Henderson's Trusts. 13 
"Our predecessors at the Chancery Bar were 
much preoccupied with the construction of 
wills and in exploring that difficult 
country they were apt to leave signposts 
at the corners of the tortious lanes with 
which it abounds. These signposts they 
called rules of construction and their 
perfect resting-place is in M.R. Hawkins' 
classical volume entitled A Concise 
Treatise on the Construction of Wills ... 
9. [1962] Ch. 226 @ p.233. 
10. Ibid. @ p.47. 
11. See Appendix (infra) . 
12. [1902] A.C.l. 
13. [1969] 1 W.L.R. 651@ p.654. Although that case turned 
on the exclusion of the rule in Andrews v Partington 
(1791) 3 Bro. C.C. 401 it is submitted that Harman 
L.J's words are equally applicable to the construction 
of wills, and, therefore, pertinent in this context. 
[B)ut our generation ... has been less 
acquainted with them, partly I suppose 
because the incidence of estate duty has 
discouraged in testators the ambition to 
govern from the grave the fortunes of 
generations yet unborn, and partly because 
in the changing temper of opinion judges 
have been putting the search for a nicer 
justice above the certainty which observ-
ance of the rules supplies." 
This "search for a nicer justice" has led judges 
such as Latey J. and Templeman J. to take the probate 
14 jurisdiction on to unchartered waters. It can be 
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observed that a similar venture is being undertaken by the 
courts of construction in exploring the limits of that 
jurisdiction. 
In the past decade other judicial statements have 
served to erode even further the strict application of 
rules of construction in favour of the more liberal inter-
pretation of principles of construction. As Megarry J. 
remarked in Re Lawrence's Will Trusts: 15 
" 
its 
in the old phrase, every will stands on 
own bot tom. " 
And Lord Denning took the opportunity afforded by the case 
of Re Cohn> 16 which concerned the vesting of a gift made 
by will, to say: 17 
14. Supra p. 120. 
15. [1971] 3 All E.R. 433 @ p.448. 
16 . [ 19 7 4] 3 All E . R. 9 2 8 . 
17. Ibid. @ p.930. 
"What then is the court to do when an 
event occurs which the testator never 
had in mind and for which he never 
provided? Is it then to go by the 
literal meaning of the words? I 
think not. The judge should put himself 
in the testator's chair and seek to 
discover the testator's intention - on 
broad general lines - without too much 
reliance on the letter." 
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In the recent House of Lords' decision of 
Blathwayt v Lord Cawley 18 advocates of both approaches to 
construction were in evidence. The case concerned the 
proper construction of a forfeiture clause appearing in a 
testator's will. The clause in question declared that: 
"if any person who under the trusts 
hereof shall become entitled as 
tenant for life or tenant in tail male 
by purchase to the possession of [the 
settled property] shall (a) Be or 
become a Roman Catholic or (b) Disuse 
the surname and Arms of Blathwayt then 
and in either of such cases the estate 
hereby limited to him shall cease and 
determine and be utterly void and [the 
settled property] shall thereupon go to 
the person next entitled under the 
trusts hereinbefore declared in the same 
manner as if the person whose estate 
shall so cease shall determine and 
become void being a tenant for life were 
then dead or being a tenant in tail male 
were then dead, without issue inheritable 
under the estate tail." 
The only question of construction concerned whether the 
testator had intended by the clause to distinguish between 
sons born before and after the date of forfeiture. A 
strict approach led to such a result, a result which was 
found in both:~the High Court and the Court of Appeal. 
18. [1975] 3 All E.R. 625. 
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In the House of Lords,Lord Wilberforce and Lord Fraser 
approved the conclusion reached by the two lower courts. 
However Lord Cros~ supported by Lords Simon and Edmund-
Davies, took the view that it could not possibly have been 
the testator's intention to make such a distinction. At 
page 641 he said: 
"If the testator has said something 
clearly and unambiguously, one must 
give effect to it even though one may 
strongly suspect that he did not mean 
to say it. But the improbability of 
the testator having meant to draw a 
distinction between sons born before 
and sons born after a forfeiture of his 
life interest by their parent is at 
least a ground for looking at the 
language used very carefully to make 
sure that it does clearly and unambigu-
ously say what it is said to say." 
This brief journey through some of the more 
recent cases concerning construction depicts the law in a 
state of flux. The general starting-point, the rules (or 
principles) of construction, are agreed upon: their 
application, however, is much in dispute. From the 
reluctant decisions of judges feeling bound to apply 
rules despite their being at variance with the testator's 
intention to the more modern cases of judges doing their 
utmost to give effect to the testator's intention, some-
times even transgressing the limits of the rules, 19 
attitudes to the rules have undergone great changes. Now, 
it is submitted, it is fair to say that giving effect to 
19. See, for example, Day v Collins [1925] N.Z.L.R. 280. 
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the testator's intention as far as possible within the 
rules is of prime importance: not, it is to be noticed, 
applying the rules irrespective of the testator's 
intention. The difference between these apparently sim-
ilar approaches has led to a greater willingness on the 
part of judges to scrutinise testamentary documents 
together with admissible evidence and to stress the 
principle aspect of the so-called ''rules" of construction 
h h . th . 1 . 20 w en reac mg e1r cone us1ons. This approach is 
laudable. If a will is to serve as a means for the 
expression of a testator's intentions to take effect after 
his death, then, it is submitted, it ought, as far as 
possible, to be construed to do just that. The present 
judicial attitude acknowledges this and has made a 
supreme effort so to apply the rules and deal with the 
evidence as to give the ascertained intention of the 
testator every chance of prevailing. 
A drawback, nevertheless, still exists: 
namely, the limits of the rules themeselves. While the 
judiciary have changed in their attitude towards the rules 
and their application of them to give greater precedence 
to the testator's intention, they have succeeded in doing 
so within the confines of the rules themselves. They 
have swung away from a strict interpretative stance 
towards a more liberal one whilst still ac~epting tbe rules. 
20. See Dworkin op. cit. @ n.33. 
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It is submitted that short of changing the rules judges 
have done as much as they can to effect testators' 
intentions. Given that the present attitude cannot always 
construe a will as the testator intended21 the judiciary 
in such cases feel constrained to conclude against their 
inclinationp, and the ''search for a nicer justice" cannot 
be rewarded. The time has arrived when legislative action 
to alter the rules themselves ought to be considered. 
4. THE CASE FOR REFOru1 
In this chapter it has been seen that in the jur-
isdictions of both Courts of Probate and courts of 
construction inadequacies in the law are apparent. In 
the probate jurisdiction the powers of that court only to 
omit matter inserted by mistake and only then as long as 
the sense of that which remains is left unaltered has 
produced artificial distinctions in innovative case law. 
As regards the rules of construction, their application 
has been meted out with varying degrees of harshness until 
the present position of latitude was attained. In both 
courts a willingness to give effect to the testator's 
intention can be ascertained. And in both the impression 
is gained that the ultimate ability of the courts to do so 
within the extant rules has been reached. The question 
therefore is: Wherefore now? As yet, no answer has been 
21. Especially because of the limits on the introduction of 
direct evidence of intention. 
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given in legislative terms, however, proposals in England 
and Queensland offer some indication of the direction of 
the prospective "new departure". 
In the 19th Report of the English Law Reform 
Committee submitted in May 1973 two main areas of the law 
of wills were considered: namely, rectification and 
interpretation. 
both aspects: 
22 Although the Committee agreed that 
" ... merge indistinguishably into the fundamental 
problem of the proper extent of the court's power 
to decide on the effect of a will, as a matter 
of procedure they must to some extent be 
separated. " 
Which, then, was to come first? The conclusion reached23 
was that a court should have the power to add words first 
and then to ascertain what the words actually mean. This 
seems a logical approach since, if the court is satisfied 
that words have been omitted from the will, that is a 
fundamental defect which should be corrected, if possible, 
before any real attempt is made to construe the actual 
wording used. 
It is intended to discuss rectification, for its 
great potential in the Courts of Probate, first and then 
the Committee's recommendations as regards interpretat-
ion, the latter being of singular significance in courts 
of construction. 
22. At para. 15. 
23. At para. 16. 
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(i) Rectification. 
At paragraph 10 of its Report the Committee state: 
"It is not easy to perceive why the equitable 
doctrine of rectification does not apply to 
wills." 
The difficulty acknowledged, 24 however, was: in exactly 
what circumstances ought rectification to be permitted? 
The Committee identified five different cases where a will 
might fail to give accurate effect to a testator's 
' t ' 25 1n ent1on. They were: clerical error; misunderstand-
ing of the testator's instructions; failure by the 
testator to appreciate the effects of the words used; 
uncertainty, and lacuna. 
Of the first two situations the Committee recomm-
ended that it ought to be open to the court to rectify a 
will where it could be established first, that the will 
failed to embody the testator's instructions and, 
secondly, what those instructions were. As regards 
standard of proof, the test laid down in the Court of 
Appeal in Joscelyne v Nissen 26 of "convincing proof" 
would have to be satisfied. 
Of the third situation the Committee did not 
recommend that the remedy of rectification ought to be 
available. It took the view that such instances were more 
a matter of construction than rectification and concluded 
24. At para. 17. 
25. At paras 12-25. 
26. [1970] 2 Q.B. 86@ p.98. 
that: 27 
" we do not consider that rectification is 
an appropriate remedy where it cannot be 
shown that the words of the will are not 
those which the testator meant to use or 
intended to be used on his behalf. To go 
beyond that is to pass into the wider 
realm of the testator's purpose." 
The final two cases, of uncertainty and lacuna, 
were clearly excluded from any proposed remedy of rect-
ification because both, if they were to be remedied, 
effectively involved making the testator's will for him. 
The Committee's opinion was that these recomm-
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endations would allow the doctrine of rectification to be 
applied to wills on the same footing as it applied to 
other instruments. Thus the exclusion of the third 
situation was justified: 28 
" ... there can be no rectification of a contract 
if it correctly embodies the words agreed upon 
by the parties even if there was some mis-
apprehension as to the meaning or effect of 
those words." 
Likewise, explaining the exclusion of the fourth and 
fifth situations from their recommendations, there could 
b t 'f' t' 29 e no rec 1 1ca 1on: 
" ... where the true intention was unascertain-
able or non-existent." 
The Committee further recommended that any relevant 
evidence, including evidence relating to the testator's 
instructions to his solicitor for the preparation of his 
27. At para 23. 
28. At para 25. 
2 9. Ibid. 
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will, should be admissible and that reading the will over 
to the testator was one of the factors to which the court 
would have to pay attention, but that it should have no 
conclusive effect. 30 Finally, it was recommended that 
no action for rectification should be brought after 6 
months from the date on which representation was first 
granted, except with the leave of the court. 31 
These recommendations are much to be welcomed, 
although they seem to have been greeted with something 
less than enthusiasm by the legislature in England. 32 
Rectification is a remedy which would provide the Court 
of Probate with a much more effective method of dealing with 
clerical errors and misunderstandings of the testator's 
instructions than exist at present.Were such recommendat-
ions to be adopted it is to be hoped that the complicated 
common law in this area, discussed in the foregoing 
chapter, could be much more simply and satisfactorily 
dealt with than has been the case to date. Any changes 
in this area must balance the rationale for the ekistence 
of the Wills Act formalities against the desire to give 
effect to the testator's real intention. To allow a 
testator's oral intention to override completely the 
terms of his will would subvert the Wills Act. On the 
other hand, to fail to effect his intention by correcting 
30. At paras 30-31; and see supra pp. 98-122. 
31. At para 32. 
32. To date they have not been acted upon. 
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a mistake seems to be giving the fear of subversion an 
exaggerated significance. A balance between these 
extremes can, and must, be found. To allow rectification 
on limited grounds, it is submitted, is an equitable 
solution: it ensures that the Wills Act formalities still 
have relevance but it allows a latitude in remedy once 
the grounds for rectification (specified in the Report) 
have been proved. Thus the law of mistake appears to be 
ridding itself of the clogging distinctions and difficult-
ies by which it has been bound for so long. 
Whilst the reasons for the exclusion of the third 
situation (failure to appreciate the effects of the words 
used) from the ambit of the proposed remedy of rectific-
ation is appreciated, it is submitted that that is an 
area where rectification could potentially be a much used 
remedy. It is also, however, a situation which falls very 
much in the middle of the balance: it could be construed 
as rendering the Wills Act meaningless in the cause of 
giving effect to the testator's intention. The law does 
not seem ready to take that step although,it is submitted, 
that that ought to be the eventual outcome of reforms in 
this field. 
The exclusion of uncertainty and lacunae are 
predictable. The general reception of evidence and the 
Committee's view of reading a will over to the testator 
are welcome, the latter according with the common law as 
indicated in the previous chapter. The time limit is 
unobjectionable as the need for certainty is of prime 
importance in such cases, both from the beneficiaries' 
and the personal representatives' points of view. 
These recommendations are needed to relieve the 
Courts of Probate from a mass of fine distinctions, 
tortuous reasoning and limited powers. Giving effect 
to the testator's intention is an aspiration of increas-
ing importance. The use of the remedy of rectification 
will go some way to attaining this objective. It is 
therefore to be hoped that our legislature will see fit 
to adopt these proposals and give legislative support to 
judges like Latey J. and Templeman J. who have found it 
necessary to take the initiative in overcoming the 
inadequacies of the present law themselves. 
Before leaving the subject of rectification it is 
33 pertinant to mention the Queensland proposals in this 
regard. In its 1978 Report the Queensland Law Reform 
Commission recommended the introduction of the following 
draft provisions into Queensland succession law: 
"31. Power of Court to rectify wills. (1) As 
from the commencement of th1s Act the Court 
shall have the same jurisdiction to insert 
in the probate copy of a will material which 
was incidentally or inadvertently omitted 
from the will when it was made as it has 
hitherto exercised to omit from the probate 
copy of a will material which was accident-
ally or inadvertently inserted in the will 
when it was made. 
(2) Unless the Court otherwise directs no 
application shall be heard by the Court to 
have inserted in or omitted from the probate 
copy of a will material which was accident-
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33. Queensland Law Reform Commission Report No. 22 (1978). 
ally or inadvertently omitted from or 
inserted in the will when it was made unless 
proceedings for such application are instit-
uted before or within six months after the 
date of the grant in Queensland." 
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This provision does not purport to go nearly as far 
as the English proposals. A certain apprehensiveness can 
be ascertained on the part of the Queensland Commission as 
regards the Report of their English counterparts. Comment-
ing that, although in favour of the English recommendations 
"we are hesitant to embark on what would be completely 
34 
uncharted waters", the Queenslanders tip their balance 
much more on the side of ensuring no subversion of the 
Wills Act formalities than on the side of giving effect 
to the testator's intention. The existence of their draft 
provision 31, however, indicates their acceptance that 
there is a serious problem to be overcome in this area, 
witnessed by their statement that "[t]he need for reform 
is well illustrated by the recent case of Re Morris". 35 
The Commission describe the Court of Probate's powers of 
omission as an unjustifiable anomaly, and continue 36 
"It is, therefore, proposed to remove this 
anomaly by enabling the court to exercise 
the same jurisdiction with respect to the 
insertion of material accidentally or in-
advertently omitted from a will as it has 
at present to omit material which has been 
accidentally or inadvertently inserted in 
a will." 
34. Ibid. @ p.l9. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. @ p.20. 
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The Commission apprehends that a prospective litigant 
utilising draft provision 31 would have to show not only 
that material had been accidentally or inadvertently 
omitted from the will, but also what that material was. 
It is thought unlikely that the court would entertain 
general evidence of the testator's supposed intention; 
and that, in practice, the kind of evidence which would 
be necessary to make good a claim would be of such 
matters as the form of the testator's instructions to his 
solicitors, failures to relay instructions accurately, 
and errors made by clerks or typists. A limitation 
period is provided in the interests of certainty for all 
parties. 
The Queensland provision is a step in the right 
direction but it does not go far enough. Rectification 
in the other areas of mistake cbvered by the foregoing 
chapter and by the English provisions would not, it is 
submitted, challenge the authority or supremacy of the 
Wills Act to the degree envisaged, and feared, by the 
Queensland Commission. Rather, it is submitted, the 
Queensland provision reflects too much the strict view 
of past eras which eventually contributed almost entirely 
to the present problems. The solution, it is submitted, 
is to be found in allowing the Wills Act formalities to 
exist whilst, at the same time, permitting as much 
latitude as possible to be accorded the testator's 
intention. By that means the formalities will be prevented 
from operating to thwart the testator's intentions (as has 
happened in some cases) and can be seen to be receptive 
to the attitudes of the changing times. In this light, 
it is contended that the Queensland proposals will be 
found wanting and that the English recommendations 
ought to be adopted. 
(ii) Interpretation. 
The question of interpretation caused the 
Committee more difficulty: 37 
"It is easy enough to observe, at least in 
theory, the defects of the present law. 
Apart from being unclear, it is open to 
charges of inconsistency and anomaly. It 
is, however, we think, virtually impossible 
to produce rules of law which will result 
in every case in the real, as distinct from 
the expressed, wishes of the testator being 
carried out." 
The Committee based its recommendations on the 
38 
understanding that two propositions were agreed upon: 
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namely, first, that the requirement of the law that a will 
must be) in writing ought to be maintained, subject to the 
existing exceptions. Secondly, that as far as is con-
sistent with the maintenance of the requirement of writing, 
the function of the court in interpreting a will is to 
search for the true meaning which the testator intended his 
words to bear. 
37. Law Reform Committee Report para 34. 
38. At para 35. 
The Committee were unanimous in agreeing that the 
1 t t . th . 1 39 present aw as se ou 1n e W1gram Ru es was 
inadequate and that40 
" ... the time has come to abolish the Wigram 
Rules and replace them by a more 
comprehensive formula." 
The Committee recommended that extrinsic evidence ought 
to be generally admitted, and in two circumstances in 
particular. First, to establish the special meaning or 
significance which the testator was accustomed to attach 
to any word, name or expression used in the wi11. 41 
They regarded this proposal as being an extension of the 
"dictionary principle", 42 and commented: 43 
"The ultimate purpose of construing a will 
is acknowledged to be to give effect to 
the wishes of the testator. Having first 
rectified the will so as to ensure that 
the language is that which the testator 
intended to use, there seems no reason 
not to take the further step of discover-
ing, by all means available, what those 
words conveyed to him." 
3 9. See Appendix,~ It can be seen from the discussion 
at p.l77 that these Rules have not been adhered to 
strictly. 
40. At para 46. 
41. At paras 41-43. 
42. At para 43. 
43. At para 41. 
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Secondly, the Committee recommended that extrinsic evid-
ence be admissible to establish as well as resolve any 
equivocation in a will, notwithstanding that the ambig-
uity is not apparent in the fact of the wil1. 44 Thus a 
45 decision like Higgins v Dawson could be avoided, and 
one like Day v Collins 46 justified. 
Both of these recommendations are to be welcomed. 
In both areas, despite straining by the judiciary, 47 
testators' intentions can often not be carried out. 
By proposing such changes to the present law it is to be 
hoped that the courts of construction will be able to 
effect testators' intentions with considerably more 
ease, yet, at the same time, without detracting from the 
requirements of the Wills Act. 
Over the question of whether this general admiss-
ion of extrinsic evidence ought to encompass direct 
evidence of the testators' dispositive intent the 
Committee disagreed. A majority of eight considered that 
such evidence should be admissible, as at present, only 
1 . . 48 to reso ve an equ1vocat1on. A minority of five 
considered that there was: 49 
44. At paras 44-45. 
45. [1902] A.C.l. 
46. [1925] N.Z.L.R. 280. 
47. For example in Higgins v Dawson supra n.45. 
48. Supra p.l78. 
49. At para 55. 
" ... no justification, either in theory or in 
practice, for making a special exception for 
direct evidence of the testator's dispositive 
intention." 
The minority would, therefore, admit all extrinsic 
evidence in every case. 
The reasons for the majority view50 were that to 
allow such evidence would go beyond that admissible for 
other written instruments; that many unmeritorious 
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claimants would "have a go" at wills, thereby eroding the 
confidence of testators and their advisers and possibly 
delaying the administration of estates; and that it 
would be difficult for the court to weigh direct evidence 
of the testator's intention, since the question would 
involve the testator's veracity, clarity of purpose and 
consistency quite as much as the reliability of the 
witnesses. 
As to the first, whilst its truth is conceded it 
may be that the peculiar nature of wills calls for 
unique rules to be made in respect of them. The other 
two criticisms, it is submitted, could quite adequately 
be dealt with by experienced courts which might well 
prefer that type of problem (should it arise) to those 
arising from the present rules of construction. In any 
event as the minority pointed out51 information received 
from other jurisd,ictions demonstrates that full admiss-
ibility works well and that there is little likelihood of 
50. At para 54. 
51. At para 59. 
a judge not being able to deal with such problems 
adequately: 5 2 
"To abolish all exclusionary rules of evidence 
in this field would accord with the general 
trend of modern judicial policy and with the 
full force and logic of the arguments of the 
majority. Wills have long been construed by 
judges and not juries so the distinction 
between the admissibility of evidence and 
the weight to be attached to it are in small 
danger of being overlooked or misunderstood. 
The law could be reformulated with extreme 
simplicity ... without difficult and anomalous 
exceptions and with the maximum likelihood of 
doing justice in disputed cases." 
The minority favoured the introduction of a 
principle similar to that embodied in section 90 of the 
Republic of Ireland's Succession Act 1965 which 
provides that53 
"Extrinsic evidence shall be admissible to 
show the intention of the testator and to 
assist in the construction of, or to 
explain any contradiction in, a will." 
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They were careful to point that, however, that such direct 
evidence should not be set up against the plain words of 
the will itself. In other words, the balance between 
the Wills Act and the testator's intention ought to be 
maintained: the latter not being allowed to overcome the 
former rendering it of no effect. As in the case of 
rectification, for such evidence to be admitted there must 
be some ground recognised by law which must be satisfied 
first: namely, a legitimate dispute about the language 
52. Ibid. 
53. At para 55. 
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of the will. Any other view would jeopardise the position 
of the Wills Act requirements, requirements which 
( 1 h h ' d f ' 54 ) d 1' h a t oug 1n nee o some repa1r o accomp 1s a 
difficult task well. 
It is submitted that the minority view is the 
preferable one. If the courts are to be charged with 
the task of ascertaining what the testator intended to 
be the effect of the words used in his will, then they 
ought to be entitled to look at any material which has 
probative value and decide on what weight to attach to 
it. Evidence of the testator's dispositive intent must 
be the single most important piece of evidence constit-
uting the "surrounding circumstances" of a will. It 
seems anomalous, therefore, that it should be the very 
item that is excluded. The courts have had a sufficient 
history of dealing with construction cases to be able to 
sift and weigh evidence on the scales ofa nicer justice 
with good effect. Such a proposal does not seek to 
undermine the Wills Act (only being admissible in cases 
of legitimate dispute about the language of the will): it 
merely seeks to redress the balance of testators' 
intentionsvis-a-vis the Wills Act formalities to an even 
keel. To deny that reveals an unwarranted reluctance to 
place legislative faith in the judiciary. To facilitate 
the introduction of the proposal would be to bring some 
54. See, generally, Chapter 1. 
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semblance of order to a field in much disarray. Justice 
could then be achieved according to principles, not 
despite them. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Of the proposals for reform discussed, it is 
submitted that the English ones are the more commendable. 
The introduction of the remedy of rectification into our law 
would be a welcome panacea for at least some of the ills 
contemplated in the previ01s chapter. Worthwhile thought 
may, however, be gi~en to extending a wider scope to the 
remedy were it to be introduced into New Zealand probate 
law. It is submitted, for example, that although the 
English Committee rejected extending the remedy to the 
situation where a testator fails to appreciate the effects 
of the words used, in many such cases rectification could be 
the best method of effecting the testators' intentions. 
55 As the previous chapter revealed, the relevant common law 
is clearly in an unsatisfactory state. 
To introduce rectification as a possible remedy, 
however, excites opposition from adherents of the argument 
that the Wills Act will thereby be rendered meaningless. 
This need not be so. If a more liberal stance were taken 
in respect of the relaxation of formalities (as advocated 
55. Supra pp. 122-124. 
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in Chapter 1) coupled with a greater effort to effect 
testators' intentions (whilst not detracting from the 
rationale of the formalities), then, a closely monitored 
use of the remedy would be beneficial and far-reaching 
rather than dangerous and unwise. 
As regards the English proposals for the admission 
of extrinsic evidence general admission, particularly in 
the cases of special meanings of words and equivocations, 
is laudable and necessary to relieve the present pressure 
caused by difficult, variously-applied rules of 
construction. Whether direct evidence of testators' 
dispositive intent ought also to be admitted produced a 
d . . . . h . th . tt 56 1V1s1on w1t 1n e Comm1 ee. It is submitted that 
the minority view favouring admission is to be preferred. 
It was contended in Chapter 1 that formalities ought 
to be reduced to a minimum consistent with their rationale 
being satisfied. One reason for that view was that, 
thereby, more testators' intentions would not be frustrated 
on account ofa mere technical defect. The position of 
importance accorded testators' intentions in that part of 
the law should not be eroded in this. Consistency, and the 
search for "a nicer justice" demands the general admission 
of testators' dispositive intent within the framework of a 
less rigorous insistence on the formalities of s.9. 
Legislative action and judicial creativity would then be 
united, not opposed: a combination which must surely 
56. Supra pp. 202-205. 
be a fruitful one for the attainment of testators' 
intentions in this area of the law of succession. 
It is to be hoped that such alterations in the 
existing law will be realised without further delay. 
oOo 
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APPENDIX 
THE WIGRAM PROPOSITIONS 
1. A testator is always presumed to use the words in 
which he expresses himself, according to their strict and 
primary acceptation, unless, from the context of the will, 
it appears that he has used them in a different sense, in 
which case the sense in which he thus appears to have used 
them, will be the sense in which they are to be construed. 
2. Where there is nothing in the context of a will from 
which it is apparent that a testator has used the words in 
which he has expressed himself in any other than their 
strict and primary sense, and where his words so interpreted 
are sensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, it 
as an inflexible rule of construction, that the words of the 
will shall be interpreted in their strict and primary sense, 
and in no other, although they may be capable of some 
popular or secondary interpretation, and although the most 
conclusive evidence of intention to use them in such popular 
or secondary sense be tendered. 
3. Where there is nothing in the context of a will, from 
which it is apparent that a testator has used the words in 
which he has expressed himself in any other than their 
strict and primary sense, but his words, so interpreted, 
are insensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, a 
Court of Law may look into the extrinsic circumstances of 
the case, to see whether the meaning of the words be sensible 
in any popular or secondary sense, of which, with reference 
to these circumstances,they are capable. 
4. Where the characters in which a will is written are 
difficult to be deciphered, or the language of the will is 
not understood by the Court, the evidence of persons 
skilled in deciphering writing, or who understand the 
language in which the will is written, is admissible to 
declare what the characters are, or to inform the Court of 
the proper meaning of the words. 
5. For the purpose of determining the object of·a 
testator's bounty, or the subject of disposition, or the 
quantity of interest intended to be given by his will, a 
Court may inquire into every material fact relating to the 
person who claims to be interested under the will, and to 
the property which is claimed as the subject of disposition, 
and to the circumstances of the testator, and of his family 
and affairs, for the purpose of enabling the Court to 
identify the person or thing intended by the testator, or 
to determine the quantity of interest he has given by his 
will. The same (it is conceived) is true of every other 
disputed point, respecting which it can be shewn that a 
knowledge of extrinsic facts can, in any way, be made 
ancillary to the right interpretation of a testator's words. 
6. Where the words of a will, aided by evidence of the 
material facts of the case, are insufficient to determine 
the testator's meaning, no evidence will be admissible to 
prove what the testator intended, and the will (except in 
certain special cases, see Prop. 7) will be void for 
uncertainty. 
7. Notwithstanding the Rule of Law, which makes a will 
void for uncertainty, where the words, aided by evidence 
of the material facts of the case, are insufficient to 
determine the testator's meaning - Courmof Law, in 
certain special cases, admit extrinsic evidence of 
intention to make certain the person or thing intended, 
where the description in the will is insufficient for the 
purpose. These cases may be thus defined:-~ where the 
object of a testator's bounty~ or the subject of dispos-
ition (namely, the person or thing intended), is 
described in terms which are applicable indifferently to 
more than one person or thing, evidence is admissible to 
prove which of the persons or things so described was 
intended by the testator. 
